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BILL T. ARNOLD 
Biblical Perspectives on Torture: War Crime~ the 
Lzmzts of RetaliatIOn, and the Roman Cross 
Our concept of "torture" has a narrow and generally accepted definition as 
the "infliction of severe bodily pain, as punishment or a means of 
persuasion."1 The Bible has no exact equivalent, and if we limit our discussion 
to this definition, we might too quickly conclude the Bible has little if anything 
to say directly about torture. This is so because the Bible's lexical specifics have 
broader connotations. Words translated "oppress" or "torment" have 
semantic domains close to our meaning of "torture," but not precisely 
equivalent.2 Thus the standard Bible dictionaries and encyclopedias are more 
likely to have entries on "crime and punishment" than "torture," and these 
have quite different themes to cover. On the other hand, if we define "torture" 
as the use of excessive physical or mental pain against one's enemy combatant 
or against innocent victims of armed conflict - what we might today call "war 
crimes" - then the Bible has plenty to say about this topic. Although the Old 
Testament does not contain large numbers of texts for us to consider, it has 
important passages in Deuteronomy and Amos pertinent to this theme, as 
well as scattered texts in the legal corpora. The New Testament, of course, 
presents the most vivid symbol of torture in human history in the form of 
the Roman crosS. 
The Old Testament contains passages that reflect the horrors of wartime 
torture, especially by prohibiting Israel from engaging in such inhumane acts 
or in condemning such actions in Israel's neighbors.3 The most important of 
these texts comes from the book of Deuteronomy, which establishes (1) 
rules for conducting the war of conquest, when Israel entered the Promised 
Land and defeated the seven nations (sometimes six are listed) inhabiting the 
land (Deut 7: 1-26), as well as (2) rules for ordinary warfare conducted after the 
settlement against enemies outside the Promised Land (Deut 20: 1-20; 21: 1 0-
14, and cf. also 23:9-14; 24:5). With regard to the war of conquest, the famously 
difficult concept of "devotion to destruction" (/:lerem) seems impossible to 
interpret for today's readers. Such a ban prohibiting personal consumption 
4 
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or the taking ofplunder is attested elsewhere in the ancient Near East, but in 
Israel it applies only to the war of conquest! \X/hen the Promised Land 
becomes Israel's, its inhabitants are devoted to Yahweh as a sacrifice in order 
to make the land itself holy and suitable for Yahweh's presence. \XJe cannot 
address the admittedly perplexing questions raised by this feature of the Old 
Testament in this brief paper.s It is enough to observe that the command 
and practice of exercising such a ban of destruction is limited to Israel's wars 
of conquest. It is the rules for ordinary warfare that hold promise for insight 
into our topic, to which we now turn. 
The paradigmatic passages prescribing how Israel is to view warfare 
generally, Deut 20:1-20 and 21:10-14, occur in a series of legal texts (Deut 12-
26).' Their placement here aligns them with the Sixth Commandment, the 
prohibition of murder,? and thus they generally take up the topic of limitations 
on the taking of human life and shedding of innocent blood. The debate 
between pacifism or "non-violence" versus just war or "justifiable warfare" 
theory is another topic beyond the scope of this paper, so it is enough at this 
juncture to observe that Deuteronomy makes the assumption that Israel, 
once settled in the Promised Land, will live in a world in which war against 
external enemies is inevitable.s And so Deut20:1-20 and 21:1O-14Iay down 
strict guidelines for the conduct of warfare. 
Deuteronomy is first aware that wartime becomes an occasion for events 
or experiences that simply ought not to be so. Terror or panic should not 
become the prevailing principle for Israelite warriors, even before a superior 
military force, because Yahweh himself does battle for them (20:3-4). More 
specifically, the builder of a new house should not fail to dedicate it himself 
because he has been killed in battle (20:5), nor should the planter of a vineyard 
fail to enjoy its fruit because he has become a casualty of war (20:6). E,-\ually 
tragic is the young man who fails to marry his fiancee because he has fallen in 
battle (20:7). We see from these guidelines that Israel's principles for engaging 
the enemy in warfare are efforts to avoid whatever seems inhumane or unfair, 
in these cases, for Israelite warriors. Similarly, the next paragraph lays down 
rules for besieging cities that are not numbered among the inhabitants of 
Canaan (20:10-15). While enemy peoples within the boundaries of the 
Promised Land are to be annihilated during the war of conquest, any city 
outside the boundaries are to be offered terms of peace prior to the conflict 
(20:10). If they accept the terms, they are spared although reduced to forced 
labor. Othelwise, all males are to be exterminated, while the women, children, 
livestock, and other possessions may be taken as booty. The law thus 
establishes a means for waging peace instead of war wherever possible, and 
then restricts the extent to which Israel can plunder its enemies. 
The last paragraph of Deuteronomy 20 censures gratuitous destruction 
of trees, and especially protects the fruit trees of Israel's enemies (20:19-20).9 
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Fruit trees served a central feature in ancient life-support systems, taking 
many years to mature and requiring long-term care and cultivationY' The 
rhetorical question - "Are trees in the field human beings cilat they should 
come under siege from you?" - draws focus to ilie human tragedy when the 
area's ecosystem is ruined, and therefore condemns the "scorched-eardl policy" 
so frequent in warfare of all periods, Israel is not permitted to employ a 
military tactic that leaves behind a mined ecosystem and deprives future 
inhabitants of the area of a viable life-support system. 
A tlnal concern of Deuteronomy's laws of warfare is the humane 
treatment of captives (21:10-14). The passage assumes a scenario in which 
Yahweh has granted victory to Israel against an outside enemy. If an Israelite 
soldier is attracted to a woman captured from the vanquished enemy, he is 
not only prohibited from raping her, as so often happens in warfare, but he 
must accord her proper rites of mourning for her losses, provide time for her 
to become fully integrated into Israelite society and culture, and make her a 
full wife, equal in status to any ociler wives. Furthermore, she will be protected 
under ilie same rules of divorce that pertain to Israelite wives. The central 
concern here is for ilie dignity of prisoners of war, and especially captured 
women. 
Tn sum, the laws of warfare in Deuteronomy do not address criteria for 
going to war (ius ad bellum) but are exclusively devoted to proper conduct 
of the war (ius in bello). This does not mean Deuteronomy provides a 
precise manual of military rules, for we tlnd nothing here of weaponry, tleld 
tactics, or overall stratagems. Instead, Deuteronomy's military laws provide 
limitations on inhumanity in times of warfare. The book of Deuteronomy 
urges its readers to tlnd "avenues of compassion, human concern, and care 
of ilie natural order in the midst of the death and destruction" endemic to 
warY As this may relate to ilie question of torture in our contemporary 
context, it may be said that Deuteronomy establishes a principle of restrain!, 
including fairness and concern for the well-being of those who must conduct 
the war, protection of the environment, and civility for noncombatant 
captives. Taken together these laws "bespoke a humanitarian idealism that 
sought to hold in check military abandon," including wanton destructiveness 
and cruelty.12 
Beyond cile specific laws of war fowld in Deuteronomy, ilie Old Testament 
has other passages here and there that reveal a concern for compassion and 
humaneness in ilie conduct of war. Perhaps most striking in this regard is the 
list of war-crimes detailed in the condemnation of Israel's neighbors in 
Amos 1-2. Other prophetic books contain oracles against the nations (d. Isa 
13-23; Jer 46-51; and Ezek 25-32), but Amos's are unique in several ways. 
Nowhere else does a prophetic book b(I!,in wiili the oracles against the nations, 
nor organize them around a recurring rhetorical formula so systematically as 
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Amos, nor use that formula to compare and contrast the sins of Judah and 
Israel with the other nations. It is doubtful whether these oracles were ever 
actually intended to be addressed to the nations in view, but instead their sins 
and punishments are intended to be lessons for the Israelite audience. 
The crimes of the nations are war crimes and general atrocities against 
humanity. There was nothing so elaborate as the Geneva Convention in 
antiquity, nor even anything like the rules of chivalry of medieval warfare. Yet 
Amos assumes the right to appeal to principles of conduct that he believes all 
nations oughtto accept. 13 Where they fail to live up to the international common 
ethos, they become responsible for their own "transgressions" (pesa" a 
particularly strong word for "sins"), we might say based on natural or general 
revelation. Thus, the Phoenicians, Philistines, Moabites, etc., are responsible 
for their war crimes, just as Israel and Judah are for their failure to maintain a 
just society, although the responsibility of other nations is more generally 
assumed rather than specifically related to the Torah of Yahweh. These crimes 
against humanity are not mentioned in regard to Judah and Israel, not because 
they were never guilty of them, but because they were held to a higher standard, 
a standard of law and revelation.!4 The nations must answer for their sins, 
but Yahweh uses a different standard than that for Israel and Judah, who are 
responsible for Torah observance and the social welfare of all in their 
kingdoms. Thus, Amos 1-2 uses the rhetorical formula to compare and 
contrast the sins of the nations with those of Judah and Israel. 
For our purposes in this brief survey, we limit our discussion to the 
crimes of Damascus, Gaza, Tyre, Edom, Ammon, and Moab. These are 
condemned because they are guilty of crimes that may in general be described 
as unchecked militarism. In the specific crimes of Israel's and Judah's neighbors 
in Amos 1:3 - 2:3, this includes inhuman treatment of captives, exiling 
defeated populations, cruel treatment of innocent noncombatants, and 
unrestrained violence against one's enemies. 
1 :3, Damascus "threshed Gilead with threshing sledges of iron" 
1 :6, Gaza "carried into exile entire communities, to hand them over 
to Edom" 
1:9, Tyre "delivered entire communities over to Edom" 
1:11, Edom "pursued his brother with the sword and cast off all 
pity; he maintained his anger perpetually, and kept his 
wrath forever" 
I :13, Ammon "ripped open pregnant women in Gilead in order to 
enlarge d,eir t<:rritory" 
2: 1, Moab "burned to lime the bones of the king of Edom" 
The precise erime of the Arameans of Damascus against Israel's holdings in 
Gilead is not entirely clear. Such sledges may have been low-hanging wagons 
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with teeth or spikes of flint or iron underneath for dragging across ears of 
harvested grain on a threshing floor, and some have assumed they were used 
in antiquity as a torturous method of executing POW s. However, there is no 
evidence from the ancient Near East of such use and it appears more likely 
that we have here a "metaphor for the savage conquest of a territory."15 Both 
Gaza and Tyre were guilty of exiling "entire communities," most likely 
denoting the capmring and selling into captivity the populations of conquered 
towns or villages. Neo-Assyrian rulers, followed to a lesser extent by their 
Neo-Babylonian successors, routinely used the exile of populations, which 
were resettled and often pressed into slavery. Edom's crime was a failure to 
restrain anger during wartime, yielding instead to wanton and merciless killing. 
Ammon's atrocity is perhaps most frightening of all, in an atrempt to wipe 
out the enemy's future by killing pregnant women. Moab's crime, that of 
desecrating a royal tomb, although sounding less severe, is perhaps more 
telling because it illustrates the point that these are general crimes against 
humanity, involving common decency that it was assumed all peoples should 
knOw. The violation of tombs was a dreaded sacrilege in antiquity, and graves 
were routinely protected by curses.16 The act of removing and burning bones 
would reflect a belief that doing so inflicted more harm on the dead than 
could be done to the perpetrator by the protective curse. "Such a risky act 
must have been motivated by intense vindictiveness."17 This table of war 
crimes reflects what we may assume were widely accepted forms of warfare, 
which the prophet could assume all would know - a sort of "international 
customary law" or "common ethos" of agreed upon conventions and accepted 
norms of conduct.18 
Beyond these proscriptions against inhumane acts of violence during 
wartime, Old Testament legal texts famously establish talionic punishments, 
including "life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth," and so on, continuing 
with hand, foot, burn, wound, and stripe (Exod21:23-25; cf. also Lev 24:19-
20, Deut 19:21). The practice was also an innovation in Old Babylonian law 
of the early second millennium Be, which almost certainly illustrates its 
origins in early semi-nomadic Amorite practices and suggests an historical 
link between Babylonian and Israelite law. 19 Although the idea seems barbaric 
to readers today, the purpose of the lex talionis ("the law of retaliation'') was 
to establish limitations on vengeance and vindictive punishment. The idea 
was to match the punishment to the crime precisely, limiting vindictiveness 
and preventing unjust and cruel punishment. Jesus, of course, acknowledges 
and transcends the talionic principle in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 5:38-
39; and cf. 7:12 and Luke 6:31) but in general, the Greco-Roman world of the 
fIrst century was no improvement on it. This leads us to turn briefly to the 
New Testament for insight on this topic, in which we fInd few passages 
specilically devoted to "torture." Instead we fInd at its theological core perhaps 
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the most famous symbol of cruel and tortuous punishment - the Roman 
cross, which transgresses well beyond the preventive protections of the Old 
Testament's lex talionis. Death by crucifixion for a Rabbi guilty of teaching 
submission to the Roman Emperor but accused of insurrection is certainly 
an example of disproportionate punishment and demonstrates that the 
Israelite ideal of limited retaliation institutionalized in the talionic principle 
would have been an improvement over Roman practices. 
The Roman cross is itself perhaps the ultimate symbol of the inhumanity 
of humans or the extent to which one human being can torture and maim 
another beyond all reasonable limits. We have archaeological evidence for 
crucifixion in the first century AD, which provides illuminating details of its 
procedures and excruciating results.20 We know that the practice has origins in 
the ancient Near East prior to the Romans, most crediting the Persians with 
inventing it as a mode of execution.2! If the Roman practice of cross-beam 
crucifixion is to be found in Persian execution by impalement, we even have 
reference to this practice in late biblical times (Ezra 6: 11).22 Simple impalement 
on stakes was also a favored form of public execution used by the Assyrians, 
most famously illustrated by the Neo-Assyrian siege of Lachish in 701 BC, 
for which we have a graphic series of reliefs from the palace of Sennacherib 
showing POWs impaled on stakes near the city walls to demoralize the 
conquered foe, while other POWs were stripped and flayed (for the biblical 
account, see 2 Kgs 18:13-17; 2 Chr 32:9;Jer 34:7).23 Sowe conclude that while 
the practice has its origins in the early first millennium BC, the Roman 
innovators were dissatisfied with how quickly the victims died and presumably 
wanted a way to prolong the suffering and the effect of the public spectacle. 
Thus they devised the now familiar method of affixing the victim on the 
stake, supported by the cross-beam, and prolonging the agony with as much 
pain and ignominy as possible, as an example of what happens to those who 
oppose Roman might. The Roman cross has become the ultimate symbol of 
the world's ability to torture, and serves as a reminder of Assyrian, Babylonian, 
Persian, Greek, and Roman institutional torture. But signiflcandy, the New 
Testament's portrait of that same cross has transformed this cruelest form of 
torture, by the grace of God, into a symbol of love and grace for millions of 
believers around the globe and through the ages. So we close these brief 
reflections on torture in the Bible by celebrating a theology that moves from 
one of the vilest forms of inhumane torture - the Roman cross - to the 
sublimest of all expressions of forgiveness - the cross of Christ. 
Bill Arnold is professor of Old Testament and semitic languages at Asbury 
Theological Seminary in Wilmore, Kentucky. 
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M1CHAEL PASQU~,\REIlO 
Heard Atry Good Sermons on Torture LatelY? 
\YJhen I set out to write this essay I thought it might be interesting to 
survey and compare sermons that have recently been preached on the subject 
of torture. While some preachers have addressed tills moral issue as a matter 
of serious concern for Christians, I think it is safe to say that the vast majority 
of pastors in America have chosen to remain silcnt. Perhaps a more appropriate 
title for this essay might be, "Why have we not heard any good sermons on 
torture lately?" 
Fleming Rutledge, an evangelical Episcopalian who spends the majority 
of her time in a ministry of itinerant preaching and evangelism, speaks from 
the perspective provided by the Gospel in addressing the moral issue of 
torture. 
it is time to make the transition from American values to 
the universal Christian gospel. From the standpoint of Christ 
Jesus, any talk of 'deserving' [the grace of God] is treacherous 
territory. Everybody seems to love tlle hymn ~\rnazing Grace,' 
but not everybody understands what it means .. Amazing 
grace can be understood fully only from the standpoint of the 
Christian gospel. The teaclllng of] esus about love for enemes 
makes no sense if it is detached from his death and resurrection. 
If it were not for Good Friday and Easter, we would be justitled 
in putting his teachings in a nice gilded box that we could bring 
out for admiration on ceremonial occasions and kept respectfully 
on a shelf the rest of the time.! 
Rutledge rightly states that, because of the Gospel, we cannot make] esus 
into a nice religious teacher, of either conservative or liberal leanings, as many 
have done in our time. Wben the cross is detached from his life and ministry 
we are unable to take his teaching seriously as a way of being and living given 
form by God. This is because the Christian faith rests on a unique, unrepeatable 
event that has fundamentally altered the way we understand reality. "The 
cross shows us that in Christ Jesus we see God exchanging his divine life for 
the life of his enemies."2 
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The questions raised by Rutledge challenge us to begin thinking about 
torture within the vision of reality given by the Gospel ofJ esus Christ who 
calls, transforms, and empowers us to live truthfully; that is, according to the 
truth of God made known in the incarnate, crucified, and risen Son of God. 
Rather than addressing the issue of tortue directly, I want to begin with the 
Gospel, considering how its message might enable us to speak and live more 
truthfully in light of the message of the cross. In other words, it may be that 
we will not hear sermons on moral issues such as torture until the church 
becomes more attentive to the Gospel as mediated by the Apostolic faith 
through the canonical witness to the person of Jesus Christ who takes visible 
form in the church. 
To demonstrate what this might mean, I will look to the example of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who was a leader of the confessing church in Germany 
from the early 1930's until execution in 1945. As a theologian turned pastor, 
Bonhoeffer's ministry was devoted to calling the church to ground its being 
and life on God's Word, ccntering itself on Jesus Christ in order to stand 
against the idolatrous claims made by the Thitd Reich of Adolph Hitler. Por 
Bonhoeffer, a confessing church was very different from what has become 
popular in America; that which might be described as either an 
accomodationalist or activist church. An accommodationalist church pursues 
"relevance" as it's primary aim, devising strategies for translating Christianity 
to be more contemporary, or "with the times," thereby making sense of life 
by fitting the Gospel into the familiar assumptions, understandings and 
experiences of "reasonable" people. On the other hand, the activist church 
aims to show or prove that Christianity can still be made useful to the modern 
world as a good resource, tool, or program for either personal improvement 
or social change. Both forms of church are very popular in our time, and may 
be seen practiced in both evangelical and mainline congregations.3 
Bonhoeffer and those joined with him in the confessing church began 
elsewhere. They did not start by focusing on the possible effects or results 
that are produced by the Gospel according the the terms and values dictated 
bv the world. They began and ended with the source, substance, and goal of 
the Gospe1,Jesus Christ himself, since they were convinced that the church's 
political outlook and moral vision ought to be determined by its primary 
loyalty to Jesus Christ instead of its commitments to the self, nation, or 
culture. In 1934, Bonhoeffer worked with theologian Karl Barth to draft the 
Barmen Declaration as an act of Christian confession to this end. It begins 
with these words, 
'I am the way, the truth, and the life; no one comes to the 
Father, but by me Oohn 14:6). It continues, "Truly, truly, I say 
to you, anyone who does not enter the sheep fold by the door 
but climbs in by another way, that person is a thief and a 
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robber. I am the door, if anyone enters by me, the will be 
saved" Oohn 10:19). 
Then follows this confession, 
Jesus Chris t, as he is attes ted for us in Holy Scripture, is the one 
\vord of God which we have to hear and which we have to 
trust and obey in life and death. We reject the false doctrine, as 
though the Church could and would have to acknowledge as a 
source of its proclamation, apart from and besides the one 
\vord of God, still other events and powers, figures and truths, 
as God's revelation.4 
In stark contrast to much of the preaching and practice of the church in 
our time, the Barmen Declaration articulates a profoundly nonutilitarian (i.e., 
scriptural and theological) vision of the Gospel. This difference helps to 
illumine the theological and moral crisis which prevents us from seeing that 
addressing a practice such as torture is exceedingly "relevant" for the church's 
witness to the Lord who was "crucified under Pontus Pilate, crucifed, died, 
and was buried." In other words, a confessing church - rather than an 
accomodationist or activist church - will seek the truth of revelation as an end 
in itself, rather d1an as a pragmatic device for accomplishing goals and producing 
results independendy of faid.; that is, in a way which departs from Jesus 
Christ, as he is attested for us in Holy Scripture. The way of confession will 
see Christ as an object oflove, awe, and obedience - rather d1an an object of 
use, control, and manipulation, even if done for d.e sake of "reaching people" 
or "changing the world" - as is claimed today. 
Bonhoeffer's life and witness helps us to see that a confessing church will 
seek faithfulness without equating it with effectiveness. A church which 
confesses Jesus Christ wilino longer see itself - as Christ's visible body in the 
world - as instrumental to ends such as a changed society or improved 
individuals, but will instead see itself as a people whose being and existence 
is the work of God, those whose faith and mission consist of witnessing to 
the truth and reality of the Gospel through dle grace of the Holy Spirit who 
judges, forms, and transforms the church into the image of Christ. In other 
words, preaching which acknowledges dlat practices such as torture are 
fundamentally at odds with the reality of Jesus Christ will be grounded in, 
and expressive of, an ethos formed by fidelity and witness to the reality of the 
Gospel - rather than those forms of religious speech that, in our time, are 
described as "effective communication." 
In his incomplete book, Ethics, Bonhoeffer makes clear that it is God who 
speaks the final or ultimate word on our life, and that those things that are 
"penultimate" must be seen and measured in light of God's word of grace. 
For when God's final Word is disposed with in favor of the "penultimate" -
the things before that which is final - it is reduced to the quality of what is 
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calculable, as a merchandise, robbed of its divine power and is thereby no 
longer a gift. Bonhoeffer then describes two false ways of seeing the 
penultimate and ultimate.s 
One way is what he calls "the radical." This is to see only the ultimate, so 
that the penultimate, the things of this life and world, are lost to our view. In 
this way, God's final word of mercy becomes the "very harndness of the law, 
so that everything in our human life is sin and denial." The alternative view is 
that of compromise in which the ultimate - God's final word - is separated 
from the penultimate things of this life. In other words, God's word of 
grace simply justifies or underwrites things as they are. By way of contrast, 
Bonhoeffer points to the Incarnation in which the reality of God and the 
reality of humanity, the ultimate and penultimate, are reconciled inJesus Chtist. 
\X1hat is earnest and serious is not some kind of Christianity, hut it is 
Jesus Christ Himself. And in Jesus Christ there is neither radicalism nor 
compromise, but there is the reality of God and humanity. There is no 
Christianity in itself, for this would destroy the world; there is no man in 
himself; for he would exclude God. Both of these are merely ideas; only the 
God - Man Jesus Christ is real, and only through Him will the world be 
preserved until it is ripe for its end.6 
Bonhoeffer insists we must learn by God's grace to see and speak of the 
world and our life as human creatures in light of the Incarnation, since we are 
neither purely spiritual beings nor autonomous human creatures capable of 
living without God in the world. 
Significantly, this must also include our bodily life, which is a gift to us 
from God and therefore deserves its own preservation. "Since it is God's will 
that there should be human life on earth in the form of bodily life, it follows 
that it is for the sake of the whole man that the body possess the right to be 
preserved .. The life of the body, like life in general, is both a means to an 
end and an end in itself." This is an important point. The body is not only 
the "penultimate," something which can be discarded at the time of death, 
since Christians believe in the resurrection of the body. The body is also an 
end in itself. And while subordinated to a higher purpose, it is nonetheless 
true that, "If the body were only a means to an end man would have no right 
to bodily joys This would have far reaching consequences for the Christian 
appraised of all the problems that have to do with the life of the body; 
housing, food, clothing, recreation, play, and sex."! 
This leads Bonhoeffer to the freedom of bodily life, "which includes 
protections against arbitrary infringement of the liberty of the body." He 
discusses slavery and rape before taking up torture. Ilis definition is worth 
quoting in full. 
Torture of the body is to be distinguished from that of 
corporeal chastisement of which the purpose is to educate the 
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mentally immature to a state of independence. It is also to be 
distinguished from that of retributive punishment through 
which one who is f,ruilty of a base crime against the body of 
another has his dishonor brought home to him by the injury 
done to his own body. By torture of the body we mean in 
general the arbitrary and brutal affliction of physical pain while 
taking advantage of a relative superiority of strength, and in 
particular the extortion by this means of some desired 
admission or statement. In such cases, the body is misused, 
and therefore dishonored, exclusively as a means to the 
acheivment of another man's purpose, whether it be for the 
satisfaction of his lust for power or for the sake of acquiring 
some particular information .. Torture is, in any case, generally 
an ineffectual means of discovering the truth; though, of 
course, this argument can have force only in cases where it is 
really the truth that is sought for. 8 
Bonhoefferwas concerned with the way torture inflicts the most extreme 
dishonor on a human being and has the effect of creating intense hatred and 
a desire to restore such wounded honor by the application of bodily force. In 
other words, bodily dishonor will seek to avenge itself on the body of its 
tormentor. For this reason, the violation of one's bodily freedom contributes 
to the destruction of a creation's moral foundation and order. 
Writing from prison in 1943, Bonhoeffer reflected on the previous ten 
years of the church's struggle to render truthful confession and bear faithful 
witness to the Gospel. He acknowledges that what was missing - from a 
Christian point of view - was the kind of "large heartedness" displayed by 
Christ himself. Tt was Christ who, according to the Scriptures, bore the 
sufferings of all humanity in his own body as if they were his own, accepting 
them by his own free will. Bonhoeffer notes that we are not Christ, nor are 
we called to redeem the world by our own deeds and sufferings, since we are 
not lords but instruments in the hand of the God of history. And while we 
are not Christ, we may share in Christ's large hearledness with both freedom 
and responsibility, demonstrating a real sympathy which springs from the 
liberating and redeeming love of Christ for all who suffer since, "Mere waiting 
and looking on is not Christian behavior." In other words, Christians are 
called to sympathy, to acts of justice and mercy by the suffering of others for 
whose sake Christ suffered; the One whose fellowship we share \vith them 9 
Bonhoeffer concludes "'~th a remarkable pasage on the "view from below;' 
asserting that the time has come for learning to see great events from the 
perspective of "the outcast, the maltreated, the powerless, the oppressed, the 
reviled - in short, from the perspective of those who suffer." For Christian 
people, this perspective can occur \vithout either bitterness or envy, as a way 
of seeing with new eyes, "matters great and small, strength and weakness, 
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sorrow and joy, that our perception of generosity, humanity, justice, and 
mercy should have become clearer, freer, less corruptible."'° 
In The Cost of Discipleship, Bonhoeffer had already described the form of 
life which characterizes the church as it is shaped by the Word incarnate in 
Christ through the activity of the Spirit and daily prayer, mediating on the 
Word, and bodily discipline. 
To be conformed to the image of Jesus Christ is not an ideal of realizing 
some kind of similarity with Christ which we are asked to attain. Itis not we 
who change ourselves into the image of God. Rather, it is the very image of 
God, the form of Christ, which seeks to take shape within us (Gal. 4:19). It 
is Christ's own form which seeks to manifest itself in us. Christ does not 
cease working in us until he has changed us into Christ's own image. Our goal 
is to be shaped into the entire form of the incarnate, the crucified, and the 
risen one. Christ has taken on human form. He became a human being like 
us. In his humanity and lowliness -we recognize our own form. He became 
like human beings, so that we would be like himY 
Because Christ unites humanity to himself in the life of his Body, it is the 
Holy Spirit who makes the words of Scripture "relevant" - in relation to the 
reconciliation of God and the world - through the church's embodiment of 
the reality of the incarnate Word in its language and life, "The truthfulness 
which we owe to God must assume a concrete form in the world. Our speech 
must be truthful, not in principle but concretely. A truthfulness which is not 
concrete is not truthful before God."'2 However, the temptation to abstract 
language, joined with desire for human autonomy, separates the church's 
language from the concrete, visible form of life sustained by Christ's presence 
in history, thus creating a form of "Christianity without Christ" which serves 
only to stimulate more desire for abstract forms of religious "relevance." 
Bonhoeffer rightly contends such strategies render words incapable of truthful 
expression. His description speaks powerfully to our time. 
It is a consequence of the wide diffusion of the public word through the 
newspapers and wireless that the essential character and the limits of various 
different words are no longer clearly felt and that, for example, the special 
quality of the personal word is almost entirely destroyed. Genuine words are 
replaced by idle chatter. Words no longer possess any weight. There is too 
much talk. And when the limits of the various words are obliterated, when 
words become rootless and homeless, then the word loses truth, and then 
indeed there must almost inevitably be lying. When the various orders of life 
no longer respect one another, words become untrue.13 
Bonhoeffer perceived that the temptation to make our lies true was 
prompted by a kind of Christian, ecclesial self-preservation which produces 
forms of popular "religion" that presumably appeal and correspond to the 
needs of the individual human psyche. Such "privatized" religion represents 
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a withdrawal of the church from the concrete, bodily affairs of public life, 
thereby serving the limited purpose of "making individuals happy in the 
depths of their being," but without asking the most decisive theological 
question of "whether it is true, of whether it is the truth" revealed by God in 
the person of Christ. 
For it could be, of course, that while religion is a beautiful thing, it is not 
true, that it is all a nice, pious illusion - but still an illusion. But whoever so 
speaks [making the question of truth secondary] only sees religion from the 
perspective of human beings and their needs, not from that of God and his 
claims Only the one who has staked his or her life on Christ as the truth is 
in a position to judge whether Christ speaks and is the truth Truth is 
recognized only in the course of living it.'4 
In Ethics, Bonhoeffer again took up the matter of the church's conformance 
to the image of Christ - the truthful unity of Christian thought and action -
as a requirement for seeing, living, and speaking the truth according to reality, 
the reconciliation of God and the world revealed in Christ. Such conformance 
is achieved by neither establishing programs nor applying "Christian 
principles," but is only realized in being drawn by divine grace into the form 
of Jesus Christ through the ministry of Word and sacrament and by prayer 
and action for justice. His words help us to see that if preachers are to address 
moral issues such as tortue, their vision of God and the world must first be 
illumined by the reality of crucified truth indwelling the church as that part of 
humanity in which Christ has taken form in solidarity with the weak, the 
humiliated, and the enemy to stand against violence, arbitrariness, and pride 
of power. 
We are sick and tired of Christian programmes and of the 
thoughtless superficial slogan of what is called 'practical' 
Christianity as distinct from dogmatic Christianity The 
primary concern is not with the forming of a world by plans 
and programmes. Whenever they speak of forming [the 
Scriptures] they are concerned only with the one form which 
has overcome the world, the form of Jesus Christ But here 
again is not a question of applying directly to the world the 
teaching of Christ or what are referred to as Christian principles, 
so that the world might be formed in accordance with these 
For indeed in it is not written that God became an idea, a 
principle, a programme, a universally valid proposition or a 
law, but that God became man. This means that though the 
form of Christ certainly is and remains one and the same, yet it 
is willing to take form in the real man, that is to say, in quite 
different gnises What Christ does is precisely to give effect to 
reality. He affIrms reality Whoever sees Jesus Christ does 
indeed see the world and God in oneY 
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CHRISTOPHER T. BOUNDS 
Augustzne's Interpretatzon 0/ R!Jmans 7-14-25, Hzs Ordo 
Salutis and His Consistent Beliif in a Christian's Victory 
over Szn 
The Apostle Paul declares in Romans 7:14-15, "We know that the law is 
spiritual; but I am unspiritual, sold as a slave to sin. I do not understand 
what I do. For what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate to do."! 
The history and development of Augustine of Hippo's exegesis of this 
passage has received significant scholarly attention.2 In his initial forays into 
Pauline study in 394/395, Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, Augustine 
interpreted Romans 7: 14-25 as a human being "under the law, prior to grace.'" 
The "I" pictured here is the quintessential unregenerate person, who has 
knowledge of the law of God, senses true guilt for sinfulness, longs for 
deliverance, but is without the grace of Christ to overcome sin. In contrast, 
the Christian "under grace," infused with the love of God, is victorious over 
sin and "ceases to sin."4 In 396, Augustine reiterates his understanding in 
Eighty Three Different Questions and in his work of 398, To Simplician on 
Various Questions. 5 
There is no hint of change in Augustine's basic interpretive approach to 
Romans 7 until 411 in his treatise On the Merits and Remission of Sins, and on the 
Baptism of Infants. In his examination of Job's righteousness, Augustine 
compares Job to the person in Romans 7:19-24 who "delights in the law of 
God after the inner man, while he sees another law in his members warring 
against the law of his mind." Job is the type of individual who says, "The 
good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now 
ifI do that I would not, itis no more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me."6 
At this point, there is no inconsistency with Augustine's earlier teaching. 
However, later in the treatise he will argue that Christians who live a life of 
righteousness like Job are worthy of praise, but are not without sin and 
therefore must pray regularly the Lord's Prayer "forgive us our trespasses."7 
Augustine implicitly connects Christians "under grace" with the person of 
Romans 7 
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What is implied in 011 the l'vlerits becomes explicit by 415 in Augustine's 
011 Alalls Perfectioll ill RighteoHslless, which sets forth the key seminal ideas of 
his new interpretation of Romans 7 The person described by Paul in this 
passage is one "under grace." The "divided self" pictured so poignantly by 
tl1e Apostle is the Christian believer.' T ~ater, in a series of sermons preached in 
417, Augustine clarifies that the "I" in this passage is Paul speaking about 
himself. Paul is testifying to his present Christian experience and providing a 
description of every Christian life before the resurrection of the body.9 By 
421 in AgaillSt TUJO Letters of the Pelagialls and in AgaillS! JHliali Augustine 
acknowledges and repudiates completely his earliest interpretations of Romans 
7 10 In 327, three years before his death, Augustine, writing his RetractiotlS, 
renounces again his earliest position on Romans 7 as a description of an 
unconverted person "under law" and reiterates his belief that this is Paul's 
Christian testimony and the experience of every person "under grace."ll 
Intimately tied to Augustine's exegesis of Roman's 7 is his ordo salHtis Of 
order of salvation. In his earliest written work on Paul, Propo.ritiollS from the 
Epz~ftle to the Romalls, Augustine uses his comments to articulate a theological 
understanding of personal salvation in four stages. Indeed, this is the focus 
of PropositiotlS. Interestingly, while Augustine changes his understanding of 
Romans 7 as he grows older, and for that matter, his reading of Romans 9-
11 and the doctrine of election, his ordo salHtis remains essentially the same 
throughout his life. He articulates it dearly in his early theological work, uses 
it as a reference point throughout his ministry as priest and bishop, and gives 
it significant treatment in his later treatises. '2 
In his ordo Augustine consistently maintains that a Christian is empowered 
to walk in obedience to Christ through the infusion of love by the Holy 
Spirit. He describes a normative Christian life as one free from outward or 
willful sin. Even as his interpretation of Romans 7 changes, this basic 
understanding of a Christian's life "under grace" does not, although it is 
nuanced differently in his later thought. 13 
The question arises: how can Augustine do this 'with his complete reversal 
on Romans 7? If the Apostle Paul is describing his Christian life, and with 
him all Christians, in verses 14-25, how can Augustine maintain a theology 
of salvation in which a Christian is free from willful sin? The purpose of our 
paper is to answer this question. To do so, we will first summarize Augustine's 
ordo sal Ntis and highlight some nuances brought to his understanding in later 
reflection. Next, we will examine how Augustine reconciles his later 
interpretation of Romans 7:14-25 with his persistent teaching on a Christian's 
outward compliance to the law. Then, we will look more specifically at the role 
of will or consent in the Christian "under grace." Finally, we will conclude 
with a few summary remarks. 
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I. Augustine's Ordo SaJutis 
Augustine in 394 identifies four basic stages in a person's experience of 
salvation, subsequently carried throughout his ministry as priest and bishop: 
a life "prior to the law," "under the law," "under grace," and "in peace."14 
However, he acknowledges that some Christians may not pass through all 
stages, such as the case of infant baptism in which a child moves from a life 
"prior to the law" to one "in grace," bypassing the stage "under the law."15 
He also sees his ordo sa/utis as an outline of the history of the church. First, 
the church existed "prior to the law;' from the moment of the fall in the 
Garden to God's appointment with the nation of Israel on Mt. Sinai. Second, 
the church lived "under the law" from the revelation of God's law through 
Moses to Christ's coming. Now, the church lives "under grace" through the 
incarnate ministry of Jesus Christ. However, Augustine maintains that life 
"under grace" is never absent in history, but is veiled and hidden. Before 
Christ's incarnation, Old Testament saints had some knowledge of and saving 
faith in Christ or they would not have been able to make prophecies about 
him. Finally, the church will be "in peace" when it enters the resurrected state 
in the eschatological age to come. 16 
Specifically, because of original sin, Augustine believes every human being 
is born into life "prior to the law." They live in ignorance of sin and follow 
their carnal desires without the restraint of conscience or established 
prohibitions.1? He interprets the Apostle Paul's statement, ''And I was alive 
once without the law," as indicative of Paul's early childhood before he could 
reason, before he reached an age of accountability. IS 
The second stage is a life "under the law." Here, through an awakened 
conscience and the revelation of God's law, people recognize their sinfulness. 
Knowledge of the law produces anxiety over their guilt and prepares them 
for the grace of salvation. They learn how sinful they really are. They are aware 
of the condemnation of God upon their lives and want to some extent to 
live in accordance with the law, but are unable to do so. They are slaves to sin 
and the fear of God.19 They want to change, but the power of carnal desire is 
too strong and they find greater pleasure in committing sin. Sin deceives 
them continually "with its false sweetness."zo 
Augustine believes a person is defeated at this stage "because he does not 
yet love righteousness for the sake of God and for the sake of righteousness 
itself. And so when he sees righteousness on the one hand and temporal 
comfort on the other, he is drawn to the weight of temporal longing and 
thus abandons righteousness, which he was trying to hold on to only in 
order to have the comfort he now sees he will lose if he holds on to 
righteousness."21 People "under law" may conform to the law, but only as 
long as it is beneficial to them. The desires of the flesh may lead to obedience, 
but only for selfish reasons. When keeping the law is no longer beneficial, a 
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person discards it. 
The only way humanity's sinful desires can be defeated is through a true 
love of God and love of the commanded good. In the absence of real love, 
carnal desire always triumphs. In the third stage of salvation "under grace," 
Augustine teaches that God gives the love of God to the human heart 
through the infusion of the Holy Spirit, empowering the Christian to 
"delight" in the law of God and walk in accordance to love. "X/hile Christians 
still have desires of the flesh, and the flesh is in conflict with the Spirit, the 
love of God triumphs over these desires so that believers do not obey them. 22 
At this point, it may be helpful to catalogue chronologically some of 
Augustine's key statements on life "under grace" to demonstrate his consistent 
belief in a Christian's victory over willful sin. Augustine in his description of 
the third stage dearly states in 395, "When this happens, even though certain 
fleshly desires fight against our spirit while we are in this life, to lead us into 
sin, nonetheless our spirit resists them because it is fixed in the grace and love 
of God, and ceases to sin. For we sin not by having this perverse desire but 
by consenting to it."23 In 398 in response to questions raised by his friend 
Simplicius, he answers, "When grace forgives sin and infuses a spirit of 
charily, righteousness ceases to be hard and becomes even pleasant."24 Speaking 
about the perfection of righteousness possible in the present life and 
experienced "under grace," he teaches in 415, "But whensoever he suffers not 
sin to reign in his mortal body to obey it in the lusts thereof, and yields not 
his members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin it does not 
reign, because its desires are not obeyed."2; In the heights of the Pelagian 
debates of 422, Augustine affirms that the Apostles did not consent to the 
lusts of the flesh and lived "under grace." He declares, "I do say that although 
they were free from consent to depraved lusts, they nevertheless groaned 
concerning the concupiscence of the Hesh, which they bridled by restraint 
with such humility and piety, that they desired rather not to have it than to 
subdue it."26 Then, in the most systematic account of his mature theology in 
422, The Eflchiridiofl, Augustine describes the Christian in the third stage of 
salvation: "But if God has regard to him, and inspires him with faith in 
God's help, and the Spirit of God begins to work in him, then the mightier 
power of love strives against the power of the Hesh, and although there is 
still in man's own nature a power that fights against him (for his disease is 
not completely cured), yet he lives the life of the just by faith, and lives in 
righteousness so far as he does not yield to evil lust, but conquers it by the 
love of holiness."27 
\X!hile Augustine remains consistent in his teaching on a Christian "under 
grace," as a life empowered to walk in love and not consent to sinful desires, 
he does nuance some of the finer points of his teaching, particularly his 
conception of sin and his understanding of the intensity of sinful desires. 
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First, Augustine develops his definition of sin. In 395 Augustine 
acknowledges that a Christian still experiences the lusts of the flesh, but does 
not sin. At this point in his theology, he defines sin as the consent of the will 
to obey, or to act according to sinful desire. Simply having sinful desires is not 
personal sin. He states, "For we sin not by having this perverse desire but by 
consenting to it."28 Elsewhere, he writes that God's condemnation docs not 
rest upon the one, "engaged in battle, but on the one defeated in battle."29 
However, by the opening decades of the fifth century, Augustine's 
hamartiology expands. He begins to see sinful desire itself as personal sin 
and in need of the absolution brought about through the Lord's Prayer: 
"Forgive our debts, as we forgive our debtors;" as well as through ahnsgiving. 
While he only sees it as venial sin and not mortal, it is still sin that a Christian 
must bear until the resurrection of the body.30 
Augustine comes to see sinful desire as sin because it falls short of the 
perfect love of God and neighbor, which is the ultimate end of the law. A 
Christian operates out of the love of God; the love of God enables a person's 
obedience, but because of the desires of the flesh, love is not perfectY 
Augustine states, "It is not the mere "doing" of a good thing that is not 
present to him, but the "perfecting" of it. For in this, that he yields no 
consent (to the desires of the flesh), he does good; he does good again, in 
this, that he hates his own lust. But how to perfect the good is not present 
to him; it will be, however, in that final state, when the concupiscence which 
dwells in his members shall exist no more."32 
Second, Augustine sees more clearly the intensity of sinful desire in 
Christian life. Early in his theological thought, Augustine recognizes or 
acknowledges concupiscence in the third stage, but does not give significance 
to it. However, while writing The Confessions he begins to address the 
psychological dynamics and intensity of fleshly desires in detail. They 
command Augustine's attention in ways not seen in his earlier work." 
Nevertheless, while Augustine paints concupiscence in the third stage with 
greater intensity, he persistently maintains a Christian's victory over it. 
In the fourth and final stage of salvation, a life is "in peace." This will take 
place when the bodies of Christians afe resurrected in the age to come. Then, 
there will be nothing in humanity that resists the love of God, but every part 
will work harmoniously together. There will be the perfection of love in 
which people will love God with all heart, soul, and mind. All human action 
will embody the perfect love of God and neighbor. Sin and sinful desires will 
be impossible to humanity, since they will be like God, having true freedom 
- to do only what is in accordance with love. 34 
II. Augustine's Later Interpretation of Romans 7:14-25 
How does Augustine reconcile his consistent understanding of the 
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Christian "under grace" with his later exegesis of Romans 7:14-25? As we 
stated earlier, by 417 Augustine sees Romans 7 as the Apostle Paul's personal 
testimony of Christian experience, as well as every individual in the third 
stage of salvation. To answer this question, we must examine Augustine's 
interpretation of this passage. His clearest and most thorough treatments are 
Sermons 151-156, preached in 417 and two treatises written in 422, OnMamage 
and Concupiscence and Against Two Letters of the Pelagians.35 
First, Augustine begins by reviewing Paul's teaching from Romans 3:20, 
3:27, 4:13, 5:20, 6:14, and 7:4, establishing the fact that the law brings 
knowledge of sin, and incites sin, but does not take it away. Because knowledge 
of the law makes a person more sinful and is not able to deliver a person 
from sin, Augustine is careful to defend the goodness of the law. The law 
drives a person to seek God's grace. Only divine grace infusing love in the 
human heart can set an individual free from sin.36 
SecQnd, Augustine interprets Romans 7:7-13 as the Apostle's personal 
witness about his life "prior to the law" and "under the law." Paul's statement, 
"For 1 was alive without the law once," refers to Paul's early childhood, before 
his ability to reason, before an age of accountability. "But when the 
commandments came, sin revived, but 1 died," addresses the time in the 
Apostle's life when he became aware of the law, but was not able to keep it, 
thereby becoming a transgressor.37 More specifically, the phrase "sin revived" 
refers to original sin in the Garden, passed down to all humanity, which 
remains hidden and undetected, until the human heart recognizes it when it 
encounters and balks at the law of God. Paul's statements, "For without law 
sin is dead," and "I had not known sin but by the law, for 1 had not known 
lust unless the law had said, 'Thou shalt not covet,'" conveys the profound 
disruption knowledge of sin brings to life. Once sin revives, it becomes 
"excessive" through the angst created in confrontation with the law. Continuing 
to speak on the command not to covet, Paul testifies, "But the occasion being 
taken, sin wrought in me by the commandment all manner oflust"38 Concupiscence 
becomes stronger in it assertion of independence from the law. 
Third, Augustine argues that Romans 7:14-23 is Paul's present Christian 
testimony and all Christians "under grace." Verse 14 states, "For we know 
that the law is spiritual, but 1 am carnal, sold as a slave to sin." Here, Augustine 
notes the use of the present tense, "1 am," and not the past, "I was." Paul is 
speaking for himself and his Christian experience. More specifically, the 
declaration "1 am carnal" refers to Paul's physical body, which has not yet 
experienced the resurrection. It is the same as saying, "1 am mortal." "Sold 
under sin" further conveys the idea of a physical body not yet redeemed from 
its corrupted state, a body that creates a "drag" upon the soul. Augustine 
makes clear though, this is also the description of every Christian. However, 
with Paul, Christians do not consent or obey the desires arising from the 
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body's corrupted state.39 
Paul writes in verses 15, "For what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, 
that do I." Augustine does not understand this statement to involve any 
external act by the Apostle, rather an internal motion in the heart. In essence, 
this is Paul's admission to concupiscence. He covets or has sinful desires 
arising from his corrupted body. However, he does not consent or obey these 
desires. These are desires that wage inside of him. He despises them, longs to 
be free from them, but finds them nevertheless in his life. Augustine 
elaborates, ''We shouldn't take what he said, 'It is not what I want to that I 
do, but what 1 hate, that is what I do' as meaning that he wanted to be chaste, 
and was in fact an adulterer; that he wanted to be kind, and was in fact cruel 
That's not the sense in which we should understand (this passage) .. but in 
what sense? 'I want not to covet, and yet 1 do covet."'40 
In verse 16 Paul continues, "If then 1 do that which 1 would not, 1 
consent to the law that it is good." Here, Augustine develops further his 
previous thought. What does Paul do that he "would not"? He has sinful 
desires. The Apostle then recognizes that the law wills that there be no 
coveting, no concupiscence and he agrees with the law. He wants what the law 
wants. Augustine explains, ''And yet what I don't want (desire, coveting, 
concupiscence) occurs in me. What the law doesn't want, I join the law in not 
wanting; what it doesn't want, I don't want either; so I give my consent to 
the law." 41 
Because there is concupiscence in his physical body, but Paul does not 
consent or give into these desires, the Apostle states in verse 17, "Now, then, 
it is no more 1 that do it, but sin that dwells in me."42 His body suffers from 
concupiscence, but not his actions. He does not obey his sinful desires. 
Therefore, he does not covet, but his body does. Augustine states, "For 'it is 
not I that do it," cannot be better understood than he does not consent to set 
forth his members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin. For if he 
lusts and consents and acts, how can he be said not to do the thing himself?"43 
For Augustine, verse 18 is the crux to understanding Paul's testimony. 
This is the "clear" passage, through which the more difficult passages of this 
section are to be read. Paul declares in verse 18, "For I know that in me (that 
is, in my flesh) dwells no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how 
to perfect that which is good I find not." Augustine argues that Paul is 
empowered to do the good. He is able to walk in obedience to God and 
follow the law of God, but because concupiscence exists in his body, his 
actions are not perfect. This accounts for the Apostle's precision in words. 
Paul does not say "to do good" is beyond his will to do, but "how to perfect 
it" is in the present life.44 
For Augustine verse 18 holds up the ideal action as a basis for judgment 
of any act. The ideal is an action performed in perfect love of God without 
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any constraints of sinful desite. Augustine states, "for the good is perfonned 
itnperfecdy when one covets, even if consent to the evil of coveting is 
withheld." Complete action, "perfect" action is by contrast action unifonnly 
supported by a person's de site to act in the love of God.45 Not only does 
Augustine contend that this is the correct reading of the verse in which the 
infInitive "to perfect" appears, but he assumes the other ways of expressing 
action in Romans 7: 14-25, carry itnplicidy the sense of acting in conformity to 
the ideal. So, for example, when Paul states in 7: 15 that he does what he hates, 
Augustine interprets this to mean that Paul performs what the law demands, 
but not without the presence of fleshly desite. Sinful desite does not interfere 
with his actions, but with the purity of his intentions.46 
Augustine believes Paul's declaration in verse 18 is amplified in verses 19-
21. The Aposde states "For the good that I would, I do not: but the evil 
which I would not, that I do. Now, if I do that which I would not, it is no 
more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me. I fInd then the law, when I would 
act, to be good to me; for evil is present with me." Again, Paul finds the law 
good when he consents to do what the law would have him to do; inasmuch 
as his consent falls short of its perfect keeping, as a result of concupiscence, 
evil is present even in his consent"? 
In the first part of verse 22, Paul testifies, "For I delight in the law of God 
after the inward man." Augustine confesses that this testimony is key to his 
transition of seeing Romans 7:14-25 as a Christian "under grace." Only a 
person "under grace" delights in God's law. A person "prior to the law" is 
ignorant of it; a person "under the law" fears the consequences of breaking 
the law and is in servitude to it. However, the Christian "under grace" delights 
in it. This delight comes from realizing the end of the law - love, made 
possible by the grace of God through the Holy Spitit. In it is love that cheers 
and gratifIes the believer.48 
The second part of verse 22 and verse 23 continues, "but I see another law 
in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into 
captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." Augustine again interprets 
this other "law" to be concupiscence in his fallen body. "Bringing me into 
captivity" addresses the flesh, the body that has a "morbid carnal affection." 
Augustine states, "In so far then, as there is now this waiting for the 
redemption of our body, there is also in some degree still existing something 
in us which is captive to the law of sin."49 This captivity is in the flesh and not 
in the mind, in the emotions, but not in consent.50 
In verse 24, Paul declares, "0 wretched man that I am! Who will deliver 
me from the body of this death? The grace of God, through Jesus Christ our 
Lord." Augustine comments, "What are we to understand by such language, 
but that our body, which is undergoing corruption, weighs heavily on our 
souls? In the resurrection there will be full liberation." 51 Although the actual 
28 I The Arbllry ]ourllal 64/2 (2009) 
law of sin partly holds th(; flesh in captivity, still it does not reign in the 
Christian life because a Christian does not obey its desires. 
Finally, in verse 25, Paul concludes, "So then with the mind I myself serve 
the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin." Augustine again drives 
home his point that Paul, and by inference, every Christian, serves the law of 
God by refusing to obey the law of sin. However, the Apostle serves the law 
of sin by having the desires of the flesh, from which he is not free entirely, 
although he does not give in to them.s2 Augustine states, "To wit, with the 
flesh, the law of sin, by lusting; but with the mind, the law of God, by not 
consenting to that lust."53 Augustine states elsewhere, "Both the law of God 
in the mind, and the law of sin in the flesh. I both take delight in this one 
(mind), and at the same time 1 feel lust there (flesh). But I am not overpowered; 
it tickles my fancy, it lays siege to me, it hammers at the door, it tries to take me 
away, but not it does not (overpower)."54 
III. The Role of Will or Consent in People "Under Grace" 
As we have now seen, while Augustine's exegesis of Romans 7 shifts 
from a person "under law" who cannot walk in true righteousness to a 
Christian "under grace" who can walk in obedience to the law, but cannot 
perfect it, nevertheless, his later interpretation conforms to his basic orda 
salutis held throughout his ministry. 
Now, the question must be asked: what enables people "under grace" to 
walk in obedience to God, to serve the law of God in their mind and not 
consent to the desires of the flesh? AUlo'Ustine's answer: the love of God 
shed abroad in the human heart by the Holy Spirit. The love of God enables 
obedience, empowering true consent to the law of God. 
Augustine identifies three factors in the exercise of human will: suggestion, 
delight, and consent. 55 First, a suggestion is any idea that comes to a person's 
mind through personal reflection, random thinking, or bodily senses. 
Therefore, when a person is told she needs to go back to school if she wants 
to work at a particular company, or an individual has a chance idea to start a 
new business while talking to his wife about a haircut, or a teenager considers 
eating an ice cream cone after seeing a Baskin-Robbins advertisement, they 
have experienced suggestion. More specifically, AUIc,'Ustine sees the law of 
God as suggestion as it comes to human beings in the law given to Adam in 
the Garden and to Moses onMt. Sinai, in the law summari:-oed by Jesus 
Christ, and in the law of reason and conscience. 56 
N ext, Augustine teaches that each suggestion encounters internal desires 
already existing in the human mind. In response to a suggestion presented 
to the mind, strong feelings of attraction or aversion may arise, motivating a 
person to move in one direction or another; or it may meet with indifference, 
creating little inclination to action; or it may encounter conflicting desires, 
TIOllNDS: AUGCSTI"lE'S INTERPRETATION OF RO~L-\NS 7:14-25 I 29 
causing internal division within the mind about what to do. 57 For example, 
when a person encounters a suggestion to eat an ice cream cone from a . 
Baskin-Robbins commercial, strong feelings of sensual pleasure may arise, or 
stimulate a deep fear of gaining weight, or cause internal turmoil if pleasure 
and fear are both persuasive to the mind. 
From whence do these desires come? AUf,'Ustine identifies two places: 
love and the force ofhabit.58 First and most basic, Augustine believes human 
desires have their origin in love - either the love of God or the love of self.59 
By creating humanity in the divine image, God made people to love God, 
which then enables them to turn toward their neighbor in self-giving love, 
and truly love themselves for God's sake. However, because of original sin, 
love has been corrupted, becoming self-centered, seeking its private interest 
above all else. In fallen humanity, desire or delight, are all manifestations of a 
person's egoist love. Augustine calls these "desires of the flesh" and 
"concupiscence." All human desires or delights have self-love as their basis, 
rather than the perfect love of God. 60 
Second, Augustine believes some desires are built and fortified by habit. A 
habit begins when a suggestion arouses pleasure that leads to consent. Then, 
the experience of gratification fuels the pleasure desire, so that when the same 
suggestion comes again, even greater desire arises, leading to action. As a 
person continues to consent to the pleasure inclination, the pleasure desire 
increases in strength, forcing other competing desires (fear, caution) to recede 
to the background, forming a habit almost impossible to break.61 
Finally, Augustine believes a suggestion that arouses the strongest delight 
leads to consent of the will, which results in action. He believes human 
beings consent to what they ultimately want. Humanity does whatever is 
their strongest desire. Human consent follows the desire most aroused by a 
suggestion. G2 For example, in the suggestion of eating an ice cream cone, 
Augustine believes a person will consent to whatever the strongest desire is. 
H the pleasure desire is stronger, she will eat the ice cream; if the fear of 
gaining weight is stronger, she will abstain; and if both are powerful, she will 
have some inner turmoil, but will eventually do whatever the strongest desire is. 
As such, the key for Augustine in the sequence of suggestion - delight -
consent is delight or desire. Accordingly, humanity in the stage "prior to the 
law" cannot begin to fulfill the law of God. They cannot "delight" in the true 
love of God and neighbor. Instead, their "delight" is completely self-focused. 
Because all human desire in this stage is self-focused, defined by 
"concupiscence," the act arising from 'willful consent will always be selfish. As 
such, they do not keep the law of God." 
In the stage "under the law;' humanity by God's grace begins to recognize 
a need to keep the law of God. They see the need to love God and neighbor. 
They may begin to desire to walk in true love. 64 As such, a new desire enters 
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into the mix. However, when the suggestion of God's law comes by 
instruction or reason, concupiscence rises to the fore, dominating any desire 
to walk in divine love, so that they are not able to keep the la,'1. Their consent 
follows their fleshly desires. Even when they act in outward conformity to the 
law, concupiscence is at the root. In wanting to avoid punishment, earn 
praise, or gain some personal reward, they act out of egoist love in the 
outward performance of the law. Only when a person wants God's will out 
of the love of God alone is the law kept.65 Thus, in The COJZjessiotIJ Augustine 
testifies of his life before conversion as one "under law" in which he wants to 
follow God, but is not able to relinquish his fleshly desires that bind him to 
the world. His fleshly desires are stronger than his desire for God. 66 
In the third stage "under grace," Augustine teaches that God infuses 
divine love or "delight for the law" by the Holy Spirit into human life. This 
comes as a gift of God to a person. Therefore, when the suggestion of the 
law comes, it encounters the internal desire to love God, which subordinates 
any other contrary desire or inclination, leading to a person's consent. God 
empowers a person with love, so that this delight, this pleasure, this inclination, 
"draws" or "leads" human consent. Divine love becomes the strongest desire 
or delight in a Christian and the human will consents to this love. \lV'hat the 
law commands, love seeks and obtains by divine grace." 
However, as already been intimated, because concupiscence resists love 
and consent to the good, the good accomplished by consent is marred. It is 
not perfect love. Nevertheless, the inclinations against which a person "under 
the law" struggles are now overcome because a higher inclination, love of 
God, has subordinated them. 
More specifically, in Romans 7:14-25 Augustine sees two conflicting 
delights. The fIrst, which is the consequence of original sin is concupiscence. 
Human beings find pleasure or delight in the wrong things. This is the law 
of sin. The second, which is a result of God's grace infusing the heart with 
love by the I Ioly Spirit is delight in the law of God. Augustine makes clear in 
his interpretation of this passage that a person "under grace" can consent to 
the good and yet not be free of conflict. Because concupiscence resists love 
and consent to the good, the good accomplished by consent is marred. It is 
not perfect 10ve.6d 
Augustine states, '~'\nd, without the gift of God-that is, without the 
Holy Spirit, through whom love is shed abroad in our hearts-the law may 
bid but it cannot aid. Moreover, it can make of man a transgressor, who 
cannot then excuse himselfbv pleading ib'1lorancc. For appetite reigns where 
the love of God does not (but) if a man begins to be led by the Spirit of 
God, then the mightier power of love struggles against the power of the 
flesh. And although there is still in man a power that fights against him-his 
infirmity being not yet fully healed-yet the righteous man lives by faith and 
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lives righteously in so far as he does not yield to evil desires, conquering them 
by his love of righteousness." 69 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, while Augustine's interpretation of Romans 7:14-25 
undergoes revision in his work as priest and bishop, his basic understanding 
of a person "under law" and Christian "under grace" does not. Augustine 
consistently maintains that a person "under law" is unable to keep the law, 
because of "delight" for self-love. The Christian "under grace" is able to 
consent to the law and be victorious over the desires of the flesh, because of 
"delight" in God's love. 
Augustine's teaching stands in a long historical line of witness to the 
expectation of a Christian's victory over willful sin and a life defined by the 
love of God and neighbor. Augustine in his doctrinal treatises believes 
Christians are able to overcome their sinful desires, because of the love of 
God shed abroad in their hearts. Because Christians "under grace" have true 
love, love subdues all other desires, enabling them to walk in love. While it is 
not perfected love, it nevertheless is love made manifest in heart and life. 
Christopher T. Bounds is associate professor of theology at Indiana Wesleyan 
University in Marion, Indiana. 
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ROBERT H. CUBILLOS 
Consolation as Theme in Luther's Sermons and 
Correspondence: Insights into his Theological Ethics 
I. Introduction 
Various themes have been identified as foundational for Luther's ethical 
program. Hegel praised Luther asserting that "the essence of the Reformation 
[is]: Man is in his very nature destined to be free.'" He also stressed, "Freedom 
of the spirit had its beginnings in Luther."2 Peering through this set of 
lenses, freedom is the theme with which Luther leaves behind the late Middle 
Ages and ushers in the modern era and with it a relentless religious 
individualism, part of maturing Geist. Harnack had the same idealistic, 
historicist mindset, seeing in Luther a new "evolution" to disposition ethics.' 
Althaus, along with a host of theologians, has identified the theme of 
justification as central to Luther's ethical thought and break with the Medieval 
Church. 
Luther's ethics is determined in its entirety, in its starting point 
and in all its main features, by the heart and center of his 
theology, namely, by the justification of the sinner through 
the grace that is shown in Jesus Christ and received through 
faith alone. Justification by faith determines Christian ethics 
because, for the Christian, justification is both the 
presupposition and the source of the ethicallife.4 
Antecedent to centering the reformer's ethics on his doctrine of justification, 
recent Luther scholarship involves the scrupulous and wide-ranging activity-
one beyond the scope of this study-of establishing where the reformer's 
theological pedigree begins. The debate of this crucial question will be largely 
set aside; but suffice here to add that eminent church historian, the late Heiko 
Oberman, ofTiibingen and Arizona State Universities, was an innovative 
and influential proponent of situating Luther within the context of late 
medieval Christian theology by attempting to show important lines of 
continuity between the reformer and his medieval heritage.s Dr. Berndt Hamm, 
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who focuses on the intellectual history of late medieval and Reformation 
Germany at the University of Erlangen-Nurnberg, has been another high-
profile advocate making an even stronger case for this continuity." In this 
same vein and after a close study of the theology and rhetorical style of 
Luther's letters of consolation, Dr. Cte Mennecke-Haustein at the University 
of Bonn, concludes in explicit terms: 
The consolation needs of the people of this time is almost 
limitless, it arises out of the situation of the existence of disease 
and death, economic and social insecurity, the arbitrary mercy 
of various authorities, and the religious uncertainty concerning 
the state of grace and one's eternal fate. The late-Medieval Age 
suffering, Anfechtung, and consolation literature variously 
consider this. While Luther accepts this theme, and indeed the 
consolation letters explain the most important task of theology, 
it is to be seen as an element of "continuity" in the "break" 
between the late-:Middle Age and reformation. The consolation 
letters of the reformer can be principal witnesses when it comes 
to accurately describing this.' 
I will discuss suffering, Anfechtung, and consolation soon enough, but 
instead of using Luther's correspondence to track his trajectory between the 
late medieval church and the Reformation, I instead want to investigate the 
theme of consolation8 contained in a broad selection of his sermons and 
letters from the standpoint of theological ethics." First, I contend that the 
special, inseparable connection between God's work of justification and 
Luther's treatment of consolation is that God's love for the hurting soul is 
operative in both. Second, that while each consoling sermon or compassionate 
letter is inadequate on its own to serve as a basis for understanding the 
reformer's moral framework, we can instead look at a "whole" these pieces 
may construct. Thus, my focus will be more upon the ethical norms contained 
in T ,uther's consolatory homiletical practice and correspondence, to gain insights 
into his theological ethics from a correlation of component parts, as it were, 
than to assess his struggle against the spirit of the late medieval church as he 
encountered it. The goal of dus essay is not to analyze the continuity between 
the reformer and the late medieval church nor is it to emphasize a revolutionary 
nature of his ideas and pastoral approach. Instead, it is to indicate how his 
theme of consolation is a principal witness to his ethical comnLitment that 
takes on the appearance of an ethic of responsibility. Some may question if 
this assessment is possible or they may say dlis results in imposing a modern 
category of ethics onto the reformer. After all, he wrote little about such 
questions as "\Vhat is the structure of the responsible self?" or "by what 
moral calculus shall I determine my personal responsibility in dlis situation?" 
His focus was instead on the more practical and theolot,>ical features of Christ, 
salvation, sin, and the sacraments. Despite that, in investigating Luther's 
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theme of consolation and questioning the presence of an ethic of 
responsibility one has to reconstruct Luther's line of thought from scattered 
writings that do not explicidy deal with issues of responsibility. 
The Reformation, as Luther occasionally called it in reference to the entirety 
of his work,IO was a reassertion of the Christian estimation of the supreme 
importance of the individual. In large part it marked a return to the interiority 
of Christianity and a reassertion of the essentially spiritual character of its 
point of view, more so than some movements within medieval piety and 
mysticism were able to achieve and imbue into the masses. The Protestant 
doctrine of "justification by faith alone" is a theological application of the 
ethical principle that the moral situation hinges not upon what one does, but 
upon what one is; upon the attitude of one's will and the bent of one's 
character. It is what one is that needs to be jus titled by grace through faith. 
Luther's continuity with this point of view and his attempts to restore a 
more consistent spiritual ethos with dIe New Testament imperative cast him 
as the theological radical of the sixteenth century. Undergirding the reforming 
and ministerial activities in which Luther participated were his theological 
ethics. Before beginning to investigate this, we must first stop to consider the 
ministerial task he took on that gave expression to his ethics. In order to 
understand the theme of consolation embedded in Christian ethical texts it 
is necessary to comprehend the complex religious and cultural circumstances 
in which they are formed. 
II. The Culture of Distress, Death and Care in Sixteenth Century 
Western Europe 
Prior to Sigmund Freud, the study of suffering and death belonged 
primarily to theology and philosophy. It was not until the nineteenth century 
that the experience and portrayal of dying and despondence entered into 
conversation with psychology and the interpretation of theology as 
anthropology began. In so doing, consolation faced as much modern hostility 
as religion itself, giving rise to thc ideas that "[i]n religion man seeks 
contcntment"l1 and that religion essentially ±illds its basis in the human need 
for consolationY What must be remembered with regard to the nineteenth 
century's experiential and psychological Zeizgei-rtand its projection of religion 
as consolation is dut dlese views were the result of investigations into what 
the common person understood by religion and his or her very narrow 
internal expressions of religion. Moreover, this era failed to produce evidence 
to sustain the claims that God/ consolalion is a psychological crutch to support 
people'S inability to cope with life's disappointments, or that belief in God 
arises from the common person's incapacity to understand physical 
phenomena. It offered no convincing proof to explain how the religious 
consolation offered at d,e religious intersection of the individual and pestilence-
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ridden society in the early sixteenth century was a contrivance or failed. 
Long recognized as one of the watersheds in European history, historians 
blame the cycle of plague epidemics (bubonic, septicaemic, and pneumonic) 
as the cause of various divergent consequences ranging from despondence 
and an obsession with the macabre to economic restructuring and the birth 
of Renaissance humanism. The great social, religious, and personal disruption 
associated with plagues makes the late Middle Ages population's desire for 
advance warning about death and the need for consolation very 
understandable. Nearly a third of Western Europe perished, and many cities 
experienced a loss of almost half their people. Transfers in choice of burial 
site, bequests to new religious groups, and questions of how one manages 
oneself upon diagnosis are dramatic evidences of social and religious changes 
in this period. In this culture of distress and death, what were the contours 
of the pre-reformation ministry of care to which Luther responded? 
A. Ars moriendi 
French medievalist and cultural historian, Philippe Aries, summarized the 
sophisticated preparations associated with the ars moriendi (the art of dying) 
literature and iconography that provide unique insights into the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries' experience of death and sufferingY Nearly 300 ars moriendi 
manuscripts survive, 20 percent of which are block books that suggest the 
great consolatory importance of this subgenre of conduct literature in late 
medieval and early modem thought.!4 The greatest fear of this era was that 
once the pestilence was contracted, one would die alone and abandoned. 
Devout folk considered sudden death to be one of many evils from which 
they should pray for deliverance.!; 
The catechetical questions posed to the dying person and traditional prayers 
of the Medieval Church acknowledge a link between warning, preparation, 
and consolation.!6 People wanted to prepare and to have a "good death" (not 
to be confused with euthanasia). This required very specific preparations. 
Dying followed prescribed gestures routinized by old customs: one awaited 
death lying down with various hand postures, sometimes the head oriented 
to the east (facing Jerusalem), the hands crossed, and the face turned up to 
heaven. The ars moriendi then gave instruction on grieving and reconciling 
oneself with loved ones, relatives, companions, and helpers. Grief occurred 
for both sides; those about to be bereaved needed to express their grief over 
imminent loss, and the dying person needed to mourn his or her loss of the 
world. A measure of suffering was an acceptable part of human dying, was 
short-lived, and not to be denied or obscured. But the Black Death,per se, was 
not the primary impetus behind the ars moriendi. The exceedingly high mortality 
rates among the clergy necessitated a more prominent participation of the 
laity in the preparation for death, that of a friend, and their own. Dying was 
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a very public preparation and ceremony took place in the bedchamber of the 
dying which was entered freely, by relatives, friends, servant, and children. In 
essence, the ars moriendi facilitated the process for the dying, for the priest and 
pastor, and the laity. 
Nonetheless, Dr. Carter Lindberg, Professor Emeritus of Church History 
at Boston University, avers that the traditional symbols of security for the 
people of the late 11iddle Ages were rocked at their roots. He emphasizes, 
"[t]he shortness of life was never far from people's mincls," which is an echo 
of Johan Huizinga, "[N]o other epoch has so much stress as the expiring 
Middle Ages on the thought of death."l7 Tn effect, to borrow a recent thesis 
from Princeton Theological Seminary's Dr. Scott Hendrix, people in this era 
were primed to listen to the "re-Christianizing" message of the Reformation 
in a new way. IS Comparing Luther with other late medieval ars maniendi 
contributors, Jarecl Wicks, S. j., concludes that, 
Luther did not first discover such interior trials, but he prescnted 
thcm with more depth and refinement than was the case in 
existing pastoral guidance. One's worthiness and disposition 
is a marginal matter, perhaps a snare, for what matters is to 
believe true what God declares and shows forth in sign. \\!ill 
one trustingly accept God's veracity and let Him make one safe 
from enemy attacks? The malignant images of death, sin, 
and hell have just one remedy. They are dissipated hy him who 
is for us sheer life, grace, and election. The sacraments reveal 
and apply, not Jesus' offering to God, but God's astounding 
gift to individual believers. All in all, in 151 <) Luther laid the 
hasis for renewing the Christian service of the dying. Most 
significantly he would ground this ministry in tlle central saving 
work of Jesus Christ and in his sacramental gift, which does 
not exclude the company of those whom he has already drawn 
into his sphere oflife and love.19 
Arguing more recently, and after an extensive analysis of the an morlendi 
and German Reformation authors' books on dying (Sterbebttscher), religious 
studies professor Austra Reinis of Missouri State University acknowledged, 
"The emphasis on the sacraments, in particular, on theological discussion of 
the sacraments in the context of instruction on dIe art of dying, is Luther's 
most significant departure from the late medieval ars moriendi.""il It is from 
within this framework that the reformer ministered to and encouraged the 
dying and despondent to receive the sacraments with joy and confidence, 
assuring them of tl1eir salvation and that their deatl1, sin and hell are overcome 
in Christ's passion. Dr. Reinis finishes her work stressing that this certainty 
of one's salvation "represents a radical departure from the arT mon-endi, which 
taught that only through proper preparation could one receive the forgiveness 
of sins offered in the sacraments."21 
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B. The Cura Animarum as an Ethic of Care 
To say that pastoral care (cura animarum-cure of soulsZZ) was essential for 
Luther is as incisive as saying that mathematics is essential for Cambridge 
theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking. The reformer's books and tracts, 
sermons and commentaries and letters were hammered out on the anvil of 
pastoral responsibility. While some may presuppose a "pestilence ethic"23 
serving as a moral-action-guide for Luther's cure of souls, his minis tty of 
consolation extends far beyond situations involving plague and the care of 
people facing immanent death. His pastoral contact included those caught in 
the grips of suffering and distress, many of whom felt abandoned to their 
own weaknesses and the onslaught of desperate feelings of woe, and many 
who felt the pangs of conscience and questioned the authenticity of their new 
faith as Protestants. Lutheran theologian Dr. Oswald Bayer'S characterization 
of Luther's ethics as an extension of his pastoral care is spot on the mark: 
"For all the differences in his addtesses, forms of addtess and ways of 
expression, for all the different themes and issues, one thing remains certain: 
in everything, including his ethics, Luther was a pastoral counselor."24 
The reformer observed individuals who were without any great measure 
of confidence in the effectiveness of penitential piety and/ or in divine aid; 
penitents were anything but consoled and God seemingly withdtew himself.25 
He held priests responsible for this in The Babylonian Captiviry of the Church 
(1520), "Therefore, as the priests are, so let their ministry and duty be. For a 
bishop who does not preach the gospel or practice the cure of souls-what is 
he but an idol in the world [I Cor. 8:4] who has nothing but the name and 
appearance of a bishop?"26 
Others, of the most ardent pastoral concern to Luther, were those whose 
consciences were ravaged by unbelief and absolute dtead with regard to their 
status before God. These lacked an assurance of salvation and thus faced-to 
borrow from Otto's classic discussion of numinous (religious) feelings-the 
"'awefulness,' the tremendum [of God], for which 'Wrath,' 'Fire,' 'Fury,' are 
excellent ideograms."z7 To describe such a conscience in havoc, Luther 
employed the term Anfechtung referring to, on the one hand-from the 
heavenly standpoint-a trial sent by God to test and sttengthen the believer's 
faith, or an attack by the devil to desttoy the believer. On the other hand-
from the human standpoint-it is analogous to Kierkegaardian "Angst"28 
but without any specific English equivalent. It is a "feeling response," whose 
content is terror and structure is dtead toward God. One discerns it as a 
tormented experience of a guilty conscience. It is all of human doubt, panic, 
and desperation that drive the soul to believe that one's guilt is greater than 
God's desire to forgive.29 
This is where Luther demonsttates the cure of souls par excellence. In his 
estimation, only "the sure and certain Word" of the Gospel was able to save 
42 I The Asbury Journal 64/2 (2009) 
one from such distress and despair and bring peace. 30 Moreover, the restoration 
of peace was evidence of God's affirmation of his grace and the effectual 
power of the means of grace. For the reformer, the care of souls was the 
shepherding, interpreting, enabling love of God-all in the context of bible-
based care-revealed in Jesus Christ, represented pastorally, and lived out in 
Christian community.31 Reformation scholar Dr. James Kittelson of Luther 
Seminary in St. Paul, Minnesota, elevated this as Luther's most important 
motivation when he said, "[a]bove all the care of souls, but not the church 
as such, was the driving force in Luther's personal development and in his 
career as friar, professor, theologian, and even reformer."32 
In Luther's including the medieval conscience as a central territory of spiritual 
battle, he targets a new dimension of spiritual care, a new breadth and depth 
in the cure of souls. Notice how he unpacks Paul's argument in Lectures on 
Galatians. Here he refers to those who have committed themselves to the cure 
of souls at the deepest level as "instructors of conscience." These are primarily 
preachers and teachers who understand the Law/Gospel dialectic and those 
among the priesthood of believers who come into contact with human life 
with the desire to lead the afflicted to the place of healing and full realization 
of God's grace. 33 Luther's ministry of the cure of souls was a ministry of 
consolation and encouragement that carried forward his theme of justification 
by grace. 
The reformer also knew that life-and-death situations reveal what people 
really believe. He equally knew that the Scriptures and orthodox doctrine have 
the possibility of giving what they describe. The function of consolation is 
also to give to people what it describes. "In order to comfort timid, 
dismayed, troubled consciences, [Christ says] 'Come to me, all who labor and 
are heavy-laden, and I will give you rest.' Here we are called to come to this 
consolation, to the gospel."34 
To take stock a little, the account I have been developing suggests that the 
reformer's response to the sixteenth century culture and experience of suffering 
and death was for the disturbed conscience of the sinner to hear the comforting 
word of the Gospel. The ancient consolation literature gave comfort with the 
firm and constant reference to the immortality of the soul and the unvarying 
reminder that death had no penal character to it.35 The Greeks drew comfort 
from the hope of a noble death, Judaism in the nearness of God as expressed 
by the Psalter.36 Luther saw that consolation placed the petrified soul on the 
receiving end of care and hope, he also saw that the doctrine of justification 
provided the mind with a clear resolution between law and gospel; both 
served to construct a defense against the perennial spiritual terror of his age. 
The "re-Christianization" and awareness that Luther helped to bring about-
that God's name comforts37-also had a comparable effect upon the 
perception of death. Whereas death was once a Stygian foe in the medieval 
CUBILLOS: CONSOLATION AS THEME IN LUTIlER'S SERMONS I 43 
church, the reformer made it into a friend, or at least something that need not 
be feared as much. 
When plague hit Wittenberg, Elector John urged the professors to leave. 
Instead of goiog to J ena, Luther stayed on iosisting that, "when people are 
dying, they most need a spiritual ministry which strengthens and comforts 
their consciences by word and sacrament and in faith overcomes death,"38 a 
person "is thus responsible before God for his neighbor's death."39 To be 
sure, Luther's stay communicates an iodelible message. It expresses in the 
strongest terms possible that the cure of souls as an ethic of care requires 
unwavering moral responsibility. Dr. Theo Boer of the Protestant Theological 
University, The Netherlands, recendy put forth, "Through justification by 
faith alone human beiogs are freed to become ethical subjects and to bear true 
moral responsibility."40 However, before we can reflect on the relation between 
Luther's doctrioe of justification and the concept of responsibility, we will be 
well served to consider his theme of consolation in his sermons and 
correspondence and to discern how they may elucidate an ethic of responsibility. 
III. Luther's Ministry of Consolation 
It need scarcely be said that the theological issue of a spiritually salutary 
death has always been a central characteristic of pastoral concern. Afrer the end 
of the Middle Ages, iostructions for Christians prepariog for death continued 
to be written either as a subsection oflarger theological and pastoral manuals, 
or, less frequendy, as iodividual treatises. In Luther's writings, his iostruction 
on consolation primarily appears io various sermons and letters; it is not 
confined to anyone particular section of his collected writings. Here is where 
he had an impact upon iodividual Christian inwardness. This is where a 
spiritual leader strives to form a Christian people; here is where the pastor! 
theologian iofluences the moral qualities possessed by a person, a group, or 
community, where people are directed toward moral excellence and the good. 
Again, my ioterest is to iovestigate the reformer's theme of consolation as it 
carries forward his theology of justification and to identify what iosights the 
theme provides into his theological ethics. 
A. Sermons 
The funeral sermon was a public declaration that the departed had obtained 
salvation. Lutheran funeral sermons of the sixteenth century intended for 
both clerical and popular audiences to receive iostruction and to console the 
grieving. "In this way their vivid accounts of sickbed and death continued the 
tradition of the ars manendi of the late Middle Ages, which had also stressed 
the importance of a blessed death."41 Unlike the Lutherans, the Reformed 
rejected most funeral ceremonial, iocluding the preachiog of funeral sermons. 
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"A Sermon On Preparing to Die"42 (1519) contains several preparatory 
stages (twenty points) for death, has a quasi-vigil tone about it, and forms a 
practical, guided imagery or a final mental construct much like the ars moriendi 
for the soon-to-be-departed. Whether the "closeness of death" refers to the 
plague and to the fact that people have come to a point of desiring a sudden 
death which was formerly a source of great fear~r perhaps to an atmosphere 
of anxiety that surrounds death and the gruesome block renderings depicting 
death in the ars moriendi and architecture that may have taken hold of the 
culture-is unclear.43 What is clear is that Luther wants to make sure that the 
focal point of death is Christ. 
You must look at death while you are alive and see sin in the 
light of grace and hell in the light of heaven, permitting nothing 
to divert you from that view. You must not view or ponder 
death in yourself or in your nature, nor in those who were 
killed by God's wrath and were overcome by death. If you do 
that you will be lost and defeated with them. But you must 
resolutely turn your gaze, the thoughts of your heart, and all 
your senses away from this picture and look at death closely 
and untiringly only as seen in those who died in God's grace 
and who have overcome death, particularly in Christ and then 
also in all his saints. In such pictures death will not appear 
terrible and gruesome. No, it will seem contemptible and dead, 
slain and overcome in life. For Christ is nothing other than 
sheer life, as his saints are likewise. The more profoundly you 
impress that image upon your heart and gaze upon it, the 
more the image of death will pale and vanish of itself without 
struggle or battle. Thus your heart will be at peace and you will 
be able to die calmly in Christ and with Christ, as we read in 
Revelation [14:13], ''Blessed are they who die in the Lord ChriSt.44 
Notice Luther's use of the imperatival must. Not only did he want to 
provide some practical evangelical pastoral assistance at the deathbed, he also 
wanted to impart a sense of responsibility to maintain one's gaze upon 
Christ. This is also accomplished in his fIrst Invocavit sermon, March 9, 1522 
(the first of eight exhortations preached at Wittenberg to school his hearers 
in the understanding of how they are responsible to live now that God had 
made them Christians); it too places responsibility on the Christian to prepare 
for death and to focus on Christ. Luther underscores that: 
The summons of death comes to us all, and no one can die for 
another. Everyone must fight his [or her] own battle with 
death by himself [or hersel~, alone. We can shout into another's 
ears, but everyone must himself [or herself] be prepared for 
the time of death, for r will not be with you then, nor you with 
me. Therefore, everyone must himself [or herself] know and 
be armed with the chief things which concern a Christian. And 
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these are what you, my beloved, have heard from me many 
days ago.45 
Systematic and ecumenical theologian, Dr. Gerhard Sauter, at the University 
of Bonn, also senses the Christian responsibility to console others in his 
treatment of the sermon. He paraphrases the reformer's thrust, "Have you 
forgotten your responsibility for your weaker brothers and sisters? We 
must prepare others to stand before God and to account authentically 
for themselves. This very responsibility before God forbids us from living 
in such a way that we withdraw into ourselves, behaving in an isolated, self-
enclosed manner."4/; True, Luther is constantly turning people outside of 
themselves into the world. 
Funeral sermons focus on the resurrection of Christ and its promise to 
Christians, who in the sleep of death await the resutrection. Luther preached 
funeral sermons for Frederic the Wise in 1525 and his brother, the Elector, 
Duke John of Saxony in 1532. The sermons have a self-sustaining, pragmatic 
component; one that relies on a future "fact" of the resutrection and which 
thereby provides consolation rooted in hope. 
Learn to comfort yourselves with these words and instill in 
your hearts the fact that it is far more certain that Duke John of 
Saxony will come out of the grave and be far more splendid 
than the sun now is than that he is lying here before our eyes. 
This is not so certain as the fact that he will live again and go 
forth with Christ because God cannot lie. But take it to heart! 
For he who does not have this comfort can neither comfort 
himself nor be happy, but the more the Word escapes him the 
more the consolation also escapes him.47 
Luther preached that the believer must cling to the Word of God and 
Christ since belief was haunted by the possibility of unbelief. In his style and 
the style of the faith he represented, he counseled, "If you give yourself to 
Scripture, you will feel comfort and all your concerns will be better, which 
otherwise you cannot control by any act or means of your own."48 The 
assertion of trust in Christ was itself a kind of worship, a litany intended to 
comfort. "This then is the true art, that in suffering and cross we should look 
to the Word and the comforting assurance, and trust them, even as He said, 
'In me you shall have peace, but in the world, tribulation' [cf. John 16:33] ."49 
''To be sure, also the faithful are suffering tribulation, but they are consoled in 
it, as we read in Ps. 4:2: 'Thou hast given me room when I was in distress,' 
and in 2 Cor. 1 :4: 'Who comforts us in all our tribulation.' This comfort hope 
and trust in God have given us."so "Therefore when something terrifies or 
harms you it is most comforting that you speak up, confess Christ, and say: 
Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius, all things are under his feet, who can be against 
me?"51 
46 I The Asbury Iournal 64/2 (2009) 
Luther's homiletic foci were no different from other sermon writers in this 
era: the cure of souls and orthodox teaching was the twofold emphasis. Not 
only were parishioners repeatedly clued-up to the finer points of doctrinal 
orthodoxy, but sermons also signified that the maintenance of theological 
principles never had an intrinsic value. These homiletic samples, and many 
more could be drawn from, also illustrate Luther's sense of Christian 
obligation-responsibility. While the impact of preaching upon individual 
hearers may appear negligible, sermons, with all their limitations, were the 
best available device for forging corporate confessional identity, for creating 
doctrinal uniformity, and building a more responsible character in God's 
people. As we can see from this sample of Luther's sermons, he placed a high 
value on his audiences' responsibility for their spiritual interests. The 
prominent feature on which this selection of sermons focuses-just as in his 
letters-is Luther's emphatic establishment of Jesus as the object and basis 
of all consolation. 
Him who comes to Me I shall equip, not only to be refreshed 
and satisfied and to quench his own thirst but also to become 
a sturdy, earthen vessel, endowed with the Holy Spirit and with 
gifts that enable him to give consolation and strength to many 
other people and to serve them, as he was served by Me. 
Thus Christ proposes to transform the man who comes to 
Him into a person different from the one Moses is able to 
make of him.52 
B. Letters and Occasional Writings 
Just as in his sermons, Luther's correspondence provides continuous 
opportunities to perfect his consolatory exaltation of God in life and death. 
Luther's reputation for mordant and forceful language obscures his opposite 
predilection for tender-hearted words of human sympathy and humor. His 
letters to and about his children demonstrate this, especially those in reference 
to the death of his children, where though grief-stricken he still praises God 
and considers the feelings and concerns of others. On the one hand, because 
of his own anguish, he is able to write powerful letters of consolation to 
others. On the other, Dr. Mennecke-Haustein explains that his letters of 
consolation have their basis in his own comfort and joy, in Luther's faith-
experience that Christ is near to human beings and gives himself to them: 
"This comforting and joy-inspiring ('trostliche und freudigmachende') 
experience Luther sought to convey with his language making use of the 
capacity of language to express emotion. "53 
Either way, his pastoral reputation for assisting individuals became so 
widespread that many wrote him asking him to send them in writing either 
counsel or consolation if he was unable to come in person.54 His epistolary 
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practice has a paradoxical feel of an "absent presence" intrinsic to his direct 
style. For example, with his removal of Friar Michael Dressel, the prior of the 
Augustinian monastery at N eustadt/ Orla who was unable to maintain unity 
and peace in the cloister, he states, ''And being absent, I want this letter to do 
to you, who are not available to me now, [precisely] what I would have done 
to you, could I be with you." He then consoles Dressel with the reminder 
that leaders cannot be good and pious in and of themselves, they are responsible 
to be peacemakers. 55 
Note also the death of Benedict Pauli's only son. Luther advises mourning 
but commands Pauli to "leave room for consolation. And this consolation is 
that the Lord gave you and now has taken away your son. Why do you 
torment yourself so much about this? God is omnipotent. He who has 
given you one son can also give you more." CitingJohn 14:19, Luther then 
bumps up against theodicy and attempts to curb any notion that God is the 
cause of evil, insisting that ''Why he pertnits this or that evil to befall us 
should not trouble us at a1L,,56 
And upon the death of Catherine Jonas, Luther writes to Justus Jonas-
the surviving husband-a note of shared consolation. He mentions that his 
own daughter (thirteen year old Magalena Luther, who had died just three 
months earlier) "fell asleep on Jesus' bosom with so many godly and blessed 
expressions of faith in him and this is my great and only consolation."57 
Another instance where Luther invokes the loss of his dearest, devoted 
daughter was in his correspondence to Andrew Osiander who suffered a 
double measure of grief with the loss of his wife and daughter. 
But the language appears to shift ever so slightly in the letter to Osiander. 
I find in it a bit of the language of an ethic of responsibility. The fact that 
Osiander had "been visited by a cross and indeed a twofold cross" implies a 
responsibility to bear it. And while God's evidential love toward Luther was 
manifest in his dearest daughter, he is responsible to crucify his own 
corresponding "natural love which asserts itself too powerfully in us" in 
order that "the good, acceptable, and perfect will of God may be done."58 
Both Luther and Osiander are responsible to offer up their natural emotions 
as if to replicate the Akedah Yitzchak (Gen. 22:2), "for the Lord this burnt 
offering is necessary, for us it is a consolation."59 Thus, if Luther is espousing 
a nascent ethic of responsibility, and I believe he is, then he is working with 
the issues of integrating faith and ethics, or responsible living as an outworking 
of his theology. 
Besides the "crises" of death, other crises can strike the believer, be it 
illness, [mancial woes, domestic difficulties, etc.; these too can result in: a crisis 
of faith and were not uncommon runong Protestants. Salvation and its 
assurance, peace and joy in one's life, as well as security in eternity, are issues on 
which the conscience primarily suffers. These can serve as a sourcing mechanism 
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for our investigation of the theme of consolation, Por Valentine Hausmann 
and his chronic unbelief, Luther consoles him with the words, "How many 
there are who have less faith than you have!" I-Iausemann's awareness of his 
condition is an affirmation that God wants to help him, Luther seems to say 
"hang in there!" "Cling calmly to God, and he will cause everything to turn 
out welL"',(I Pour months later, Luther writes again insisting that Hausmann 
should not be impatient with regard to achieving the strength of faith he 
feels he ought: "You should not worry too much about it," implores the 
reformer. Furthermore, additional instructions and responsibilities are given 
to assist in the situation: 
You must pray powerfully, cry out against your terror, and 
repeat the Lord's Prayer in a loud voice, Above all, you must 
take to heart that there is no doubt that your terror comes from 
the devil. God wants you to resist, and it is on this account that 
he allows this to happen, And you may be sure that he will hear 
fervent prayers and help, lHJave something from the Psalms 
or the New Testament read to you in a clear vo ice, and listen 
attentively to the reading,'d 
Examples of "other crises" include "Matthias Weller's and his bouts of 
melancholy He was encouraged by Luther to avoid his own thoughts and to 
listen to what others (presumably Christians) say to him, It is a di vine 
command that they are to comfort one another, and he needs "to learn to 
believe that God is speaking to you through them,",,2 His brother, J erome 
Weller, lived in Luther's home, tutored the Luth<:f children, and served as 
amanuensis for much of the tab le talk, For his depression Luther encourag<:d 
him to "rejoice in this temptation of the devil because it is a certain sign that 
God is propitious and merciful to you:' When the temptation to become 
depressed appears, Jerome ough t not dwell 011 "those deadly thoughts," but 
instead " joke and play games" in order to "drive out lthe] diabolical thoughts 
and take courage:'G3 The stratagem for \'Veller was "more merriment!" and 
forJonas Von Stockhausen, police captain of Nordhausen, the prescription 
was "sweat it out!" "For the darts of the devil cannot be removed pleasantly 
and without effort when they are so deeply imbedded in your flesh, They 
must be torn out by force:'64 Nonetheless, the foundational similarities 
between these are Luther's reminder of Christ's unpleasant sufferings and 
believers' responsibility to bear them like him, 
The preceding references can be re-read through the lenses of "personal 
responsibility" as each case required an action or Luther prescribed a duty. In 
his "1\ letter of consolation to the Christians at Haile"" \ (1527) occasioned by 
the murder of his friend, follower, and young pastor- George Winkler-
and written to console his parishioners, the reformer's primary points include 
a call for them to pray for their enemies, They are responsible not to retain any 
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feelings of bitterness or thoughts of revenge, but to pity and pray for his 
murderers. In the midst of this calling to act responsibly, he bids them to 
accept suffering as natural and inevitable for Christians. 
The fInal correspondence we will consider concerns George Spalatin who 
wrote to Luther requesting that he prepare a book or letter of spiritual 
consolation for Elector Fredrick who was bedridden with a serious illness. 
Luther refused him, exclaiming to Spalatin-who was also the elector's chaplain 
and secretary-that he did not see the necessity of it since he had already 
written a modest exposition of spiritual comfort entitled Te.rsaradecas 
consolatoria, "The Fourteen of Consolation."66 "Even better," responds Luther, 
"why don't you urge him to read the Gospels and the Passion of Christ, for 
there is no better consolation than that?"67 
In sum, Marius relates "[t]here was always in Luther a powerful sense, 
paradoxically terrifying and comforting at once, of the individual standing 
alone before God."68 On the part of Luther's sermon hearers or recipients of 
his letters, he consoled thcm with the good news ofjustifying grace. Theirs' 
was a responsibility to labor hard through the suffering and grief, being 
responsible before God and relying solely on Him for the results of His plan 
as they had come clear in the death and resurrection of Christ as well as by the 
means of grace in their own lives. As Dr. Jane Strohl of the Pacific Lutheran 
Theological Seminary fIttingly contends, "Although he gives his own particular 
cast to the art of dying, death remains the fInal test, and one is not wholly 
secure until it has come and gone and found one steadfast. \~?hile proclaiming 
faith to be a gift, Luther still holds the dying person responsib Ie for remaining 
constant in the conviction that he is saved by grace alone."69 
These representational selections of the Luther canon reveal his pastoral 
concern and demonstrate his intentionality of calling people to live and die 
responsibly in the context of the Word, to rely on the mercy of God and His 
justifying grace, and to accept salvation and the consolation of God by faith. 
The exempJarism contained in these sermons and correspondence was directed 
primarily, although not exclusively, to sustaining a Christian attitude rather 
than providing concrete examples of the Christian life and its good works. 
The emphasis is not on an external act which is to be dutifully emulated, but 
an internal mind-set which is to be evident to others. SpecifIcally, in their 
responsibility to imitate the paradigmatic pattern of Christ's life, Christians 
are to have faith in the midst of bearing the cross and faithfully serving the 
needs of the neighbor, not as it is displayed in Jesus, but because it is displayed 
in Jesus. Christians are to be obedient, humble and loving, not as Jesus 
was-which would present an overwhelming challenge since we livc in vastly 
different cultures and under immeasurably different circumstances-but 
because he was. 
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rv. Luther's Theology of Justification and Theological Ethics 
The continuity between Luther and late medieval culture segues into a 
new quality of the experience of God where God actively assails passive 
humanity in order to bestow joy and courage to life. "This is the comfort that 
preserves us. Our hearts are full of joy and courage despite the persecutions 
and raging of the world. For we have the kind of Lord who does not merely 
redeem us from sin, God's wrath, and eternal death, but who also protects 
and saves us in suffering and persecution so that we do not perish."70 And 
where the former response to human suffering, death, and the cure of souls 
was culturally hidebound, Luther's response, and the content and shape of 
his consolation-I am arguing-find its grounding in theological ethics and 
its source in the doctrine of justification by grace through faith. Before we 
investigate this, we are once again in a better position to understand Luther 
and his theological ethics if we first understand his Sitz im Leben and the 
contours of the theology and philosophical ethics to which he responds. 
A. Justification By Grace Through Faith 
In his lectures through the Psalms (1513-15), Romans (1515-16), and 
Galatians (1519), and in his working out his theology in conttoversy with Eck 
and his other detractors, Luther emphatically rejected the medieval notion of 
progressive justification and its Aristotelian source that "we become just by 
doing just acts.'>71 He came to see that the gospel reveals the righteousness of 
God (iustitia Del) and that "by the righteousness of God we must not 
understand the righteousness by which He is righteous in Himself but the 
righteousness by which we are made righteous by God. This happens through 
faith in the Gospel."72 
In his sermon Two Kinds ojRighteousness (1519), Luther exclaims that it is 
this righteousness, an "alien righteousness, that is the righteousness of 
another, [which is] instilled [into us] from without. This is the righteousness 
of Christ by which he justifies through faith."73 The justification of sinners 
is not due to their sanctification, but due to Christ's fulfillment of all 
righteousness. His righteousness has been imputed or credited to US.74 Proper 
righteousness is the outgrowth of Christ's alien righteousness (justitia Christi 
aliena). It is proper "not because we alone work it, but because we work with 
that first and alien righteousness. This is that manner of life spent profitably 
in good works."75 The Reformation, like Paul, articulated the liberation of 
humanity by faith from the obsession of works. Thus, the correct sequence 
in Luther's mind was "Good works do not make a good man, but a good 
man does good works."76 Along this line, Luther insisted that genuine faith 
does not serve the self, but is active in love toward the neighbor.77 
Luther's juxtaposition of justification and consolation by faith is most 
evident in his Lectures on Galatianswhere they appear as a sequential progression 
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in the life of the believer that begins with justifying grace, gains momentum 
by faith, and-like the concluding crescendo of a Bach fugue--ends with the 
victorious climax of consolation. Justification-reception of forgiveness by 
faith-gladdened and consoled conscience-triumph over troubles, including 
the ultimate trouble, death. The doctrine of justification, for Luther, brings 
assured "consolation to troubled consciences amid genuine terrors.»78 He 
professed, "Thus when a man is consoled and encouraged by the grace of 
God-that is, by the forgiveness of sins and the peace of conscience-he can 
bravely endure and overcome all troubles, including even death itself."79 In 
Luther's thinking, justification vouchsafes the experience of consolation. 
Again, the reformer carries forward consolation as a conclusion to justification 
when he insisted, "If He gave Himself into death for our sins, then 
undoubtedly He is not a tormentor. He is not One who will cast down the 
troubled, but One who will raise up the fallen and bring propitiation and 
consolation to the terrified. Otherwise Paul would be lying when he says 
'who gave Himself for our sins.m80 It is in Luther's theology of justification 
we see what Christ's love has done for us, in the theme of consolation we see 
theological ethics embodying justification, both of which are grounded upon 
God's unmerited love for humankind. 
B. Theological Ethics and the Ascription of Responsibili!J 
Luther cut his ethical teeth, so to speak, while lecturing several times 
weekly on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics during his first year at Wittenberg 
(1508-09). Here he saw firsthand the amalgamation and domination of the 
Aristotelian system in scholasticism. Aristotle's seminal doctrine of e~I~, 
where humanity's moral virtue is incrementally realized, perfected, and made 
permanent (on the order of skill or musical expertise achieved by continual 
practice or. E:8IOl..loC;)81 was baptized by the scholastics who Christianized the 
notion as an added sense to human nature, the vehicle by which good works 
done in imitation of the example of Christ prepare for the reception of grace, 
righteousness and, inevitably, salvation. 
Against this thrust of most scholastic moral theory and anthropology 
Luther asserted, 
[t]he common saying that human nature in a general and 
universal way knows and wills the good but errs and does not 
will it in particular cases would be better stated if we were to say 
that in particular cases human nature knows and wills what is 
good but in general neither knows nor wills it. And this is 
in agreement with Scripture, which describes man as so turned 
in on himself that he uses not only physical but even spiritual 
goods for his own purposes and in all things seeks only himself. 
This curvedness is now natural for us, a natural wickedness 
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and a natural sinfulness. Thus man has no help from his natural 
powers, but he needs the aid of some power outside of 
himself.82 
It was the scholastics and their Aristotelian method of basing "sin and 
righteousness on works, both their performance or omission,"83-the scope 
of their actualization on what a person does-that troubled Luther. He 
thought that this was to place action in ascendancy over being; and to be 
turned into the self (incurvatus in se) instead of being absolutely dependent 
upon God. Faith is not to look "within," but "outside of," to Christ. If we 
believe that what a person is, is the result of what a person does, then the 
matter of sin and grace are in point of fact removed from any discussion of 
human nature; it consigns them solely to the realm of works. This, Luther 
believed, is the underlying reason why, 
[oJur theologians .. have deflected the discussion of sin to the 
matter of good works only and have undertaken to teach only 
those things by which works might be safeguarded but not 
how through much agony men should humbly seek healing 
grace and confess themselves to be sinners. Thus of necessity 
they make men proud and cause them to think that they are 
already entirely righteous when they have performed certain 
outward works.84 
And this is why Luther reasoned that "[v]irtually the entire Ethics of Aristotle 
is the worst enemy of grace. This in opposition to the scholastics.""' 
Luther concluded that the Aristotelian person seeks his /her own good in 
everything, and therefore human fulfillment comes in self-love. Furthermore, 
inasmuch as the medieval ethic sought after justification and reduced to a 
basic mechanistic imitation86 of Jesus' life-style, both of which are primarily 
ethical concepts, through pious works, the most we can say is that it was this 
theological ethic which brought about the reformer's failure as a monk. 87 The 
focal point of medieval Christology was the archetypal and paradigmatic 
nature of the life, work and death of Christ, the Christus exemplum. 88 Luther 
rejected medieval piety's placement of the Christus exemplum before the Chrisms 
sacramentum, works before faith, and the imitatio Christi before conformitas 
Christi. This is not to say that he rejected good works or the imitation of 
Christ. In fact, it is faith in Christ's sacrifice which in turn obliges or "behooves" 
us to imitate and live according to the example of Christ. 89 This reversal of 
the traditional medieval order, rather than the compulsion of an existential 
choice, is the truly revolutionary aspect of Luther's Christo logical and ethical 
thought. It was the realization that in imitating Christ we cannot hope to 
become a contributor to the divine activity of assimilating a copy of the 
exemp!um. It is the reformer's theological ethics that make the believer 
responsible to perform good works and it is her maintaining the imitation 
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Christ that gives guidance and direction for those works to be performed. 
Underlying this seemingly straightforward dichotomy is a profound 
theological insight. The transformation of humanity is a prerequisite for its 
reformation. The art of living authentically for God and for others, what we 
may refer to as ars vivendi, is the spontaneous, responsibly responding action 
of that transformed character participating in acts of beneficence as unto 
God, not out of obedience to a discipline of law imposed from \\~thout. Yet here, 
in a manner of speaking, is the proverbial rub in the reformer's theological ethics. 
Luther first worked out some of the main contours of his theological 
ethics in his 1520 tract, "The Freedom of a Christian."90 His undertaking was 
to create a context in which people could become the kind of Christians 
envisioned in this tract, introducing the seemingly complementary theses 
that the Christian life was one wherein the Christian is "a perfectly free lord, 
subject to none" and "a perfectly dutiful servant, subject to all."91 It makes 
clear that a believing Christian is free from sin through faith in God, yet 
bound by love to serve his neighbor, and Luther sees these as correlative 
truths. Nonetheless, his ethics-based as it is on the law of love-contains 
his famous ambivalence. On the one hand, it is free from the law; on the 
other hand, deontologically, it really is G od's command, and the Christian is 
responsible, even duty-bound to follow it. Is this not in fact a new formulation 
of law standing in the way of true morality? How docs Luther advocate 
freedom from law and resolve this apparent love legalism?92 
Systems of ethics are inclined to discuss moral acts in terms of their goal 
(teleological), duty (deontological), or fittingness (cathr;kontic). A theological 
ethical system based upon the doctrine of justification by faith tends to 
discuss moral acts in terms of what they presuppose or are intended to 
express. From this standpoint, Luther asserted that the Christian is free 
inasmuch as the Word of God and the forgiveness of sins in Christ liberates 
her from sin, death, hell, and the devil. Such a liberated Christian does not 
scorn good deeds but does them willingly. Joined with Christ in justification 
the Chtistian lives as Christ in the world, a life of consoling service to others." 
As to its outworking, Luther presented his theological ethics in the context 
of his recommendations for practice. "\1(,'hy, the whole Scripture is concerned 
with provoking us to faith; now driving us witll commands and threats, now 
drawing us with promises and consolations. In fact, everything in Scripture is 
either a command or a promise. The commands humble the proud with 
their demands, the promises exalt the humble with their forgiveness."94 In 
other words, the task of theological ethics is to present the claims of the 
Word of God to humanity. Theological ethics must, therefore, remain 
grounded in the Word of God; otherwise it is untrue to its charge and 
disintegtates into a theoretical enterprise at best or-at worst-a metastatic 
escapist gnosis. Luther elevated this new etllical context within the ilieologieal 
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confines of his age anc..llived it out-lived it as a demonstration of consolation 
and cura animamm-rct1ecting the Gospel working through the Christian 
individual, penetrating whatever it touches as it serves others. 
The fine, theological point ofit-a harmonizing ofms alleged ambivalence 
seen through today's theological spectacles and wrapped in the parlance of 
responsibility-is this: the task set before the Christian is more a responsibility, 
and less a duty. It is discretionary, filled with problems left to one's moral 
sensitivities and decision-making abilities. The norm is not simply a law to be 
obeyed, but a job as a faithful, responsible steward to be done well (l\1t. 
25:21). Just as the reformer responded in love to the real world of his 
experience, the responsible Christian responds to God by responding in love 
to the exigencies and people found in each situation with which experience is 
shared. 
The authentically Christian etmc for T ,lither is based on an experience of 
what God has given and makes possible, not on some absolutized perception 
of what God demands; it therefore deals more with doerr than with specific 
deeds (the parable of the Good Samaritan is really about being a neighbor, 
not just loving one's neighbor). This is an ethics, then, that consists not of 
Christian actions, but always of "Christian acting," not in the sense of role-
playing, but as a people who have been shaped by God whose Christian 
responsiveness grows out of the response to God's love and responds to 
othersYs Therefore, in the theological attribution of responsibility, the 
Christian is made, not held, responsible. Casting this in terms of the reformer's 
notion of conscience-the key to his mature theological understanding of 
the sel( and a key insight into his theological ethics--our union with Christ96 
makes us conscious of responsibility, th.e self as being before God and 
responsible toward God. 
V. Consolation and the Moral Economy of Christian Responsibility 
In this article I have brought together Martin Luther's theology of 
justification with his theol06'Y and ministry of consolation, and found them 
to be compatible, based, as they are, on the love of God as revealed in Christ. 
I have shown that the theme of consolation, while temporally conditioned, 
affirmed, and established in the lives of people, is to be seen in the light of 
Luther's theology of justification and theological ethics. Consolation was no 
mere theoretical model; it was effectively used as a spiritual resource in his 
personal experience.'" It was also understood to be biblically determined, as 
Paul announced to the Corinthians (2 Cor. 1 :3-7), 
Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the 
Father of mercies and the God of all consolation, who consoles 
us in all our affliction, so that we may be able to console those 
who are in any aft1iction with the consolation with which we 
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ourselves are consoled by God. For just as the sufferings of 
Christ are abundant for us, so also our consolation is abundant 
thtough Christ. If we are being afflicted, it is for your consolation 
and salvation; if we are being consoled, it is for your consolation, 
which you experience when you patiently endure the same 
sufferings that we are also suffering. Our hope for you is 
unshaken; for we know that as you share in our sufferings, so 
also you share in our consolation.98 
Accordingly, consolation begins with transcendence and turns to human 
responsibility to fortify others, the same as loving one's neighbor. From its 
place in the divine economy, consolation is to be injected by the Christian into 
the lives of people when they need it most as part of the moral economy of 
Christian responsibility. 
We identify Luther as a reformer, yet his pastoral ministry was far more 
extensive than is generally recognized. He never lost sight of the individual 
soul, which he cared for and consoled with God's Word. And perhaps chief 
among his contributions in the history of Christian thought was the notion 
that the redeemed/justified do not need to be overwhelmed by sin, distress, 
and death. Looking at the present-day religious scene, we may conclude that 
he greatly contributed toward this, achievement. Not in the sense that psycho-
therapeutic religion has prevailed over cultural conceptions of death or in the 
prolonging of biological survival over any cost in suffering, but in the 
reformation sense; one that calls us, above all else, to protest our own sin and 
insouciance toward God, to be open to God's love in life and death and to be 
responsible to see the neighbor as Christ sees her, to be--in Luther's words-
"a Christ to the other."99 
Against those who insist that "the stakes of evangelical spiritualism that 
continue to be raised are at constant risk of having their bluff called,'>HlO or a 
Nietzschean narcissistic assertive, "If it was the central purpose [of the 
Protestant Reformation] to make people-all people-think, feel, and act as 
Christians, to imbue them with a Christian mind-set, motivational drive, 
and a way of life, it failed,"101 Luther would hurl his inkpot and offer his 
Christological wager. 
Why are you seeking and looking for other ways? Look to Me, 
and reject all other thoughts regarding ways to heaven. You 
must expunge these completely from your heart and think of 
nothing but these words of Mine: "I am the Way." See to it 
that you tread on Me, that is, cling to Me with strong faith and 
with all confidence of the heart. I will be the Bridge to carry you 
across. In one moment you will come out of death and the 
fear of hell into yonder life. For it is I who paved the way and 
the course. I walked and traversed it Myself, so that I might 
take you and all My followers across. All that is necessary is that 
56 I The Asbury Journal 64/2 (2009) 
you unhesitatingly set yout foot on Me, wager boldly on Me, 
go cheerfully and happily, and die in My name.102 
The imperatival tone in the reformer's wager tells us again that the 
reformation ethic of responsibility is a theological ethic-more so, a Christian 
ethic-insofar as it confesses Christ to be the participatory center of the 
church and her ethics. Thus, it is Christological. In affirming this, we must 
step back from our usual grounding of our ethics implicitly or explicitly in 
various human experiences with respect to how we define morality. The 
appeal to experience alone does not substantiate an ethical position. Nor can 
the philosopher and theologian simply identify the state of affairs that must 
obtain in human existence (i.e., the need of consolation) for persons to have 
such experiences (i.e., being consoled). The ultimate and best evidence for 
Christian ethics and justification lies in God's Word in its tripartite sense of 
Christ, the gospel he made known, and the Scripture that reliably communicates 
this and consolation to us (e.g., "Even though I walk through the valley of 
the shadow of death," "God is our refuge and strength, a very present help 
in trouble," "This is my comfort in my affliction, that your word has revived 
me," "Come to me, all who are weary and heavy-laden, and I will give you 
rest.") 
I have also demonstrated that a suitable context for consolation is the 
moral economy of Christian responsibility. The responsibility to console 
emerges from Christ's vicarious sacrifice into a world that is God's, yet fallen. 
It is a mature ethic of care, of respect, and enhancement to the integrity of 
life. The theme of consolation in Luther's correspondence and sermons not 
only demonstrates but gives us the insight into his theological ethics that 
there is a moral economy to Christian responsibility: Christians are to structure 
the basic forms of human relationships in which they live in such a way that 
God may be glorified and people might receive God's gift of consolation. 
For Luther, the characteristic of this Christian life is life lived in response to 
redemption. It is decisively rooted in one's responsibility to God for the 
actions made in life, in one's faith, hope, and love. In so doing, the anxiety 
and ritual of death are replaced by the ethics of life, through Jesus Christ; 
through his life, death, resurrection, and reign in power. This was how Luther 
reinterpreted his era's interpretations of life and death. 
Indeed, the fundamental part of the Christian art of living (ars vivendi) is 
the recognition that life takes place in the presence of God, and the challenge 
to take responsibility for the whole of our lives, religious and secular, is as 
stewards obedient to God. While we cannot simply repeat the reformer's 
consolatory insights and inject them into out age, we can ask of what might 
this ethics and ministry consist and where does it begin it in light of the 
terrors of out day. The starting point of a genuinely Christian ethics in 
Luther's system of thought and its relation to the realities of our world today 
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lies in the recognition that the conversion of the individual leads to a new 
faith and obedience, a new lifestyle of being bound to the God who 
commands, and a personal ethic of responsibility to the commands of God. 
All too often Christianity today avoids responsibility when entering the realm 
of love, and avoids love when entering the realm of responsibility. To the 
extent that the people involved in the cure of souls are a Christ rooted people, 
they must remember that the love and beneficent care offered to others is 
implicit in their responsibly-responding relationship to God. As such, a 
ministry of consolation may be the most effective way to promote a renewed 
sense of Christian responsibility for today, because it emphasizes the inner 
resources of faith and a redeemed life rather than any external incentives that 
our world may offer. 
What, then, does consolation in the moral economy of Christian 
responsibility require? T t is the responsibility for the Chris tian to be, on a one-
to-one basis, a companion and encourager of him or her who is in distress, 
in desperate need, or alone, to be spontaneously near him or her and absolutely, 
genuinely present with someone whom hardship-of whatever nature it 
may be-has placed in critical need or solitude. It includes loving our neighbors 
(Rom. 13:8-10), caring for their souls, directing them to God, providing for 
their needs where we are able, and speaking the consolations of God into 
their life. ,o3 Barth concurs, "If another can comfort and encourage me by 
telling me that he stands with me under the same command-and there is 
no greater comfort or stronger encouragement on earth than awareness of 
this common bond-nevertheless no other can be responsible for my proper 
hearing of what is commanded of me. "'04 
Thomas it Kempis wrote, ''All human comfort is vain and short."105 Not 
so \vith the consolation of God; its forms are many and can always match the 
suffering. God can deliver us "otttifaftliction" or encourage us "itt affliction" 
so that it can be endured. Luther would be quick to add that the consolations 
of God soften, rather than remove affliction. '06 The moral economy of 
Christian responsibility today, just as in Luther's day, takes up this ministry 
of care to temper sorrow, rather than striving to make it disappear, and what 
is to be expected from its influence is calmness in catastrophe, strength in 
tribulation, and peace in adversity rather than the sudden and definitive 
extinction of all suffering. It is a positive ethics of accompaniment, as opposed 
to living and dying in desolation. 
At this point permit me to beg to differ with Pascalian heartfelt intuition 
and the diminution of conso lation, that «Peu de chose nous console, parce 
que peu de chose nous afflige.»107 Life-whether during the late 11iddle Ages, 
or the Reformation, or today-involves a monumental amount of conflict 
management, the greatest of which is death. A prevalent Christian theme 
asserted by the reformer was that in order to achieve consolation in this life, 
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one must first be responsible to confront and successfully manage the anxieties 
of the age and the fear of death by responding and responsibly relying on the 
God who alone redeems from sin, justifies, and gives peace of conscience, 
comfort, and security. Thus, consolation is not a remedy, it is a result of the 
remedy; it is found in ar.r 1)i1Je1Jdi not ar.r moriendi. 
Robert H. Cubillos is visiting professor of current topics in Bible ami 
theology at the Russian-American Christian University, Moscow, Russia, and 
adjunct professor of philosophy at California State University, Dominguez 
Hills, Carson California. 
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"Luther's Eschatology: The Last Times and the Last Things" (PhD diss., University 
of Chicago, 1989), 110. The late Richard Marius of Harvard contended that 
Luther had no "rational or systematic answer" for the problem of evil and that 
"Satan was filially God's Satan, doing in a perverse way God's will." See Richard 
Marius, Martin Luther: The Christian Between God and Death (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 76-79. 
57 To Justus Jonas, December 26, 1542, WA, Br, X, 226-228. This reminds us 
of Schleiermacher's very personal statements in his graveside sermon for his nine-
year-old son, Nathanael, translated in Albert L. Blackwell, "Schleiermacher's Sermon 
at Nathanael's Grave," Pastoral Psychology 26/1 (1977): 23-36; and Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schleiermachers siimmtliche Werke (vol. II/6; Berlin: 
Georg Reimer, 1834-64), 71-72; also found in The Christian Household: a sermonic 
treatise (trans. Dietrich Seidel and Terence N. Tice; vol. 3; Schleiermacher Studies 
and Translations; Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellen Press, 1991). 
58 To Andrew Osiander, June 3, 1545, WA, Br, XI, 113, 114. 
59 Ibid. 
60 To Valentine Hausmann, February 19, 1532, WA, Br, VI, 267 
61 To Valentine Hausmann, June 24, 1532, WA, Br, VI, 322-23. 
62 To Matthias Weller, October 7, 1534, WA, Br, VII, 104-06. 
63 To Jerome Weller, July 1530, WA, Br, V, 518-20. 
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64 To Jonas Von Stockhausen, November 27,1532, WA, Br, VI, 386-88. Note 
also the letter to Mrs. Jonas Von Stockhausen on the same day (pp. 388-89) 
wherein Luther mentions that God sends suffering in order that we might conform 
to him. Note also the encouragement that she not leave her husband alone and 
that she hide the cutlery, other sharp instruments, and any toxins: "leave nothing 
about with which he might harm himself. Solitude is poison to him." 
65 A Letter of Consolation to the Christians at Halle Upon the Death of their 
Pastor, George Winkler, September or November 1527, WA, Br, II, 402-03, LW 
43: 145-66. 
66 WA, VI, (99) 104-34, LW 42:121-166. See also, Jane E. Strohl, "Luther's 
'Fourteen Consolations,'" Lutheran Quarterly 3/2 (1989): 169-82. 
67 To George Spalatin, November 11, 1521, LW 48:325-28. 
68 Marius, Luther, 333. 
69 Strohl, "Luther's Eschatology," 160. 
70 LW 13:340 (expo siting Psalm 110:6). 
71 See The Complete Works of Aristotle (ed. Jonathan Barnes; vol. II.!; 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), Nicomachean Ethics, 1103b. 
72 LW 25:151 (Lectures on Romans). 
73 LW 31:297 (expositing Phil. 2:5-6). This anthropological and soteriological 
perspective, that the Christian is and lives in another extrinsically, extra se, by an 
alien righteousness, not from and in herself, is essential for understanding Luther. 
See Daphne Hampson, Christian Contradictions: The Structures of Lutheran and 
Catholic Thought (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001), 9-55. 
74 The doctrine of justification, considered by Luther and his followers to be 
the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae, is enshrined in the Augsburg Confession 
(1530), a brief statement in Article 4; the Smalcald Articles, Part II, Article 1 
(1537); Belgic Confession (1561), Articles 22-23; Heidelberg Catechism (1563), 
Question 60; and Westminster Confession of Faith (1647), Chap. II. For a superb 
examination of the historical development of the doctrine, see Alister E. McGrath, 
Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, (3rd cd.; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
75 LW 31:299 (Two Kinds of Righteousness). 
76 LW 31:361 (The Freedom of a Christian). 
77 Perhaps his most earnest declaration of this belief is in his Preface to the 
Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans (1546), LW 35:370-71. 
78 LW 26:133 (expo siting Gal. 2:17) 
7Y LW 26:27 (Lectures on Galatians). 
80 LW 26:39 (expo siting Gal. 1:5). 
81 See Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, and the references to training by accustoming 
or habituation at 1098b4, 1099h9, 1103a20, b16; 1119a27, 1121a23, 1151aI9, 
1152a29; 1180a3, 15 until one acquires the right habits (©2'H) referenced at 
1095a4, 1l03a17, 1148b17, 34; 1154a33, 1179h21, 1180b5, 1181b22. 
B2 WA 56:355, LW 25:345. 
83 LW 25:261 (Lectures on Romans). 
84 Ibid., 263. 
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85 LW 31:12 (Disputation Against the Scholastics). 
86 While I Cor. 11: 1,1 Pet. 2:21, and the writings of Tauler and it Kempis press 
believers into the medieval rhetorical sense of imitatio, a careful observance of 
how one responds to the givens in one time and place and going and doing likewise 
in another time and place, mimicry is not the aim but is often the unmindful result. 
What is intended is closer to Paul's depiction of the identifying essence of his life 
in Phil. 1:21 ("For to me, to live is Christ"). This speaks to a far more meaningful 
connection than a conformand's simple impersonation of Jesus, the core sense 
being nearer to the Johannine lJeV€IV, a participatory religio-moral-action-guide 
found in the real living experience of rootedness in Christ and the concrete ethic 
of his example; one of concrete relations-a responsibiliry before God. 
87 C£ LW 44:200-1 and his cover letter to John Lang, February 8, 1517 (WA, 
Br, 1:88-89, LW 48:36-38), and most notably his theses of September 1517 
against the inftltration of Aristotelian philosophy into Scholastic theology (WA 
1 :224ff.; LW 31 :9ff). On the idea that Aristotelian ethics drove Luther to take up 
the reformer's mande, note the exchange between Ronald N. Frost (''Aristode's 
Ethics: The Real Reason for Luther's Reformation?" Trinity Journal 18/2 [1997]: 
223-241) and Richard A. Muller ("Scholasticism, Reformation, Orthodoxy, and 
the Persistence of Christian Aristotelianism," Trinity Journal 19/1 [1998]: 81-96), 
and the rejoinder by Frost ("'Scholasticism, Reformation, Orthodoxy, and the 
Persistence of Christian Aristotelianism': A Brief Rejoinder," Trinity Journal 19/ 
1 [1998]: 97-101). 
88 Dietmar Lage, Martin Luther on the 1mitatio Christi and Conformitas 
Christi and Their Relationship to Good Works (vol. 45; Texts and Studies in 
Religion; Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990): passim. 
89 LW 27:238, "the suffering of Christ is both a sacrament and an example-
a sacrament because it signifies the death of sin in us and grants it to those who 
believe, an example because it also behooves us to imitate Him in bodily suffering 
and dying. The sacrament is what is stated in Rom. 4:25: 'Who was put to death for 
our trespasses and raised for our justification.' The example is what is stated in I 
Peter 2:21: 'Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you should follow 
in His steps.''' 
9D LW 31:333-377 
91 From Paul's dictum, "For though I am free from all, I have made myself a 
servant to all" (I Cor. 9:19, ESV). 
92 Richard Niebuhr "solves" this problem in Luther by utilizing Ernst Cassirer's 
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (4 vols.; trans. Ralph Manheim, pref. and 
intro. Charles W. Hendl; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953-1996). He 
relegates the law emphasis to the image of "man the citizen" homo politicus(the 
obeyer and enactor of laws), which-incidentally-Niebuhr rejects, and 
incorporates the love emphasis into the image of "man the answerer" homo 
dialogicus (the fitting responder), the symbol of the responsible person. See H. 
Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral 
Philosophy(New York: Harper & Row, 1963). Gustafson "solves" it by considering 
Luther's ethic a Gesinnungsethik, an ethic of disposition; as it is not a new external 
law it avoids legalism. The Christian is inwardly disposed to do what the law 
requires her to do in a different spirit from what was once the case and she acts out 
her faith toward her neighbor in a spirit and manner that exceeds legal requirements. 
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See James M. Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life (New York: Harper & Row, 
1968). The notion of exceeding legal requirements is reminiscent of two other 
possible "solutions." Pascal's epigram indicated his contention that true morality is 
found beyond the law, «Ia oraie morale Ie moque de la morall!» ("true morality laughs 
at morality"), see Blaise Pascal, Oeuvres Completes (Texte Etabli et Annote par 
Jacques Chevalier; vol. 34 Bibliotheque de la Pl6iade; Paris: Gallimard, 1954), 
1094, §24. As well, Halakhic Judaism's concept of 1"il m,lZ77.1 O'l!l' (/ifnitll mi-
shurat ha-din), usually rendered "beyond the line of the law" or "beyond the measure 
of the law," understands morality to begin only after the fulfillment of the law. As 
a supererogatory act, it promotes an end (teleologically) which is morally binding 
to follow (deontologically), yet in such a manner that it is not deontologically 
obligatory because it requires so much of the actor. The requirement is to do the 
right and the good in the eyes of Yahweh (Deut. 6:18) as evolving from the 
context of one's acts, and may vary with circumstances and individuals; different 
from the imposition of a fIxed objective legal standard (1", din). Along this line, 
George Lindbeck ("Martin Luther und der rabbinische Geist," Neue Zeitschrift 
fur Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 40/1 [1998]: 40-65) fInds 
formal similarities, despite material differences, in his comparison of Luther's 
point of view as a pastor and catechist to Max Kadushin's probing of the Rabbinic 
mindset in the latter's The Rabbinic Mind (Classics in Judaic Studies; New York: 
Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1952; repr., Binghamton, N.Y.: Global 
Academic Publishing, 2001). 
93 LW 21:103, Luther says, "Here you have a word and a command of God 
hovering over you, commanding you to love your neighbor, to rebuke the disorderly, 
and to comfort the sorrowful. Because it is a matter of command, it cannot be 
wrong" (expo siting Mt. 5:33). 
94 LW 36:124 (The Babylonian Captivity of the Church, 1520). 
95 I am drawing on Niebuhr's The Responsible Self, 126, and his theological 
conception of responsibility: "Responsibility affttms: 'God is acting in all actions 
upon you. So respond to all actions upon you as to respond to his action.'" 
96 A trenchant interpretation of neighbor love as shaped by justifIcation/ 
union with Christ which serves as a model to understand and integrate faith and 
ethics-following the Finnish school of Luther interpretation-is provided by 
Michigan State University College of I,aw Professor, Mark Totten, who also holds 
a Ph.D. in ethics from the Yale University Department of Religious Studies. See 
his "Luther on Unio cum Christo," Journal of Religious Ethics 31/3 (Winter 
2003): 443-462. 
97 LW 43:200, "I give thanks for his infInite compassion by which he has come 
to me in such a fatherly way and, unasked, unbidden, and unmerited, has offered 
to be my God, to care for me, and to be my comfort, guardian, help, and strength 
in every time of need. We poor mortals have sought so many gods and would have 
to seek them still if he did not enable us to hear him openly tell us in our own 
language that he intends to be our God. How could we ever-in all eternity-
thank him enough!" (A Simple Way to Pray, 1535). 
98 The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version (Nashville: Thomas Nelson 
Publishers, 1989). Luther cites this passage in WA 15, (54) 69-78, LW 43:96-102 
(A Christian Letter of Consolation to the People of Miltenberg Instructing Them 
on the Basis of Psaim 120: How to Avenge Themselves on Their Enemies, 1524). 
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99 LW 31:367 (The Freedom of a Christian, 1520). 
100 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death (trans. David Wills; Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 111 culls this reading from Charles Baudelaire, 
"The Pagan School," in Lois Boe Hyslop and Prancis E. Hyslop,.Jr., eds and trans., 
Baudelaire as Literary Critic (Universiry Park: Pennsylvania State Dniversity Press, 
1964), 74-77 Derrida argues that the act of doing good is a gift to someone that 
usually comes at a greal cost to us, the greatest of which would be to die for 
others. Derrida's clever yet slight reference to the Christian teaching of God 
suffering a death to save humanity (p. 40-50) is eclipsed by his discussion of .Jan 
Patoeka's distillation of religion as responsibility and Nietzsche's Genealogy of 
Morals as "the long history of the origin of responsibiliry (Verantwortlicbkeif)" (p. 
112). \Vhilc religion needs to sustain its conversation with its secular critics, and 
vice versa, identifying the essence of religion to be responsibility results from 
drawing a sizeable portion of religious dross from their theological predecessors. 
101 Gerald Strauss, Luther's House of Learning: Indoctrination of the Young 
in the German Reformation (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1978),307, in Hendrix, Recultivating the Vineyard, 149 This sentiment, 
particularly indicative of the reductionistic element in Strauss' work, also reflects 
a morally solipsistic thought on Christianiry in general. It calls to mind Nietzsche's 
madman who announces the death of Godin The Gay Science, no. 125 (1882) and 
his haunting queries, '''Whither is God?' he cried. 'I shall tell you. We have killed 
him - YOLi and I. All of us are his murderers How shall we, the murderers of all 
murderers, comfort ourselves?'" Nietzsche devoted the lingering years of his rational 
life to the answer that humanity must take the matters of forgiveness and atonement 
into its own hands. So too with our consolation, at the end of the day it can be 
found by our own hand, "The thought of suicide is a strong means of comfort: it 
helps us get through many an evil night." Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and 
Evil (ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann; trans. Judith Norman; Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Philosophy; Cambridge, UK.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 70, 
§157 
102 LW 24:42 (comments on John 14:7). 
103 Mennecke-Hauslein, Luthers Trostbriefe, 274, emphasizes this aspect of 
Luther's consolatory style, "Viclmehr betont er immer wieder seinen Willen, sich 
urn den Cons oland us Zu bemtihen, sein Bestes :tu geben und alle seine Kiinste 
sprachlichen Oberredens und Oberzeugens, des Aufmunterns und Erheiterns, kurz, 
seine rhetorica consolatrix einzusetzen" ("Rather he stresses repeatedly that it is 
his will to exert himself for the one being consoled, to give his best and to use all 
his speaking skills in persuading and consoling, in encouraging and cheering up, in 
short, his rhetoric of consolation"). 
104 Karl Barth, Ethics (trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley; l\;ew York: The Seabury 
Press, 1981), 84. 
105 Thomas it Kempis, The Imitation of Christ: A New Reading of the 1441 
Latin Autograph Manuscript by William C. Creasy Uvlacon, Georgia: Mercer 
University Press, 1989), 73. 
106 LW 33:137 (explicating Ezek. 18:23, 32 in The Bondage of the Will, 
1525). 
10, Pascal, OeLlvres Completes, 1132, §175, "little things console us, because 
little things afflict us." 
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W CREIGHTON MARLOWE 
The Wicked Wealtf?y in Isazah 53:9 
The meaning and pointing of'" ti)l7 in Isa 53:9 (usually rendered "rich") 
remain controversial subjects and need resolution because of the importance 
of this verse and chapter in the history of Old Testament (OT) messianic 
interpretation.' One approach has been to emend it to "evil-doers" 
(l7, "tDl7).2 Others leave the text as it stands in the MT, believing the text 
anticipates or predicts the burial of Jesus in the tomb of the rich Joseph of 
Arimathea.3 The fact that "rich" is a tri-consonantal reversal of its parallel 
term "wicked" (1" ti)l7 110" l7ti),) has been noticed by a few commentators. 
But since "rich" is not a normal parallel for "wicked," they conclude 
emendation is the best solution. Most, however, do not mention this 
literary feature or see it as exegetically significant. 
This article will argue that emendation is not required because "rich" can 
provide a proper synonymous and semantic parallel to "wicked" in this text 
and within its OT context.4 These "rich" are the "wicked rich." While 
rejecting the MT reading as the Hebrew word for "rich," some in principle 
have agreed by proposing a sense like "rabble" based on an Arabic cognate. 
What follows will establish that Isa 53:9 is not a prophecy applicable to the 
wealthy Joseph in whose tomb Jesus was buried. A contribution to scholarly 
debate on this matter is made, not by discovery of the interplay of common 
letters for "wicked" and "rich," but by demonstrating that this play on words 
is an intentional use of the word "rich" because it offers this pun and provides 
a suitable synonymous parallel to the "wicked ones" of the preceding poetic 
line. These "rich ones" in the OT cultural climate also would have been 
considered disreputable people. This study hopes to answer the challenge 
posed by Watts in his commentary on Isaiah: "With a rich one remains 
unexplained. The phrase has been applied to Jesus but it is difficult to 
find the meaning in its original setting."s Further it will challenge the answer 
given by Young's commentary: "There is no need to assume that '''ti)l7 
necessarily connotes rich men who are evil."6 Isaiah 53:9a (the first of two bi-
cola in v. 9) will be shown to be a synonymous and symmetric parallelism: 
a-b-c / / [a']-b' -c' with a 3:2 word-count meter. The translation of this text 
that will be defended is: 
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A B C 
And-it-was-assigned with-the-wicked his-grave // 
[A'] B' C' 
[And-it-was-allocated] with-the-wealthy [oppressors] his-death. 
Survey of Modern Interpretations/Translations of Isaiah 53:9a 
The issues that divide interpreters and translators ofIsaiah 53:9a are evident 
when versions and commentaries are compared. Many leave interpretation 
open to the reader while others are minimally or highly interpretive, but rarely 
is l' V!) rendered other than "rich."7 Others also have accepted that "[the] 
rich [ones]" is a repetition of" [the] wicked ones" in Isa 53:9a. While concluding 
that "'rich' is not a natural [parallel] to 'wicked'," North makes reference to 
Nyberg's work in 1942 which insists that these terms are synonymous and 
uses the OT prophets' denunciations of the rich as proof.8 What follows will 
pick up where Nyberg left off and provide similar and additional, yet hopefully 
more convincing, support for the synonymous parallel of "rich" and ''wicked'' 
in Isa 53:9a. What is new is the conviction that the author purposefully 
employed l' V!) to symbolize the "wicked" (!)V1), using this reversal of 
letters as a literary device to enable his readers to make the interchangeable 
connection between the wicked and the "wicked wealthy." Childs rejects this 
approach by saying that a link between the burial of the rich and wicked 
"hardly offers a natural parallel within Israel."9 This is true in terms of the 
burial customs for each class of citizens, but the concern of the text ofIsaiah 
53:9 is with the fact that the Servant undeservedly was treated like a criminal 
(which concept is identified as those who are "wicked" / / "rich',). Even 
Childs helps on this point by noting that this juxtaposition (wicked / / rich) 
continues the typology of the Servant as the righteous and innocent sufferer 
of the Psalter.!O Others, in line with Nyberg, as Childs points out, allow for 
"rich" to have, within its semantic range, the sense "rich through extortion."!! 
Exegesis of "Rich" in Isaiah 53:9a 
The main controversy that surrounds Isa 53:9ai (11:Jp t1' !)tD"n..,~ 1 r1',) 
is the meaning of the opening verb based on the root1r1j ("give"; "place"). 
Regardless of how this is resolved, it has little or no bearing on whether 
1'V!) in 9aii means "a rich one" or "the rich ([oppressive] ones)."!2 
The phrase "r1~:J 1'[I!)-r1~' (53:9aii) is the great challenge for the 
exegete of this verse. Who is this rich one or rich ones? Why the plural 
expression "in his deaths"? Is the initial wawantithetical? Since the verse 
begins with a wcaryiqto! (preterite, past-tense) verb, and not a W -qata! (so-called 
prophetic perfect), why do some say this text prophesies the death and/or 
burial of this servant with a rich man?13 Is he Israel or an individual? Was he 
associated in death with the wealthy and wicked (synthetic parallel) or just the 
wicked (synonymous parallel) or, contrary to expectation, with the rich 
(antithetic parallelism)? Our concern is with the meaning of this clause in its 
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immediate literary, linguistic, and living contexts. Notably the NT does not 
use this text (Isa 53:9a) as one fulfilled by Jesus.14 The term l' tbll ( ("rich") 
is singular; but is it a collective (plural) or numerical (singular) single form in 
function?15 The LXX uses plural forms for both "wicked" and "wealthy." 
The poetics ofIsaiah 53:9a are arguably those of a synonymous parallelism. 
The verb of 53:9ai must be supplied for 53:9aii and the final terms mirror 
each other ("his grave" and "in his deaths," which latter is often emended to 
"in his tomb"). All this warrants that the remaining and medial terms 
(adjectives) of 53:9ai and aii be viewed as mirror images.16 Since "[the] wicked 
[ones]" is plural "rich" can be interpreted as a collective singular, i.e. "[the] 
rich [ones]." Futther, since the context is about the intentional andlor actual 
mistreatment of a righteous one as if unrighteous, the mention of the 
"shearers" in 53:7 shows that the author is focused on the oppressors (cf. vv. 
7a and Sa) of this "lamb" (cf. vv. 6-7). Such undeserved association with evil 
oppressors is the concern ofIsaiah 53:9. As a result the initial waw of 53:9aii 
may be taken as pleonastic (stylistic and un-translated) or explicative ("even") 
rather than adversative ("but"; e.g., N ASB uses "yet"). 
The Poetry and Poetics of Isaiah 53:9a 
The Hebrew consonantal text of Isaiah 53:9a may be schematized as 
follows (d. the MT major disjunctive accents): 
~ ~ ~ c b a 
i'r11,j:l1'rD!n'~1 [1r1'] (9aii) I I 11:lp tl'llrD1-r1~ 1r1'1 (9ai) 
It forms one line of a synonymous, incomplete bi-colon with a 3:2 
word-stress meter.17 As the mechanical layout of 53:9a above shows, 9aii 
is a mirror image of 9ai. Most telling is the fact that the words for 
"wicked" and "rich" share the same basic consonants but in reverse order, 
producing a kind of alliteration and assonance: +.i) / / tl+' +ll+tv+ 1 
1+' + tv (reM 'fm II 'asfr). This has been recognized previously by scholars. IS But 
the main contention here is that this phonetic and morphological similarity 
was a pun intended to clarify that these "rich ones" are related to the "wicked 
ones." These are the wicked rich or wealthy oppressors. For those who 
interpret this oppressed servant messianically and individually, he would be 
treated like a criminal in his death and burial. He would be "assigned" by evil 
design a place with the dregs of society although he did not deserve it. This 
was the intention of the oppressors, regardless of what kind of tomb he 
actually received. Por those who interpret this suffering servant as Israel 
(typologically messianic to some), the nation was unjustly treated as one 
deserving a dishonorable death or burial. This suffering servant, though not 
guilty of violence or verbal abuse (v. 9b, or if synonymous, only verbal 
violence), has a criminal's tribute and tomb planned for him. This proposed 
synonymy of "wicked" and "wealthy oppressors" is further strengthened by 
the fact that other approaches to explain contextually this term (1'tbll) are: 
(1) to emend to.i)1 ' tvll "doers of evil"; or (2) to defer to an Arabic cognate 
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(thus Hebrew homograph) meaning "refuse [noun]" or "rabble"; or (3) to 
emend to "demons" (tl'1,VttJ)Y It should be noted that no textual data 
exist to support these or any other proposed emendations. We are left, 
therefore, to do the best we can exegetically with the text as it stands. 
A major exegetical issue for many commentators is the plural form of the 
fInal term of 9aii "in his deaths" (l'r1tlJ).20 The point of the various 
proposals is that this may have referred to a burial place or tomb built at a 
religious site.21 An argument that tries to support the plural Mf form "deaths" 
as original says that it refers to the nation ofIsrael rather than an individual, 
or it is a plural collective to parallel the singular collective in the synonymous 
colon.22 "Tomb" is a more exact parallel with "grave" but "death" does not 
remove the synonymous nature of these two cola in Isaiah 53:9a. Whatever 
the conclusion ("death" or "tomb',), the evidence for the meaning of "rich" 
(1' ttl,V) presented so far is not affected one way or the other. 
Some suggest that the interpretation of the preposition (~,V) that begins 
the bi-colon immediately following (Isa 53:9b) does tip the scales one way or 
the other as regards the subject ofIsaiah 53:9a. Oswalt, for example, notes 
that antithetical parallelism (thus adversative waw) for Isa 53:9a could be 
supported bya causal use of''v in 53:9b; that is, that the original plans were 
thwarted due to the servant's righteousness.23 But since synonymous 
parallelism is so likely in 53:9a, the preposition beginning the bi-colon of 
53:9b must be taken as concessive "although," which is a rare but possible 
use of ~,V 24 However, regardless of whether one says "because he did no 
violence" or "although he did no violence," the arguments for the 
synonymous nature of Isaiah 53:9a stand. 
The Wicked and Wealthy in the OT 
The author of Isaiah 53 could expect his audience to relate to his parallel 
of "rich" and ''wicked'' and play on the shared root consonants because in 
their world of religious thought the "rich" were often considered disreputable. 
A number of OT passages support this,2s as well as the collective use of 
singulars like "rich."26 In the Book ofIsaiah l' ttl,V is a hapax legomenon.27 It 
is found twenty-two other times in the OT.28 Little is said of riches in Isaiah, 
when other words rendered "rich" are investigated. Mainly, riches are the 
spoils of the nations and salvation that God's people will receive 
eschatologically (Isa 25:6; 30:23; 33:6; 45:3; 60:5, 11; 61:6; 66:12). InIsa 10:3 
wealth is left behind when disaster strikes. North notes that Nyberg insists 
the words "rich" and "wicked" in Isa 53:9a are synonymous and quotes the 
prophets' denunciations of the wealthy. In addition he quotes a Targum as 
identifying these "rich" as "rich in possessions they have obtained by 
violence."29 The translation "a rich man" is viewed as pedantic since the 
singular Hebrew form (1'ttl,V) is a collective (plural) in function.3o 
Synonymous Parallelism ofIsaiah 53:9b 
The bi-colon in 53:9b does not have to be synonymous in order for the 
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one in 53:9a to be synonymous, but then the likelihood that 53:9a is 
synonymous is strengthened. Most have taken 53:9b as synthetic but an 
argument can and will be made that it is synonymous. The following will 
show that this second bi-colon of 53:9 is synonymous: he did no violence 
[with his mouth]!! that is, no deceit [was] in his speech. 
The structure and poetry of this verse is suggestive of its synonymy: 
[D] C B A 
[with his mouth] he-did no-wrong Although 
Q'!J:J] iitO.lJ tl~n-~~ '.lJ 
D [C] B'2B'! [A] 
with-his-mouth [he-did] and-no deceit [Although] 
, '!J:J [i1to.lJ] i1rJ'~ ~" ['.lJj 
This results in a line of synonymous bi-colon, with the pattern a-b-c-[d]!! 
[aJ-b1-b2 - [c]-d, and a 3:3 word-stress meter. The wawbeginning the second 
half of this parallelism is to be understood not as co-ordinative ("also") but 
as pleonastic (stylistic) or explicative ("even") or emphatic ("especially").31 
Reverse parallelism is perhaps less rare than often imagined.32 The second 
member of the parallelism may contribute to the fIrst, whereas most often it 
happens the other way around. Not only poetically is synonymy supported 
but also lexically and contextually. The word often rendered "violence" (tIrJn) 
can just mean "wrong [especially 'as a false witnessl" 33 In context 53:9b is 
a flashback to v. 7, where the servant's mouth is first mentioned for its virtue: 
"He was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he did not open his mouth; like 
a lamb that is led to slaughter, and like a sheep that before its shearers is 
silent, so he did not open his mouth" (NRSV). The emphasis in context is 
on the lack of speech-related sins. He refused to be abusively defensive or to 
lash out verbally in revenge or anger at those who abused him. Isaiah 53:9b, 
then, may be read not as the servant's avoidance of physical and verbal 
retaliation but as only the latter, restated as reverse parallelism. The "violence" 
of Isa 53:9bi is the verbal violence of a false or hostile witness.34 A key OT 
theme is the importance of knowing how and when to speak. OT wisdom 
literature abounds in advice about speaking seldom, sensibly, and sanely.3S 
The Apostle Peter (1 Pet 2:21-24) may have reflected upon this OT spirituality 
in the light of Jesus' teachings,36 when he recalled the words ofIsa 53:9b to 
illustrate the sinless life of Christ, who stood silent before his accusers and 
went willingly and quietly to his undeserved crucifIxion. 
New Testament Use of Isaiah 53:9b 
The NT does make messianic use ofIsa 53:9b (1 Pet 2:22) while it nowhere 
employs 53:9a. Such an argument from silence does not prove the 
interpretation of "rich" as "[wicked] rich" as opposed to "rich [man]," but 
why the Apostles would have by-passed such a precise proof-text if they saw 
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a parallel between it and the rich Joseph of Arimathea is very curious. Peter, 
apparently, was more impressed with the typology of the parallel between the 
Isa 53 servant's silence than his burial, for whatever reasons. The interpretation 
being proposed merely clarifies that 53:9aii is a restatement of what is said 
about him in 53:ai (that he was treated like a criminal at the time of his death). 
Isaiah 53:9b adds that he was not deserving of such abuse; although (or 
"because") he had committed no violence or spoken deceitfully (as most 
versions have it). But as shown above this second bi-colon of 53:9 is likely 
synonymous, as is the previous one. 
Immediately before Peter cites Isa 53:9b, he says that the way Jesus suffered 
is an example to believers (2:21), and immediately following he explains how 
this example is primarily in how he managed his mouth (2:23). Part of 
l\1atthew's account of Jesus' trial explains that he gave no answer to his 
accusers and refused to reply to a single charge from Pilate, to his amazement 
(lvIatt 27:12-14). Peter does not introduce this quotation \vith a formula of 
fulfillment or of it being a pronouncement of Scripture, and makes no 
reference to the OT author or book. He does employ it contextually, however, 
in a manner that indicates he understood Isa 53:% (and presumably 9a et al.) 
as suitable for application to Jesus. But Peter's version of Isa 53:9b is more 
reflective of the Greek than Hebrew OT. Instead of "he did no violence [or 
'devised no scheme'] " of the MT, 1 Peter 2:22 has "who committed no sin" 
(cf. LXX "because he practiced no lawlessness").37 Apparently Peter wanted 
to emphasize that the Messiah Oesus) was sinless not just innocent of 
particular types of wrongdoing or harm (physical or verbal). While the LXX 
uses "because," Peter chooses to focus on this sinless character, and is not 
concerned with the connection to 53:9a. 
Conclusion 
Challenging the consensus of opinion that "rich" (1'ib.!)) in Isa 53:9aii is 
either synthetically or antithetically related to "wicked ones" (0' .!)ib1) in 
53:9ai, this examination ofIsa 53:9 has determined that the relationship is 
most likely synonymous, and that the best translation of1' iLl.!) is as a collective 
singular adjective functioning as a plural indirect object (the same as "wicked 
ones" in the previous colon): "rich [ones]." Further the common association 
of wealth and wickedness in the OT world suggests that within this 
synonymous parallelism, the full sense is "[the] wealthy [wicked]." The 
author's intention in v. 9 was to tell about the servant's undeserved suffering 
(v. 9b), wherein he was portrayed and processed as a criminal in his death and 
burial by his persecutors and prosecutors (v. 9a). The plan of these evil 
people (rich and reprobate) was to place him among the refuse of mankind 
(v. 9a), even though he had committed no violent and verbal crimes (v.9b). 
The synonymy of "wicked" and "wealthy" is strengthened by the fact that 
these two Hebrew words share the same basic consonants, but in reverse 
order. The author intended his readers to take this as a sign that "wicked" of 
tlle preceding parallel line is interhvined wid. fue "wealthy" of v. 9aii. Therefore 
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emendation ofl'ibll to "doers of evil" (1'1 't:Jll) as often resorted to, in 
spite of no textual ev.idence, is unnecessary. The content, construction, and 
context of lsa 53:9 argue for a synonymous parallelism not only in v: 9a but 
also in 9b. This depends on accepting the presence of reverse parallelism in 
both cases in addition to observing how other structures and statements in 
the immediate and more distant contexts support the synonymous nature 
of these two bi-cola. Consequently the proposal being made is that "violent" 
of v. 9bi be understood as a counterpart to "no deceit was in his mouth" of 
v. 9bii. The synonymy of Isa 53:9a is not dependent on this but is 
strengthened by it. It was demonstrated that OT thought is replete with 
concepts about the frequent wickedness that comes from wealthy and powerful 
people, the servant's (or for some the Messiah's) verbal virtue, and the 
righteousness of speaking the right words at the right time. Silence or 
economy of words is highly praised. The S/servant especially is praised for 
being quiet before his enemies and not sinning verbally. A case has been 
made for the understanding ofIsaiah 53:9 as a text that reveals that (1) the 
suffering servant would be handled by his opponents as a criminal in regard 
to his death and burial (53:9a); and (2) this treatment would be unfair and 
unjust because this servant had never sinned verbally or had never acted 
violently or retaliated verbally (53:9b). 
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sein Grab und bei einem Reichen seine Stiitte." Klaus Baltzer, Deutero-Jesaja 
(Giitersloh, GR: Giitersloher Verlagshaus, 1999), 494. Luther's text reads: "Und 
man gab ihm sein Grab bei Gottlosen und bei Ubeltiitern, als er gestorben war." 
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subject, which apparently led Torrey to translate it "appoint." See Torrey, 253, 
420. Exegetes face the urge to re-point the verb as passive ("he/it was assigned") 
or use a third plural subject ("they appointed',). Change lr1O'l wqyyittr;n either to 
It'J?l wqyyuttan or jjt;l'l wqyyitfniJ. This latter option follows IQIsa' ,m', Cf. 
Joseph Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 40-55, The Anchor Bible, vol. 19A (New York: 
Doubleday, 2002), 348. Blenkinsopp renders it "located." Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 40-
55, 345. The LXX, interestingly, has the equivalent word but uses a future tense 
and 1"-person pronoun ("and I will give"), whereas the Mr is unmistakably past 
tense and 3'd_person. Similarly the Vulgate employs the future tense but stays with 
the 3nl-person subject ("and he shall give''). Sapp has suggested that the consonantal 
text ofMr or Qumran represents a present tense imperfect 0r1" wytn "he gives" 
or ,jr1', wytnw "they give''). Sapp takes the Qumran text as a corrective on the 
Mr. DavidA. Sapp, "The LXX, lQIsa, and MrVersions of Isaiah 53," inJesusand 
the Suffiring Servant, ed. William H. Bellinger,Jr. and William R. Farmer (Harrisburg, 
PA: Trinity Press International, 1998), 190. With simple waw these could be 
interpreted, alternatively, as future tense, since the morphology would be the 
same--context making the difference. Some argue for an active form with passive 
function. E.g. Macrae alludes to examples in Gen 11:9; 48:1; Am 6:12; and Mic 
2:4. See Macrae, "With the Rich in His Death," 70. But none of these examples 
uses lr1l 
13 Of interest is the fact that only Matthew finds it necessary to speak of 
Joseph's wealth (cf. Matt 27:57-61; Mark 15:42-47; Luke 23:50-56; and John 
19:38-42). 
14 However, Peter does utilize Isaiah 53:9b (the second of the two bi-cola in v. 
9; cf. 1 Pet 2:22), which suggests a mindset among the Apostles that the entire 
verse and perhaps chapter are Christological, at least by application. Peter calls 
Christian slaves to follow Christ's example of not retaliating against those who 
ruistreat them but rather fully trust in God (cf. 1 Pet 2:18-24). Isaiah 53:9b is 
quoted as a proof-text that Christ did not retaliate verbally when insulted on the 
Cross, what Peter calls "the tree"(1 Pet 2:21-24). The text, if messianic, only-
foreshadows or foretells that the S / servant will be treated in purpose, if not in 
practice, as a criminal when dead and buried, although he comruitted no crime. 
15 This is handled in one of two ways by the versions. NRSV, KjV, NKJV, NIV, 
and JB (to name a few) all read "with the rich"; while the ASV and NASB, for 
example, have "with a rich man." The former versions take this word as a collective 
singular while the latter ones as a numerical singular. LXX and Vulgate have "and 
the rich" (respectively, Kat TOV~ TIAovaiov~ and et divitem) as well as Syriac 
('tyri and Targum ('1.0'rI.!,) 'attfre). Macrae's argument (''With the Rich in His 
Death," 70-71) that something must be added after "rich" is insightful, but this 
does not mean that "man" must be added. It is just as reasonable to add "ones." His 
point that languages like German and Hebrew often use a singular adjective like 
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rich to nlcan "rich nlan" applies equally to "rich l11el1." The definite use of anarthrous 
nouns in Greek or Hebrew is well documented. In OT poetry many nouns are 
definite without the definite article prefixed. Nothing in the Hebrew language 
indicates clearly that an anarthrous noun (as "wicked ones" in Isa 53:9ai) applies to 
a small number of people while if definite it wuuld mean "a large group." The 
surrounding context defines this wicked group as more than a few. 
16 Cf. John )J. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40-66, NICOT, cd. R. K. 
Harrison and R. L. Hubbard, J r. (G rand Rapids: Wm. H. herdmans Publishing Co., 
1998), 397 Oswalt urges that the text must not be made to say more than it does 
by forcing an antithetical parallelism onto a text that structurally is clearly 
synonymous. Delitzsch (rraiah, II: 326-29) argues in much linguistic detail for the 
traditional "rich," also compelled by the presupposition of Jesus' fulfillment of 
the verse. Disagreement with Dc1itzsch is not on a linguistic and lexical basis but 
a poetical and hermeneutical one. He is bothered by Luther's marginal gloss "a rich 
man who sets all his heart upon riches, i.e. a wicked man" (p. 327), the very view 
this article supports. Delitzsch wrote when conservative scholars had fewer 
hermeneutical options than today, especially with our expanded understanding of 
how the NT uses the OT in light of tirst-century Jewish exegesis. But as will be 
sho\vn, the understanding of "rich"as synonymous v .. rith '"'v.~ickcd" does not remove 
a valid messianic application to Jesus, it just restricts the fulfillment to his being 
treated like a criminal rather than that plus being buried in a rich man's tomb. The 
translation of i'iblJ in lsa 53:9aii is properly "rich" as Delitzsch and others 
demonstrate. Its interpretation or application in the context of I sa 53, the poetry 
of v. 9, and biblical prophecy is that of "[the wicked] wealthy." "Rich" here 
parallels "wicked ones" so is a figurative way to restate the latter (which is the first 
group named in Tsa 53:9ai, followed by its counterpart "rich lones]" in 53:9aii). 
Word meanings (usages) are principally governed by context and in poetry to 
parallelism. Authors arc not restricted to common lexical options especially when 
writing poetically. 
17 The word order (explicit or implicit) for each member of the parallel line is 
verb + indirect, adjectival object + direct object (V IS + TO + DO). Poetic 
analysis of OT Hebrew continues to be controversial and subject to various 
systems and nomenciature. Whatever scheme or terminology is employed, the 
synonymous nature of this passage (I sa 53:9a and/ or 9b) is made plausible if not 
probable by issues of context and structural and literary features that do not 
change regardless of how the poetics are labeled or counted. Por Isaiah in particular 
see Robert H. O'Connell, Cot/cent,icity ami ContinNity. The Literary StructNre of Isaiab 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994. For surveys of theories of OT poetic 
techniques see among many other valuable or classic books and articies, \Xiilfred G. 
E. Watson, Cla.fIical Hehreu! Poetry, .JSOTS Supplement Series (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 2nJ edition, 1986); James I" Kugel, The Idea of Biblical Poetry: 
Paralle/ism and Its History (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Robert 
;\Iter, The Art of Biblica! Poetry (New York: Basic Books, 1985); Robert Lowth, 
Leelttre.f on the Sacred Poelry 0/ the HebreJPJ, trans!' G. Gregory, 2 vols. (New York: 
Garland, 1971 reprint of 1787 ed.); and T". A. Schi)kcl, A A1artual 0/ HehrelJ) Poetics 
(Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1988). 
18 See, e.g., North, The Second Isaiab, 231, who notes the alliteration; Baltzer, 
Deuterojesaja, 527, who points out the reversal of the consonants lJibi r-.r-' and 
it:JlJ '-.I~r was previously observed by Gesenius. )Jorth makes no more out of this 
than to defer to an emendation to lJi 'iDlJ "those doing evil." Baltzer only 
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comments on this word-play in passing and agrees that the "rich" is somehow 
related to an "evil doer" ("Frevler"); then moves on to what he considers the most 
pressing exegetical matter for ulis verse, the plurality of "death" in 9aii. 
19 The Arabic cognate 'sr ("wicked") could suggest a I Iebrew consonantal 
homograph (liD.l.l) that is used just this one time in the OT literary corpus. 
In transmission it could have been corrupted to 1'ib.l.l (and this form is a 
hapax in Isaiah). Of course this is highly conjectural. Cf. J. A. Alexander, The 
Prophecies of Isaiah, 2 vols. in one (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing 
House, 1976 rpt. of 1953 ed.), II: 301-302; and Delitzsch, Isaiah, II: 327 
~orth (The Second Isaiah, 231) cites A. Guillaume's reference to Arabic JuOY" 
"rabble" or "refuse of mankind." Cf. A. Guillaume, "A Contribution to 
Hebrew Lexicography," in Bulletin 0/ the School of Oriental and African Studies 
XVI/l (1954): 10. For the "demons"hypothesis see D. W Thomas, "A 
Consideration of Is 53 in the Light of Recent Textual and Philological Study," 
Bphetnerides Theologicae Lovanienses 44 (1968), 79-86. 
20 The entire phrase "and with a wealthy one [or 'the wealthy'] in his 
deaths" is usually deemed unintelligible, so re-punctuation is resorted to 
automatically (inQ~ bamuti) instead of1Db:J bi!motuw), since the change 
affects only the removal of one letter, d,e yod from the MT. This changes the 
meaning to "his burial mound" or "his sepulcher"(following Albright's 
proposal). Cf. Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 40-55,348 and R. N. Whybray, Isaiah 40-
66, The New Century Bible (London: Nrarshall, Morgan, & Scott, 1975), 178, 
both who cite WE Albright's 1957 essay in The High Place in Ancient Palestine, 
Volume du Congres: Strasbourg, VTSPIp 4 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957),242-58, 
and noting that this option may also be supported by 1 Qlsa" Since this 
approach preserves the consonantal text, \vith the minor exception of the 
removal of a vowel letter which may have been inserted later by the Naqdanim, 
it is arguable and plausible that here we are dealing with a lexical rather than 
transcriptional error (although accepting that the vowel points were applied 
to thc wrong word, the authoritative consonantal text remains unchanged). 
Rather than reading preposition =+ "death/s"(nitJ) + possessive 
pronominal suffix 3ms (waw), the root is iTtJ:J "back, hill, ridge, high place"> 
nltJ:J "high place(s)" or "great high place(s)."Therli suffix may be interpreted 
otherwise as feminine or abstract (Ugatitic cognate is bmt, "back"). One wonders 
why not just suggest inb:J "in his death"as better alternative, since "[d,e] 
rich [one]" is singular morphologically if not functionally. 
21 BDB wonders if "funeral mound" is the meaning in Ezek 43:7, a 
passage among a few others that Albright considered to validate nitJ:J as 
"funeral mounds" or "tombs." Cf. L. Koehler and W Baumgartner, gen. 
eds., The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, .5 vols., rev. W 
Baumgartner and J. J. Stamm et aI., trans!' M .E. J. Richardson, et al. (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1994-20(0), S.v. iTr-:J, where one meaning given is "Canaanite 
grave" (cf. Ezek 43:7; and Job 27:15 as a conjecture). Still this view is currently 
thought unlikely by some authorities. See Willcm A. VanGemeren, gen. ed., 
New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis (Grand 
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Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1996)s.v. j1r,jJ by Martin J. Selman, 
where only Isa 6:13; 53:9; and Ezek 43:7 are possible supports. 
22 CE. "Is Isaiah 53:9 refering [sic] to Jesus? .. (www.geodties.com/Athensl 
Agora (4229 (jsaiah htm)' but even if a collective plural or not, if the text is about 
the nation, the nation may be typological of and, therefore, applicable to the 
Messiah as a retrospective historical parallel (picture or anticipation or 
foreshadowing). Plural collectives are known in the Hebrew OT, e.g. the well-
known 0';; ~~ "gods" used as the proper name of the one, true God. Other uses 
are for intensity or abstraction. Plural collectives also are common in Arabic (cf. 
Paul Joiion, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, trans. and rev. T. Muraoka, Vo!' 2, Part 
Three:Syntax (Rome: Editice Pontificio Instituto Biblico, 1991),497-502. NRSV 
renders ,'r1rJJ as "tomb" following the proposal of the editors of BHS. Qumran 
reads 1nt:l1J. CE. Watts, Isaiah 34-66, 226; North, Second Isaiah, 231; Sapp, "The 
LXX, 1 QIsa, and MT Versions of Isaiah 53," 178, n. 10. Singular "death" is found 
in Greek, Syriac, and Latin OT versions, as well as by Qumran and Targums. 
23 IS4 53:9 (a or b) is not mentioned in Jooe Krasovec, Antithetic Structure in 
Biblical Hebrew Poetry, Supplements to Vetus Testamentum 35 (Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
1984). 
24 E.g. see Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40-66, 397-98. In support of 
the concessive use of the preposition ~ll, Oswalt cites Job 10:7; 16:17; and 34:6). 
The point of 53:9, for Oswalt, is to highlight the final irony of this Servant's life. 
He was not buried with the poor, who had been his faithful companions in life but 
was surrounded in death (not burial) with those who oppressed him and whose 
sins he carried (Ibid., p. 398). In this way Oswalt tries to makes sense out of the 
use of "grave" in 53:9ai and "death" in 53:9aii. 
25 Cf. 2 Sam 12:1-4;Job 27:13, cf. v. 19 (and note the word play between "rich" 
and "ruthless"[i'iDll 'syr and r'ill 'ry$l); 31:24; Psa 49:5 (6 MT); 52:9; Prov 
11:28; 18:23; 22:7, 16; 28:6, 11; Ecd 4:8; Mic 6:12 (using the same word for 
"violence" as in Isa 53:9b); Amos 4:1; et al. See Schoors, Jesuja II, 326, who also 
recognizes promised riches for those who fear Yahweh(psa 112:3; Prov 22:4). In 
the NT cf. Mat 19:23-24; Lk 6:24 (which proves the "poor" of v. 20 are the 
economically poor); 16: 19-25; 1 Tim 6: 17; J as 1 :9-11; 2:5-7; 5: 1-6. 
26 Exod 30:15;Jer 9:23 (22 M1); Ruth 3:10;Job 27:13 ("wicked man" parallels 
"ruthless ones"); Psa 37:16 ("righteous" II plural "wicked"); 49:2 (3 MT); Prov 
22:2; 28:11; Ecd 5:12 (11 M1); [ cpo Ecd 10:6 (where collective singular "fool" 
parallels plural "rich")]; possibly Ecd 10:20. 
27 Gesenius speaks of both "good" and "bad"wealth as options of meanings for 
i'ibll. The latter is the sense of "haughty" or "impious" given that riches are a 
source of pride and pride in the OT is impiety. In relation to Isa 53:9 he cites Job 
27: 19, "They go to bed with wealth, butwill do so no more; they open their eyes, 
and it is gone"(NRSV). Cf. Gesenius' Hebrew-Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament, 
trans!. Samuel P. Tregelles (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1949), 
S.v. i'ibll. DCH stilI lacks the volume containing this Hebrew term (cf. David J. 
A. Clines, gen. ed., The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, 5 vols. (Sheffield: Sheffield 
University Press, 1993-2001), hereafter DCH. Vol. 6 is forthcoming (November 
2007). 
28 Exod 30:15(where the arthrous and collective singular form appears for 
"rich" and "poor"); 2 Sam 12:1-2, 4;Jer 9:23 (22 MT); Mic 6:12; Psa 45:12 (13 
M1); 49:3; Job 27:19; Prov 10:15; 14:20; 18:11, 23; 22:2, 7, 16; 28:6, 11; Ruth 
3:10; Ece! 5:11; 10:6, 20. 
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29 North, The S ecund Isaiah, 231. 
,0 Ibid. 
NRSV, JB, and NEB have "and"; ASV, NASB, KjV, NKJV, Wv, NAB, 
-Vulgate, and LXX have "nor" Of "neither." 
" See David Noel Freedman, "\1(;'hat the Ass and the Ox Know-But the 
Scholars Don't," Bible Review 1:1 (February 19R5):42-43. 
Cf. Gen 16:5 where NIV has "wrong" (also .lob 19:7; 21:27; Prov 8:36). In 
several passages this term is used in a contexl of false speech (e.g. Exod 23;1; Deut 
19:16; Jer 51:46; Mie 6:12; Psa 27:12; 35:11). See Koehler and Baumgartner, 
Lexicon, s.v. D1Jn, where the following verses arc given for this term meaning a 
witness who does wrong or false witness: Exod 23:1; Deut 19:16; Psa 35:11. 
There is a homograph (II Dtln) that means "devise,"and this fits the context 
better, although this is speculative and not firmly fixed in Hebrew lexicography. It 
can be considered, however, as a possible solution. Cf. Koehler and Baumgartner, 
s.v. Dtln II, which compares Syriac /:tmas"to dev-ise"; and Arabic hamasa "to 
mumble"; cf. Job 21:27, " the schemes by which you would wrong [Dtln]me." 
Cf. VanGemeren, f\JIDOTT£, s.v. II Dtln, by John E. Hartley, which word is said 
to mean "think, invent" (cf. Syriac "meditate, muse, study"); the verb in Job 21:27 
is said to be related to this Syriac cognate. DCH mentions this verse and others in 
Job in relation toIIDtln, but in line with its lexical philosophy gives no etymological 
data. 
,. For 53:9bii NAB has "spoken any falsehood"; NEB "spoken no word of 
treachery"; JB "no perjury in his mouth." 
35 Cf. Job 2:9-3:1; Prov 4:24; 6:12; 13:3; 17:27;18:7; Ecd 5:2,6; 6:11; 9:17; 
10:12, 13; 1:10. 
36 Cf. Matt 6:7; 12:34, 37; 15: 11. 
37 o~ GflOpTiov OUK ETIoill(JEV cf. ihl avofl(av OUK ETIoi1]<TEv. This influenced 
the Vulgate, "he had done no iniquity"(imquitatem non fecerit). 
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A Review Essqy: The Church and Post modern Culture 
Serzes 
Who's Afraid of Postmodernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault 
to Church 
James K.A. Smith 
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic 
2006, 156 pp. soft cover, $17.99 
What Would Jesus Deconstruct? The Good News of Postmodernism 
for the Church 
JohnD. Caputo 
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic 
2007, 160 pp. softcover, $19.99 
GloboChrist: The Great Commission Takes a Postmodern Turn 
Carl Raschke 
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic 
2008, 175 pp. softcover, $17.99 
Baker Academic, under the direction of James K.A. Smith, is partway 
through publishing The Church and Postmodern Culture series. The series, with 
three of an anticipated seven books published, aims to capitalize on the 
opportunity that postmodernity (the cultural phenomenon) provides to 
rethink church comprehensively utilizing postmodernism (the philosophical 
movement). Pastors, specialists, lay members are all welcome to read and 
explore where continental philosophy meets the church. The books are offered, 
Smith says, "as French lessons for the church." This review essay examines 
the fIrst three books of the series, Who'sAfraid of Postmodernism? What Would 
Jesus Deconstruct?, and GloboChrist, offering overall thematic strengths and 
weaknesses of the series. 
Who's Afraid of Postmodernism? 
James Smith's Who! Afraid of Postmodernism? kicks the series off by 
considering postmodernism's most recognized mottos: "There is nothing 
outside the text;" "Postmodernism is incredulity toward metanarratives;" 
and "Power is knowledge." Smith begins with Derrida's claim that "there is 
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nothing outside the text," which he reads as saying there is nothing that is 
not interpreted via language (39). A consequent practice of deconstruction, 
then, allows the church to break up the world as it is interpreted by 
contemporary culture (57-58). Smith sees in modernity a danger for lone-
ranger Christianity, and Derrida's belief that all interpretation is community 
governed is a welcome practice for the church as she seeks the guidance of the 
Spirit (58). 
N ext Smith urges his readers to see Lyotard's claim that postmodernism 
is incredulity toward metanarratives as a deep skepticism, not toward the scope 
of stories, but toward the legitimation of stories by appeal to universal reason 
available to any smart and virtuous individual (67-68). Postmodernism's 
belief that all narratives are culturally and temporally conditioned does not 
negate whether or not something is true, only the certainty with which it is 
known. If all knowledge is narratively based, then Christianity can boldly 
proclaim its cultural, temporal, and universal story without appealing to 
something beyond it (70-71). Not only can the church preach in humility and 
confidence, but the church must do so. 
Third, Smith defends Foucault's claim that "power is knowledge" as the 
belief that communities form truth claims based on the structures already 
found therein. Knowledge is never neutral. Now, one can read Foucault as a 
Nietzschean-power is neither good nor bad--describingpower's role in culture, 
or as an Enlightenment liberal-power is bad and please take your hands of 
my individual autonomy-prescribing roadmaps for a better society (96-97). 
Smith reads Foucault as the latter, but defends power, and the role it plays in 
formation by institutions. Smith's critique of one flavor of the emerging 
church-denominations shouldn't tell us how to run our churches and 
churches shouldn't tell people how to run their lives!-results in a defense of 
formation through discipline. If Foucault is right, Smith says that it's not a 
matter of whether or not there will be power, discipline, and formation, but 
who will do it and what direction it will go. The answer to a culture forming 
sexualized, publicized, and electronically networked people is not no 
formation, but formation with the proper telos in focus-Jesus (106-7). 
All of this gathers the role of the church as a confessional community, 
relying not on universal reason, but revelation; preaching Christ rather than 
demonstrating the faith's correlation to absolute truth. Smith is more 
concerned that the church put forth something worth adjudicating than who 
gets to adjudicate. ''We confess knowledge without certainty and truth without 
objectivity" (121). Though postmodernity has not completely supplanted 
modernity, it haunts it. We like penicillin and anesthesia but we are keenly 
aware that, as Stanley Hauerwas has said, we won't make it out of life alive. 
Faced with a postmodern culture preoccupied with death, individualism, and 
skepticism, Smith says we preach, practice, and perform the story of Jesus. 
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w:hat Would Jesus Deconsttuct? 
Next, John Caputo seeks to show how deconstruction can help save the 
church as an institution by reflecting on the four words of the book's title, 
What Would Jesus Deconstruct? Caputo argues that the "bite" of the would must 
be felt by those who first ask the question (24). What wouldJ esus do? Certainly 
not capitalize on the profitability of such a slogan! Caputo urges that we keep 
this question open refusing to give quick answers because while deconstruction 
does not deny that there is a path, or way, to God, it does believe that the path 
is covered by many footprints (38). This is the "plain sense of the plurality of 
things" (41). Caputo illustrates this with the French word pas, which can 
mean either 'step' or 'not.' Deconstruction answers the question "What is the 
beyond?" with "Pas." But does this mean a step or nothing? Precisely: the 
"step/not beyond" (42-46). This is the path walked by deconstruction. 
Caputo clarifies this step/not by distinguishing between events and names. 
Events have happened and are still happening. They are vocative-but though 
they call to us and we call to them, they are beyond our reach. Names, on the 
other hand, are existential. They are the natural order of real things (58-59). 
!This is not a defense of realism. Caputo affirms with Derrida that what is 
beyond, the step/not, is beyond real; it is "hyper-real" (39).] Names must 
always be deconstructed in order to hear and continue striving for the event. 
For example, what passes under the name democracy must always be 
deconstructed so that the event of democracy is always pursued (61). True 
democracy, along with gifts, hospitality, justice, forgiveness, and love, is 
impossible. Our names for these events are never the events themselves and 
must always be deconstructed and in this deconstruction we see their 
impossibility and thereby practice them as expressions, but only expressions, 
of the impossible. Relentlessly pursuing these impossibilities is a type of 
"madness" for the Kingdom that is the uniqueness of Jesus (86-87). He 
pursues these things and his Kingdom is just such an impossibility. 
So, what would Jesus deconstruct? Caputo highlights Christianity's (mainly 
in the form of the Religious Right's) approach to war, abortion, and 
homosexuality. What is good is impossible because, for example, justice calls 
to us and our name for justice is simply a lesser evil. One might need to resort 
to war at times, but while it is justified, it is never just (101). Likewise, while 
Caputo is against abortion, he admits that it might be the lesser evil (115). 
Caputo seems less complicated regarding homosexuality, however. Quite 
simply, the Greeks were right and the Christian/Jewish tradition was wrong 
(109). While we have no reason to think Jesus would have taught differently 
from Judaism (108), his gospel oflove would today find love in homosexual 
relationships (109). 
Caputo finishes by examining two churches in light of his apology for a 
deconstruction of Christianity. These churches struggle to live out the 
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Kingdom of God in their contexts while it is impossible. The good news is 
that by deconstructing Christianity the church can continue living into the 
impossibility of the Kingdom of God (137-38). With this summary in 
place, let's turn to a critique. 
Caputo's ability to communicate complex subjects with humor is 
undeniable. He is a gifted philosopher. However, several problems are equally 
evident. First, Caputo urges that the impossibility of knowing the path to 
God makes one's tentative steps possible as steps of faith. While some worry 
that this path leads nowhere, Caputo is quite right to say that deconstruction 
does not lead to nihilism. Even though one never knows where it will lead, 
it will lead somewhere. Now, this may be an appropriate approach for one 
exploring the Christian faith or Islam or Judaism, but it is not appropriate for 
one determined to follow the way of Jesus. When Jesus announces that he is the 
way, he is the deconstructor of all paths but his alone. While deconstruction 
can still apply to all attempts to follow this Jesus, the resurrected Jesus is not 
tentative in where he is leading. He is leading to the Father. He calls people to 
repent and follow. The One whom Jesus reveals is one with Jesus. If you 
have seen Jesus, you have seen the Father. The step/not beyond has taken flesh 
in Jesus. 
Second, Caputo falls into the Enlightenment camp through his defense 
of homosexuality and his critique of Scripture. Caputo grounds his defense 
of homosexuality by "invoking the spirit of a certain Jesus" and "the basis 
of critical reasoning" (109). But whose critical reasoning? And which Jesus? 
Certainly not the historical Jewish Messiah nor the critical reasoning of the 
majority of Christians. Because Caputo is not making an appeal from the 
Christian tradition, but an appeal to common sense (available to all?), he is 
continuing the Enlightenment project. We should all agree on homosexuality 
once we've reasoned well enough, right? From here, Caputo rightly assumes 
that people will wonder exactly what status he believes of Scripture when he 
believes homosexual love should be accepted by Christians, even though 
Scripture teaches against it. He answers by saying that he is not an "idolater" 
(110). Whatever status one affords Scripture, one cannot put a book before 
God who is wholly other. But if Caputo rejects aspects of the Bible and the 
broad tradition of followers of the God whom he claims to worship, can 
Caputo be worshiping this same God? And if he rejects aspects of the 
biblical teaching, then from where does Caputo's understanding of God 
come? This seems a Christian religion without the bounds of Scripture and 
within the bounds of Caputo's reason. 
Perhaps ifDerrida could say that he rightly passed for an atheist, then one 
can read Caputo and say he rightly passes for a Christian. Caputo is devoted 
to the church and follows (his interpretation of) the way of Jesus. But one 
still wonders: Who does Caputo believe Jesus to be? Could this Jesus, right 
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now, deconstruct Christianity personally or would it simply be the memory of 
Jesus that deconstructs Christianity? Caputo wants to live out the teaching of 
Jesus with habits that Jesus would recognize today (112), but why doesn't 
Caputo think that this is exacdywhat the Religious Right, Caputo's favorite 
target, is doing? 
GloboChrist 
Carl Raschke's GloboChristis a most appropriate third installment of the 
series. Raschke's call for radical Christians to take their love to the world nicely 
follows Smith's desire for a confessional witness of the Christian faith. This 
love must be as radical as the devotion of radical Muslims and reflect the 
radical difference between these religions. As Raschke says, the "differences 
make the difference" (115). Raschke's work is also a strong counterpoint to 
Caputo's work because Raschke is devoted to Jesus of Nazareth crucified, 
resurrected, and, most ilnportand y, coming again. 
Christ Jesus is becoming the GloboChrist. Contrary to the religious critics 
of the death of God movement, secularism has not moved the world over. 
Rather, religion is making a comeback. Controversially, Raschke believes that 
mass communication, globalization, religious and political upheaval is not 
something Christ is working against, but a way he is showing his relational 
power. "Christ is showing his power not just among the nations but also for 
the nations" (19). Yet religion has not taken this ally in its propagation 
neutrally. While it utilizes globalization, religion also battles against 
globalization because of its secular flavor. As a result, the clash of civilizations 
is not between religions, as Samuel Huntington believed, but between the 
religious and the secular. With the upsurge of Christianity and Islamism, 
religion is winning (32). That said, the clash will inevitably come between 
these distinct religions and their radically different eschatologies (139). 
GloboChrist is Raschke's critique of the West's anemic versions of Christian 
faith and his brave challenge that Christians become radical, relational, 
revelatory, and rhizomic in order to fight Islam as we watch and wait for the 
ICingdom of God in the return of Jesus. This is the Globopomo moment. 
Let's focus on Raschke's two most important contributions. Pirst, Raschke 
moves beyond deconstruction to the semiotic project of Gilles Deleuze. 
Deleuze uses the notion of the rhizome to illustrate the relation between 
ideas. A rhizome is a subterraneous root structure that grows horizontally 
that sends up shoots periodically. In applying this to Christianity, Raschke 
says that globopomo mission must recognize that there is no pure gospel, 
but only one that is contextualized. Similarity between expressions of the 
faith, then, is not found in their being logically self-silnilar but in their having 
"rhizomic" relations (40). They are related as family trees reveal relations over 
generations: something unites them, butitis often difficult to see what (41). 
PERRY: THE CHURCH AND POSTMODERN CULTURE SERlE.'; I 87 
Raschke defends this notion as a necessary outflow ofIncatnation by saying 
that the real is always relational. Christian missionaties-and yes, they are 
desperately needed-must utilize indigenous religious expressions in order 
to spread the gospel, not only for theological reasons, but because this is how 
Christianity spread so quickly in the first three centuries. 
Second, Raschke takes the Emerging Church movement head on, 
challenging those who may be tempted to think that the "new kind of 
Christian is simply an easier-to-get -along-with Christian" (160). Raschke writes, 
"Open-mindedness, nonjudgmentalism, and radical inclusivity, ate no less 
idolatrous" than "natrow-mindedness, legalism, [and] exclusivity" (159). 
Raschke's relationality is always radical. Radical relationality recognizes and 
believes religious differences, while believing one to be right and the other 
wrong, but all with a radical devotion to love the other. This is not Gianni 
Vattimo's ''weak Christianity." It is the postmodern application of mission 
by a product of the Magisterial Reformation. One almost expects Raschke to 
yell, ''To atms!", but instead Raschke queries, not disapprovingly, with the 
words of the controversial Matk Driscoll: "[I]s the 'emerging' future of the 
new evangelical Christianity .in the hands of a generation of 'whiny idealists 
getting together in small groups to complain about megachurches and the 
religious right rather than doing something' that will hasten the eschaton 
itself?" (150). One wonders how Caputo might respond! 
Reflection and Critique 
The brunt of critique in this review has fallen, perhaps unfairly, on John 
Caputo for two reasons. First, because his work supersedes the boundaties 
of what is normally associated with Baker Academic projects. Second, because 
Caputo has most thoroughly practiced one of the most important emerging 
themes of this project: Preaching. Smith urges that we communicate with 
confessional language and Raschke says that Christians must be about 
"preaching the joyful inevitability of the coming GloboChrist, the GloboChrist 
who turns back the sword of Islam. "(150). Caputo does not simply talk 
about preaching; he preaches/Thus my critique attempts to capture the true 
strength of the series: It has something to say and it demands response. It preaches 
and it stirs me to preach, but not in the way of modernity, which, I believe 
Peter Leithart has said, "thunders from the pulpit." This is Incatnational, 
relational, active preaching. It is full bodied preaching. I hope the Church and 
Post modern Culture series continues in this regard. 
On the other hand, the series is not readily accessible for as wide an audience 
as they hope. For those with eyes to read, however, it is this challenge that 
both draws Christians into the postmodern conversation and provides space 
for readers to think about their own vocations. While each book reviewed 
here flnishes with sections that focus on local churches with Smith's 
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enthusiasm for radical orthodoxy, Caputo's praise for St Malachy's and the 
"Ikon" assembly in I3elfasl, and Raschke's critique of emergent Christianity, 
the series still struggles to draw the academy and the church closer together. 
However, this shortcoming allows for ret1ective and effective practitioners to 
find their place as practical d'leologians.l do not know how Smidl and Raschke 
would fare as preachers or how Caputo would fare as pastor, but their work 
can make embolden preachers in d'leir proclamation and encourage pastors in 
their discipleship, thereby facilitating the call of more preachers, pastors, and 
professional thinkers. The series deconstmcts itself by always calling for more 
participants. 
A second critique is that the three contributors so far are all men working 
in a North American context. Would it not be better to have alternative voices 
and geographical contexts? Perhaps not. First, while these are all North 
American men, they do not always agree. Caputo roves outside the Christian 
tradition while Smiili emphasizes a confessional witness. Caputo relics heavily 
on Jacques Derrida while Raschke opts for Gilles Deleuze. Second, these men 
are working in the context for which they are writing. Perhaps the people who 
need to read this series arc best served listening to others in their context who 
ably provide resources to begin critiquing that this is (and is expected to be for 
future contributions) a "guys only" group. Perhaps we could see that the 
current (and expected) contributors aim to deconstruct the series itself by 
making it clear that more needs to be written and read and practiced. This is not 
meant to be seen as a final word because we haven't yet heard from another 
gender or the rest of the world! The series deconstmcts itself by offering a 
certain uniformity of voices. 
Conclusion 
Toward the end of the series preface, Smith asks, "\'Vhat does Paris have 
to do with Jerusalem?" The challenge T faced as I paced myself through some 
of the tough reading was "What does Paris have to do with Johnson City, 
New York?" I thought of people in my church who would hear my sermons, 
sit in our small groups, and raise money for their teens. The challenge (and it 
is a challenge) of every reader of the Chtlrc}; and Po.r/modern Ctlittlre series is to 
ask this same question in the hope that God's Spirit makes the connection 
clear and shapes our worship and witness of dle resurrected Jesus-even 
through our institutions. 
Aaron Perry is a doctoral student in biblical studies at Asbury Theological 
Seminarv in Wilmore, Kentcky. 
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WEBSTER C. MUCK 
A Revzew Essqy: The Life qf Christ 
For 75 years, from the time 1 took New Testament Survey at Wheaton 
College under Edith Torrey in the mid-30s, untill retired from teaching in 
the early 70s, no year passed without my reading a half-dozen books on the 
Life of Christ. As a matter of fact, my retirement didn't change that. A couple 
of months ago, I finished reading Walter Wangerin's The Book of God, which 
is a novel covering the entire Bible, and which devotes the last 200 pages to 
the New Testament. And I'm now waiting for Anne Rice to finish her thrce-
volume set on Christ the Lord. I've read the first two volumes and will read 
the third when it comes off the press. 
Long ago, I started classifying the lives of Christ r read. There were lives 
of Christ that were mere lists of dates and events. These lacked personality. 
There were, at the other end of the spectrum, those that were written solely 
to express disdain: I rejected these as demonstrations of spiteful malice. 
Frederick Niets"che fell into this category. His ideali:.<ing of the Superman 
was a worship of power; Jesus dared to describe himself as 'meek and lowly 
of heart,' and Nietszche flew into a cold rage at such a display. 
Closely associated with this type of presentation is that of Sigmund 
Freud, who wrote in his Future of an Illusion that any type of religion was 
infantile and unworthy. Freud's analysis renders any kind of human life 
abnormal. For example, if you are characteristically late to everything, you are 
dilatory; if you are ten minutes early for all events, you are an eager beaver; if 
you are always on time, you are compulsive. You can't win through to normalcy 
because there is no such a thing! Perhaps that was because Freud's data base 
was his own patients, of whom he used a dozen or so to set up his theories. 
The latest release of books from the Crossings book club has two 
rehearsals of the Life of Christ. One is a sorting of the gospel data into 
chronological order; the other is a coffee table book that adds art to history 
from the American Bible Society. The first, by Ed Stewart, compiler, and 
titled Jesus 365: Experiencing the Four Gospels as One Single Story is not the way 
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the church down through the ages has read the story of Christ's life. Stewart 
homogenizes the data; the people of God have savored the differences. 
Garry Wj]]s has taken a different path than Steward, a path more in line 
with the history of the church's interpretations. In his life of Christ (',YJliat tlie 
Gospels lvleant) he quotes Raymond E. Brown's rendition of the passion of 
Christ (A Crucified C:hriJt in Holy Week) where Brown deals with the demand 
that all the strands of the Gospels be woven together: 'When these different 
Passion narratives are read side by side, one should not be upset by the 
contrast or ask which view of Jesus is more correct: the Marcan Jesus, who 
plumbs the depth of abandonment only to be vindicated; the Lucan Jesus, 
who worries about others and gently dispenses forgiveness; or the J ohannine 
Jesus, who reigns victoriously from the cross in control of all that happens. 
All three arc given to us by the inspiring Spirit, and no one of them exhausts 
the meaning of Jesus. A true picture of the whole emerges only because the 
views of it are different. To choose one portrait of the crucified Jesus, in a 
manner that would exclude the other portrayals, or to harmonize all the 
Gospel portrayals into one, would deprive the cross of much of its meaning. 
It is important that some be able to see the head bowed in dejection, while 
others observe the arms outstretched in forgiveness, and still others perceive 
in the title on the cross the proclamation of a reigning ICing." And Wills 
eloquently ends his book by answering his own question: "How to read the 
Gospels? As a whole, with the reverence they derive from and address, yet 
with the intelligence God gave us to help us End him." 
I cannot read a Life of Christ rapidly. Usually, I read a book in tempo with 
its type: I skim a book until it has proved that it deserves the respect of careful 
reading. Some chapters can be exhausted by reading the first and the last 
paragraphs. With some books I read no more than the publisher's blurb, the 
introduction, and the preface; then I know it has no interest for me and I 
return it to the shelf whence I took it. But the majority of the Lives of Christ, 
even those written by authors who despised the Nazarene, I read slowly. I 
know of no other class of literature I approach in this fashion, and I have 
never bothered to ask lJJhy. 
I read each volume of the Life of Christ with a sense of the author's 
presence. That varies: I approach GK.Chesterton's Tbe E1Jeria.rtil1;:Afatlwith a 
different mind-set than I bring to Sholcm Asch's The To neither 
one am I rejecting: I simply itemize what I think they will bring to the subject-
matter and then verify my expectation. In a sense, I do that with all books, 
but I do it more intentionally with tllese books than with any other genre. 
One fact on which all the lives of Christ agree is that Jesus was born and 
lived in poverty. Anne Rice at the close of her Erst volume on the life of 
Christ (Christ the Lord: Out ofE/fypt) imagines Mary speaking to Jesus after 
his visit to the Temple when he was 12: '~'\nd now you come home with us 
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to Nazareth. Not back to the Temple. Oh, I know how much you want to 
stay at the Temple. T know: But no. The Lord in Heaven did not send you to 
the house of a teacher in the Temple or a priest in the Temple or a scribe or a 
rich Pharisee. He sent you to Joseph bar Jacob, dIe carpenter, and his betroilied, 
Mary of the Tribe of David in Nazareth. And you come home to Nazareth 
with us," 
I have never lived in poverty, so I do not know from experience what it is 
to be poor or what it is not to know when I'm going to get my next meal. I 
have read much about such things. For example, Rudyard ICipling, in his 
book on the half-Irish, half-Indian Kim, relates that Kim always wanted to be 
with his impoverished friends rather than his high-placed English 
acquaintances during the vacations. For Kim, ilie fellowship of the poor was 
vasdy superior to life among middle-class British. 
\X1hi.ch brings me to the question, What do I do with these Lives of 
Christ? They say to me: 
Love as Jesus loved; 
Intend with the mind-set Jesus used; 
Respond to oiliers as Jesus responded. 
For a while, some suggested that we use the question, WhatwouldJesus do? 
as a clearinghouse for our behavior. But Jesus lived 2000 years ago. His ideas 
of hygiene do not accord with ours. His cultural patterns clash with those of 
the 20'h century. His dress would set him apart from those who wear jeans 
and T-shirts. His sandals would be ill-suited to Minnesota snmv. 
Jesus himself left us in no doubt. Love. ''A new command I give you," he 
said [fohn 15.12]. It is the urgency and the emphasis that are new, for ilie 
form of the command goes back to the law of Moses; indeed it goes back to 
the nature of God. 
Paul called it "a far better way." His description of the way of love is 
sublime: [1 Corn 1.1.1-13] 
"IfI speak with human eloquence and angelic ecstasy but don't 
love, I'm nothing but the creaking of a rusty gate. 
"If I speak God's word \viili power, revealing all his mysteries 
and making everything plain as day, and if I have faiili that says 
to a mountain 'Jump,' and it jumps, but I don't love I'm 
nothing. 
"If I give everything I own to ilie poor and even go to the 
stake to be burned as a martyr, but T don't love, I've gotten 
nowhere. 
"So, no matter what I say, what I believe, and what I do, I'm 
bankrupt without love. 
"Love never gives up. Love cares more for others than for self. 
"Love doesn't want what it doesn't have. Love doesn't strut. 
"Love doesn't have a swelled head, doesn't force itself on 
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others, isn't always 'me first,' doesn't fly otI the handle, doesn't 
keep score of the sins of others, doesn't revel when others 
t,'Tovel. 
"Loves takes pleasure in the flowering of truth, puts up with 
anything, trusts God always, always looks for the best, never 
looks back, but keeps going to the end. 
"Love never dies. Inspired speech will be over some day; praying 
in tongues will end; understanding will reach its limit. \Ve 
know only a portion of the truth, and what we say about God 
is always incomplete. But when the Complete arrives, our 
incompletes \\Jill be canceled. 
"\Vhen I was an infant at my mother's breast, I gurgled and 
cooed like an infant. When I grew up, I left those infant ways 
for good. 
"We don't yet see things clearly. We're squinting in a fog, peering 
through a mist. But it won't be long before the weather clears 
and the sun shines bright. We'll see it all then, see it all as clearly 
as God sees us, knowing him directly just as he knows us! 
"But for right now, until that completeness, we have three 
things to do to lead us to that consummation: Trust steadily in 
God, hope unswervingly, love extravagantly. i\nd the best of 
the three is love." (Eugene Peterson's paraphrase) 
As to the intentions Jesus brought to his life, they, too, come clear in the 
majority of those who write his life. Echoing Isaiah, and rebuking the 
imperialist aims of his disciples, Jesus told them: lMatt 25.24-28] 
"You've observed how godless rulers throw their weight 
around, how quickly a little power goes to their heads. It's not 
going to be that way with YOLl. \Vhoever wants to be great 
must become a servant. \Vhoever wants to be first among you 
must be your slave. That is what the Son oLMan has done: He 
came to serve, not be served and then to give away his life 
in exchange for the many who are held in hostage." 
Jesus was under no illusions. He came to earth to die. In perhaps the 
greatest drama of all time-maybe of all eternity-he employed death to 
defeat Death. The road he took to the Cross was the road of servitude. I lis 
choice was deliberate; he knew what he was doing. I wonder: when did it 
come clear to him? Anne Rice thinks it was on his way home from the 
episode at the Temple when he was 12. Wangerin suggests that it was during 
tlle wedding feast at Cana of Galilee. I think it was when he "set his face to go 
to Jerusalem." That's the KingJames; The l'v1eJJage renders it, "When it came 
close to the time for his Ascension, he gathered up his courage and steekd 
himself for the journey to Jerusalem." 
T like the way Anne Rice sets tlle contrast: "In sum, the whole case for the 
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non-divine Jesus who stumbled into Jerusalem and somehow got crucified 
by nobody and had nothing to do with the founding of Christianity and 
would be horrified byitifhe knew about it that whole picrure which had 
floated in the liberal circles 1 frequented as an atheist for 30 years 
was not made." 
that case 
And why was it not made? "He set his face to go to Jerusalem." 1 have a 
great deal of sympathy with Thomas who reacted to this stubbornness with 
unbelieving loyalty: [John 11.16] "Come along. We might as well die with 
him." Jesus' recognition that he must die, and his determination to do so as 
Jewish scripture predicted form a watershed for those who write the story of 
his life. 
I first moved out of this unbelieving loyalty to an understanding that 
Christ went to the Cross with deliberation when I was in college. I was 
reading G. Campbell Morgan's The Crises of the Christ. When it came to the 
story of the Transfiguration, [Luke 9.28-36] the topic of the conversation 
between Jesus, Moses, and Elijah was "the decease which he should 
accomplish at Jerusalem." That's the King James Version. None of the 
modern versions captures the force ofI(jng James, which emphasizes the 
awkwardness of a man's accomplisbing his death. J was so struck by this that, 
later, I preached on it. My congregation was not enthralled by my sermon: 
several thought 1 should stick to topics that were less strange. 
At 93 years of age I view my death as imminent, but I do not consider it 
an accomplishment. It will be a nuisance, but 1 do not seek either to hasten it 
or delay it. Since 1 don't have a vote in the matter, 1 don't waste energy 
contemplating it. But Christ had a different intention about his death. In the 
passage about the good shepherd, [John 10.1-21] he says: 
"1 am the Good Shepherd. I lmow my own sheep and my 
own sheep know me. In the same way, the Father knows 
me and I know the Father. I put the sheep before myself, 
sacrificing myself if necessary. You need to know that I 
have other sheep in addition to those in this pen. I need 
to gather and bring them too. They'll also recognize my 
voice. Then it will be one flock, one shepherd. That is why 
the Father loves me: because I freely lay down my life. And 
so I am free to take it up again. Noone takes it from me. 
I lay it down of my own free will. I have the right tolay it 
down: 1 also have the right to take it up again. I received 
this authority personal1y from my Father" 
I sympathize with Jesus' disciples' confusion at such words. Nor has the 
confusion lessened a great deal over the years. For example, who are the 
"other sheep" our Lord is referring to? Are they the Muslims? Are they those 
who, not having heard, have yet believed? 
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But consider, not what he is not saying, but what he is saying: he is 
asserting his ownership: "My own sheep." I am comforted by Jesus' insistence 
that he knows his sheep and calls them by name. I do not plumb the depths 
of such knowledge. I understand why my farmer uncles and aunts forbade 
their children to name any of the animals that were destined to end up on the 
dining room table. "I couldn't eat a bite that noon," one of my cousins told 
me. "I had named that hen and she came when I called her. I cried when she 
was killed." 
Cosmically, I do not know how literally I may take the Psalmist [-1474] 
when he sings praise to the Lord who "Counts the stars and assigns each a 
name," 
But Jesus knows my name, and yours, and promises to care for us. 
'iX/hen Jesus says that he has the right to lay down his life as well as to take 
it up again, he parts company with us. \'Ve do not have such control. Nor do 
I want it. Jesus had to choose between what he wanted and what was the will 
of his Father. It was not an easy choice, and the conclusion was never foregone. 
We should never read a life of Christ and confuse the possession of "all 
power" with "being carried to the sky on flow'r)' beds of ease!" 
We come to the third use of the Life of Christ genre of literature. It is to 
respond to others as Jesus responded. This includes both loving and 
intending. It excludes, as we have seen, the accidents of how he dressed and 
conducted his manner of life. 
The essence of the Godhead is love, as John the apostle said [I John 4.17 -1 IlJ 
"God is love. When we take up permanent residence in a 
life of love, we live in God and God lives in us. TillS way, 
love has the mn of the house, becomes at home and mature 
in us so that we're free of worry on Judgment Da) -our 
standing in the world is identical with Christ's. There is no 
room in love for fear. Well-formed love banishes fear. Since 
fear is crippling, a fearful life-fear of death, fear of 
judgment-is one not yet fully forrned in love." 
When one's view of God does not put love first, that misconception 
leads to such events as the Inquisition, the Holocaust, and American slavery, 
or, indeed, any kind of slavery. The Inquisition was performed by organized 
Christianity that thought that righteousness could be achieved by punishment. 
That was the same mind-set that prompted George Bush to bomb Iraq. The 
Holocaust was Hitler's idea of ridding society of the Jews; his public relations 
justification was tllat he was doing Germany a favor. And the lunerican South 
considered that an enslaved Negro was God's notion of a proper society. 
Jesus said, of lhose who crucified him, "Father, forgive them; for they 
know not what the) do." I think IllS prayer overrode that of those who 
crucified him, who said, "Ilis death be on us and on our children." Jesus 
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promised the repentant thief, ''You will be with me in Paradise." He acted 
with total disregard to the ritual laws that would make him unclean by touching 
bleeding women, lepers, and dead bodies. 
We adopt Jesus' perspective in the parable of the Good Samaritan, that 
the sight of bleeding, damaged victims stirs compassion. Therefore we will 
join in the singing of that new song that the Apostle John foresaw in his 
vision of our Hnal society: [Rev 5.9-10] 
''You are worthy to take the scroll and open its seals, because 
you were slain and with your blood you purchased men and 
women for God from every tribe and language and people and 
nation. You have made them to be a kingdom and priests to 
serve our God, and they will reign on the earth." 
He's talking about us. 
Webster C. Muck is professor of psychology emeritus at Bethel College in 
St. Paul, Minnesota. 
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Book Notes 
Matt Tomlinson 
In God's Image: The Metaculture of Fijian Christianity 
2009 Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press 
Reviewed ry MichaelA. Rynkiewich 
Tomlinson's narrative is called ethnography in Anthropology; the description 
of the culture of a single society, with a focus dictated, in part, by the interests 
of the people being described. Fiji, as a nation, has a problem. The British 
colonizers permitted the Fijians to own their own land, but because of that, 
the Fijians saw no need to work as slaves for the British. The British then 
brought in Indians from elsewhere in the Empire to work as servants and 
labourers. Now, fifty some years after independence, the population is about 
50 percent Fijian and 50 percent Indian, or Indo-Fijian. Business belongs to 
the Indians, and the land belongs to the Fijians. The political debate has been 
punctuated by three violent coups, events unique in the Pacific Islands. 
Fiji, in a sea of islands, is intimately linked to Tonga and Samoa, a triangle 
in which Polynesian culture developed and from which it spread thousands 
of years ago. All three are predominately Christian, specifically Wesleyan/ 
Methodist, although in recent years the Mormon Church has grown with 
speed. In local, that is, district and village, settings, there is also a sense of leqa 
(pronounced leng-ga) or 'trouble' The trouble is "social disunity, which leads 
to the loss of power" (5). The conceptual structure of this trouble reveals 
itself in the analysis of discourse: past/present, lotu/ vanua, capitalism/ 
communalism, democracy/chieftaincy, Fijian/Indo-Fijian. The theme 
Tomlinson develops in the book is this: "The metacultural distinction between 
the lotu (Christianity) and the vanua (a complex domain encompassing chiefs, 
their people, land, and tradition) is a profoundly consequential one in Fiji" (6). 
Fijians consider the people of the past to have been, at once, pagans and 
powerful. That makes their spirits still dangerous, and yet their time looms 
larger than life with a unity that, regrettably, has now been lost. Christianity is 
perceived to be responsible for this loss of unity, but also to hold the 
possibility of reconstituting community. Sometimes this hope takes ethnic 
form: "to be Fijian, the claim goes, one must be indigenous and Christian" 
(7). So, a culture (linguistic domains and discourse that shapes perceptions 
and behavior) about culture (interpretations of the past and the present) has 
developed that wresdes with these dichotomies. 
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Tomlinson's concluding third section of the book deals with ways that 
the church has been involved in metacultural debates. "My goal is to understand 
the context in which riotous and destructive acts can seem to many local 
observers to be the positive acts of moral Christians" (27). Many in the 
church are exploring new ways to understand Fijian society and the place of 
the past, the Indo-Pijians, the processes of modernization, and the enduring 
chiefs in a new configuration that does not lead to the violence of the coups. 
Tomlinson tells the extended narrative of a catechist who had a dramatic 
conversion demonstrating God's power in and over the events shaping his 
life, and in particular reshaping some of the dichotomies that characterize 
Fijian metaculture. If the church caused a loss of power in the past, it may be 
the church that reconnects Fijians with power in the future. However, in an 
otherwise fine ethnography, Tomlinson fails to help the reader see how a 
personal conversion and coming into power will affect the larger narrative of 
how society should operate. A failure shared too often by the church in other 
eras in other lands. 
In the past, doing anthropological ±leldwork placed researchers in emerging 
Christian societies populated with missionaries and indigenous pastors. But, 
the anthropologist, bent on discovering what this culture was like before the 
arrival of the missionary, the administratof and the trader, saw the missionary 
as in intruder seeking to change the culture she wanted to recover. Christianity 
was in the way of solid anthropological research and that put anthropologists 
at odds with the missionary enterprise. The result was ethnographies in 
which missionaries were not even present or ethnographies in which 
missionaries wefe the bad guys. 
There is now a new movement, beginning around 1990, called The 
Anthropology of Christianity. The movement reflects the postmodern turn, 
in which everyone is deconstructed (in tius case, the antl-lropological enterprise) 
and everyone has a voice (even if Christianity no longer has a privileged voice). 
Joel Robbins, who worked in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, has 
fostered the movement with his Becoming Sinners: Christianity and "'ioral Torment 
in a Papua Neu) Guinea S oriety leading a wave of young ethnographers who 
treat "local Christianities" as a given fact and, with a more neutral pose than 
their predecessors, proceed to describe the culture and society that exists in the 
present. Tomlinson's book is one of many in the series Robbins edits with 
the University of California Press: Webb Keane, Christian lvloderns: Freedom 
and Fetish in the Mission Encounter; Matthew Engelke, A Problem of Presence: 
Beyond Scripture in an African Churcb; David Smilde, Reason to Believe: Cultural 
AgemJ' in I Atin American Evangelicalism; Francio Guadeloupe, Chanting Doum 
tbe New Jerusalem: Calypso, Cbn'stianity, and Capitalism in tbe Caribbean; William 
F. Hanks, Converting Wordr: A1aya in tbe Age of tbe Cross; and Frederick I(jaits, 
Death in a Cburch of Life: lv10ral PaHion during Bof.rwana's Time of AIDS. 
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These ethnographies, and others outside the series, including two readers,' 
provide a new resource for missiology, and, at the same time, provide a 
challenge for doctoral programs in Missiology and/ or Intercultural Studies 
to do this level of research and writing. 
Michael A. Rynkiewich is professor of anthropology at Asbury Theological 
Seminary in Wilmore, Kentucky. 
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The Manuscript Journal of the Reverend Charles Wesley, M.A. Vols. 1,2 
2008. Nashville: Kingswood Books 
JohnR. Tyson 
Assist Me to Proclaim: The Life and Hymns of Charles Wesley 
2007 Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans 
Reviewed by Kenneth J. Collins 
Even though it is now more than two hundred years since the birth of 
Charles Wesley, research into his life and thought yet remains at a rudimentary 
stage. Two works that are addressing this issue, each in its own way, are The 
Manuscript Journal of the Reverend Charles Weslry and a new biography, Assist 
Me to Proclaim: The Lift and Hymns of Charles Weslry. Although the first work 
is a fine addition to the primary sources, it is not actually an autobiography of 
Charles since it does not include the entirety of his life but ends abrupdy in 
1756. The material that makes up this manuscript was found, oddly enough, 
"among some loose straw on the floor of a public warehouse in London." 
The manuscript was later purchased, along with some other materials, by 
Thomas Jackson in 1831. However, neither Jackson's edition of the Journal 
nor the subsequent attempt by Telford was complete and accurate since neither 
was able to handle properly the shorthand material that was a part of the 
original composition. Beyond this, Jackson took greater editorial liberties 
with the text than were warranted with the result that a complete and accurate 
edition of Charles Wesley's journal would have to await this twenty-first 
century effort. 
BOOK NOTES I 99 
The second work,AssistiVle to Proclaim, is indeed a birth-to-death biography 
and it is interlaced with an able discussion of Charles Wlesley's poetic genius as 
expressed in his numerous hymns. For those readers who are unfamiliar 
with "the younger brother of Methodism," the life and thought of Charles 
offers a number of contrasts to his older brother, John. To illustrate, Charles, 
as Tyson aptly points out, was a turbulent personality often moved by passions 
that John hardly or rarely felt. With his head and heart often out of sync, 
Charles at times burst onto the scene (the Grace Murray fiasco, for instance) 
and took bold and irremediable action that his hesitating brother could only 
regret. "'ioreover, these differing personalities clashed theologically in terms 
of the doctrine of Christian perfection, especially as to the manner of its 
actualization. And Charles, for his part, never shared John's antipathy for the 
rich but was far more gregarious. Indeed, John Gambold described Charles 
Wesley as a 'man made for friendship." 
As important as these differences are, the reader of Tyson's narrative is 
nevertheless struck with the numerous similarities between these brothers 
who were two of the principal leaders of the eighteenth-century evangelical 
revival. Both, for example, sought early on to be sanctified before they were 
justified; that is, they hoped to be saved by "my best endeavours to serve 
God." Both doubted at one point whether they had ever been a Christian 
demonstrating how important the Pietist notion of "real Christianity" (as 
opposed to nominal Christianity) was to them. Both viewed the willingness 
to die as an key indicator of saving faith. Both had important and memorable 
evangelical conversions to the proper Christian faith which issued in freedom 
from the guilt and power of sin. Both engaged in field preaching and confronted 
the mobs in gracious serenity. Both informed their wives that they would not 
preach one sermon less or travel one mile less in a married state than in a 
single one. And both insulted the venerable at Oxford in prophetic sermons 
that made them the pariahs of the University. To be sure, these similarities are 
not only numerous but they are also stunning. That is, Charles and John 
Wesley were not only brothers by birth they were also, in a real sense, brothers 
in the gospeL 
After his marriage to Sarah Gwynne in 1749, Charles Wesley effectively 
settled down and travelled much less. He was therefore, as Tyson puts it, 
"less amenable to his older brother's requests and demands for evangelistic 
assistance." But the key tension that emerged between the brothers as their 
careers progressed had to do with the issue of ecclesiology in general (would 
Methodism remain within the Church of England?) and with lay preachers 
in particular (Charles would Hre the lay preachers almost as fast as John would 
hire them). Tyson offers a helpful and extensive discussion of this issue and 
thereby reveals the theological trajectory of Charles that was distinctively his 
own. Overall, then, Tyson's work is a faithful guide to a complex and 
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sophisticated figure, one who deserves significant treatment in his own right 
out from under the shadow of his far more famous brother. 
Kenneth}. Collins is professor of historical theology and Wesley studies at 
Asbury Theological Seminary in Wilmore, Kentucky. 
Brian Stanley 
The World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh 1910 
Studies in the History of Christian Missions 
2009. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 
Reviewed ry Marcella Hoesl 
In anticipation of the 100th anniversary of the World Missionary 
Conference, Edinburgh 1910 this excellent book by the Director of the Center 
for the Study of Christianity in the Non-Western World, University of 
Edinburgh, is most welcome. Using mainly primary sources the author 
presents a fine panorama of people and events of the lively processes that 
took place in the eight commissions that made this Conference so important 
in church history. The book notes that the modern ecumenical movement 
began with Edinburgh 1910, even though the word "ecumenical" was 
abandoned due to differences in how "ecumenical" was understood. In that 
context, an enlightening detail is the mention of the Roman Catholic Bishop 
Bonomelli of Cremona who sent a letter of greeting to the Conference (Roman 
Catholics were not represented). The Bishop was ~ friend of Angelo Roncalli, 
who was to become John XXIII, the architect of the Second Vatican Council. 
Chapter V 'Give Us Friends!~ words taken from the address by V.S. Azariah 
(1874-1945), an Anglican clergyman from southern India, gives much food 
for thought of the major issues facing churches today, such as race, imperialism, 
inculturation, dependence on foreign aid, spirituality. (Roland Allen's classic, 
Missionary Methods, Ours or St. Paul's? (1912) readily comes to mind.) 
Chapter 10, Missionary Co-operation, gives an excellent distillation of the 
proceedings of Commission VIII, 'Co-operation and the Promotion of Unity, ' 
so vital as we await Edinburgh 2010. As the author notes: "The promotion 
of unity between Christians was a means to the end of co-operation in 
mission, rather than the other way around" (279). Briefly referred to (317 f) 
the Department of Mission at Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, England 
was a remarkable cooperative endeavor of the six major British Missionary 
Societies in Britain for many decades, and also for a number of European 
societies including several from the United States-an ecumenical story yet to 
be written. 
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Photos, footnotes at the bottom of each page, a full bibliography add to 
the readability of this book. It will serve well as a learning and teaching tool 
for church historians, missiologists, ecumenists, all persons who wish to 
understand the movement of the churches to this day, what we can learn 
from probing the past, and with hope for the future of the ecumenical 
movement. 
Marcella Hoesl is a Maryknoll Sister and the former academic dean and 
professor of systematic theology at Oblate School of Theology in San 
Antonio, Texas. 
Geordan Hanunond and David Rainey, eds. 
Wesley & Methodist Studies. Volume I 
2009. Manchester, UK- Didsbury Press 
Reviewed by HowardA. S /ryder 
This atttactive peer-reviewed journal is the fruit of the new Manchester 
Wesley Research Centte, created in 2003 at Nazarene Theological College, 
Manchester, in collaboration with several other Wesleyan-oriented institutions. 
Cliff College in England and Asbury Theological Seminary are among the 
collaborating institutions. The journal is linked as well with The Oxford 
Centre for Methodism and Church History, Oxford Brookes University. The 
coeditors are both associated with Nazarene Theological College. 
The Manchester Wesley Research Centre was created "to support research 
in the life and work of John and Charles Wesley, their contemporaries in the 
eighteenth-century Evangelical Revival, their historical and theological 
antecedents, their successors in the Wesleyan tradition, and contemporary 
scholarship in the Wesleyan and Evangelical tradition." The journal's press 
release makes the point that examining Wesleys' contemporaries means 
"proponents or opponents." 
Four of the five essays in this first annual issue are by research students at 
Nazarene Theological College or the University of Manchester. Their topics 
hint at the range of current Wesley research. John Cunningham writes on 
"PneumatologyThrough Correspondence: The Letters of John Wesley and 
John Smith' (1745-1748)." J. Russell Frazier's essay considers 'John Wesley's 
Covenantal and Dispensational View of Salvation History" --apparently part 
of his larger research on John Fletcher's doctrine of dispensations. Randall 
McElwain writes on "Biblical Language in the Hymns of Charles Wesley," 
and D. R. Wilson on "'Thou shal[t] walk with me in white': Afterlife and 
Vocation in the .Ministry of Mary Bosanquet Fletcher." 
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The lead article by Henry D. Rack, emeritus senior lecturer at Manchester 
and author of ReaJunable EnthuJiast: John Wes/!'}' and the Rife of JV[ethodism) is 
titled "1\ Man of Reason and Religion? John Wesley and the Enlightenment." 
Rack notes recent reassessments of the Enlightenment, then revisits the 
question of John Wesley's reasonableness or credulity. "Wesley was nearer 
than has often been allowed to the centre of a spectrum stretching from 
deists and sceptics at one end to claimants to divine inspiration at the other," 
Rack concludes, seconding David Hempton's assessment that \Vesley 
embodied "creative tension between enlightenment and enthusiasm." 
However Rack notes Alexander Knox's caveat that Wesley "was prone to find 
supernatural explanations where natural ones were more plausible." 
Rack summarizes Wesley's views on toleration, education, politics, social 
reform, and church order. Commenting on \Vesley's ecclesiology, Rack points 
out the paradox that in forming a voluntary society (largely) within the Church 
of England, Wesley "was unwitLingly organizing a religious body on 
ecclesiastical principles quite different from those of most existing English 
churches" and thme he himself formally espoused. 
Cunningham's essay concludes that "perceptible inspiration was the essence 
of John Wesley's economic pneumatology." For "since inspiration is 
perceptible, the nature of the Holy Spirit is self-revelatory. God seeks self-
disclosure." Cunningham sees a practical implication: "In order to be faithful 
to its namesake, Wesley studies (especially those in theology) must always be 
framed by his commitment to tlle relational nature of God's Holy Spirit." 
J. Russell Frazier examines John Wesley's understanding of history, 
particularly his use of the themes of providence, covenant, and dispensation. 
Wesley's emphasis on history was part of his case against predestination, 
providing a "cogent view of his tory against the Calvinist doctrine of decrees." 
Calvinism "seemed to bypass the significance of personal histories of 
conversions due to its emphasis on divine tlat," whereas "Wesley's theology 
authenticated salvation experiences" embedded in real history. "Wesley 
developed a theology of history which gave meaning to personal histories as 
well as the history of salvation within the world." 
In his essay McElwain says the biblical language in Charles Wesley's hymns 
was "both the natural outflow of a lifetime of biblical study and a deliberate 
effort to 'preach'" through hymnody. The article is part of a larger project 
examining Charles Wesley's biblical interpretation. 
D. R. \Vilson explores Mary Bosanquet Fletcher's fifty-year ministry in 
terms of both her spiritual journey-particularly her "belief in the afterlife 
and concern for the unconverted"-and the complex of liberties and 
restrictions facing Methodist women. Mary Pletcher's ministry included 
"establishing a religions community of women" (on Pietist precedents), 
"founding an orphanage, becoming one of the first female Methodist 
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preachers, and playing a central role in the ministry of a local Anglican parish." 
Wilson notes correctly that "N either the Established Church nor Methodism 
as a movement with the Church, offered the opportunity for women to 
[fully] pursue a call to either lay or ordained preaching." In ~lethodism, 
restrictions actually increased over time (a familiar patrern in new movements). 
The essay is adds to the growing body of research on Mary Bosanquet Fletcher 
and other early Methodist women preachers. 
The welcome appearance of Wesley & lviethodist Studies is another sign of 
the international ±lowering of Wesley studies today. Where I teach in Toronto 
half a dozen of competent younger Canadiall scholars are pursuing doctoral 
work in \1Vesley studies, and similar things are happening elsewhere. Growing 
international collaboration as represented by this journal speaks well for the 
future of Wesley studies in the new century. 
Wesley & iviethodist Studies is now accepting submissions for future 
publication. Information is available at www.mwrc.ac.uk/wesley-and-
methodist-studies / 
Howard A. Snyder is professor of Wesley studies at Tyndale Seminary in 
Toronto, Ontario. 
Can you define 
cosmoanthropecclesiology? 
a. It's what happens when you sneeze. 
b. It's the type of knot church members will use to hog-tie 
you for using the word "science" in a sermon. 
c. It's Christian confusion about how cosmology, 
anthropology and ecclesiology intersect. 
IfyouYve ever wondered how to connect 
fotth and sczence in your mtnlstryy Q3 
is the conference for you. 
You'll come away from Q3 with a renewed excitement about God's 
Word and a fresh , informed perspective on the sciences. Join us as we 
tackle three big questions at the intersection of faith and science. 
Register at asburyseminary.edu 
Early-bird: $49 per person (through Feb. 15, 2010) 
Individual: $99 per person (after Feb. 15, 2010) 
Group: $49 per person (group of 5 or more) 
Asbury Seminary students receive the early-bird rate. CEU credits are available. 
Call Ginny Proctor at 859.858 .2301 with any questions. 
Funded by a grant from the John Templeton foundation's Science for Ministry Initiative. 
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The whole Bible 
for the whole world 
Ph.D. studies at Asbury Theological Seminary 
_ .. ___ to~ 
..... Mttlittflitiltg them to 
r...Iasofoihliul ~ 
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A limited number of scholarships are available for qualified applicants. Apply today! 
